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Preface
This thesis has become a collection of papers about uncertain returns and childrens schooling
in Tanzania. This was not my intension when I embarked as a fresh Ph.D. student. However,
under the supervision of Martin Browning, I have learned one main lesson - the insight is in
the detail. He has kept me focused, asking the right questions at the right time, keeping my
motivations and spirits high. I am deeply grateful for that.
Mette Ejrnæs, my second supervisor in the last phase of the Ph.D., has been an invaluable
support, always available for questions, doubts and, not least, challanging discussions. It has
been a true joy and an amazing privilege to be a student under this team of two.
During the course of my time as a Ph.D. student I have had my base at Centre for Applied
Microeconometrics at Department of Economics at University of Copenhagen with periods
visiting and working with Xavier Gine at the Development Research Group at the World
Bank, the Economics Department at University of Essex who so kindly provided me with o¢ ce
space when needed, and at Institute for Fiscal Studies/UCL in London with the kind assistance
of Prof. Richard Blundell and Prof. Andrew Chesher. Partcipating in, and not least learning
from, these di¤erent research environments has been very productive and highly appreciated.
Finally, I would like to thank the entire group at CAM for great discussions, David Dreyer
Lassen for a long and rewarding co-authorship and friendship; Fane Groes, my o¢ ce and soul
mate, for lots of fun, co¤ee and endless discussions; Alice Klynge and Mette Lunde Christensen
for invaluable support and guidance; Bo Honoré for his suggestions and for always checking on
me when in Copenhagen; Kathleen Beegle, Joachim DeWeerdt and Rikke Nørding Christensen
for facilitating the use of Kagera data and for making our collection of the qualitative data
nancially possible with the support of the World Bank. Last, but not least, a special thank
you to my dear family, friends and most of all, to my husband, Joao Miguel Ejarque, whose
continuous support, challanging questions, love and blind belief in my abilities has made the
world of research a lot more fun.
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Introduction and Summary
Introduction
Classic human capital investment theory dictates that one should invest in education as long
as the future discounted returns of such an investment are higher then the current direct and
indirect costs. However, when it comes to primary education in developing countries, the
investment decision is taken by parents on behalf of their children. This raises a problem of
intergenerational contracts between parents and children. Parents cover the costs of investing
in education of their children, but they face uncertainty about the level and their share of the
future returns to such an investment.
Lack of primary schooling among rural children in developing countries is often attributed to
credit constraints and child labour, implying that direct and indirect costs of sending children
to school are high. Surprisingly few papers have considered the importance of the expected
returns to parents from investing in the human capital of their children. However, in most
developing countries parents rely fully on their children for old-age support and subsistence.
Uncertainty about returns to education might therefore be an equally important factor in the
human capital investment decision made by parents, as credit constraints and child labour has
proven to be, because to parents these returns constitute a good part of their pension plan.
This is the focus of this thesis.
When parents face uncertainty about the future returns to educating their children, they
invest less in schooling. In chapter one, we nd that in villages were there are stronger so-
cial norms guiding the intergenerational contract between parents and children, parents invest
more in schooling than elsewhere. They face less uncertainty about their share in the childrens
future returns to schooling. When parents face uncertainty about the level of returns to edu-
cation and when this uncertainty is uncorrelated across sectors, parents diversify their human
capital investments. Most developing countres are characterised by a traditioal agricultural
sector and more modern urban sector. Schooling tends to direct children towards future urban
employment, whereas traditional on-farm learning-by-doing will direct children towards the
agricultural sector. With such a sectoral divide in returns to education, the need for risk di-
versication can result in households keeping some of their children out of school. The nding
that returns matter for the human capital investment decision should come as no surprise. The
important contribution is that uncertainty about returns can have a strong inuence on the op-
timal human capital investment decision of parents. Rural households in developing countries
do not only diversify risk by diversifying current income sources both within the agricultural
sector and between sectors. This result is of general importance because it shows how the need
for risk diversication is fundamental and guides many aspects of life for households operating
in an environment characterised by high risk, incomplete capital markets and virtually no social
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security system.
Data from Tanzania have formed the basis for my empirical analyses. Rural Tanzania has
proven a great choice for studying schooling because due to President Nyereres socialisation
reform in the 1970s all villages have been endowed with a primary school. Access to school
has therefore not been an issue that needed special attention. Furthermore, there has been
no social unrest or ethnic conicts in Tanzania for the past decades, which generally tends to
have adverse e¤ects on schooling of children. Finally, travelling to Tanzania and working with
Tanzanians has been a true pleasure.
Summary of Chapters
This thesis consists of four chapters. The main focus of all chapters is the human capital
investment decisions parents make on behalf of their children. Each chapter is in principle self-
contained. However, chapter one, which is joint work with David Dreyer Lassen, di¤ers from
the remaining three chapters in the sense that it analyses the inuence of the local environment
through informal institutions on the seemingly privatedecision of educating your own children.
The last three chapters are all very closely related. In chapter two, I develop a simple human
capital portfolio model which, in chapter three, is extended such that it can be tested on a
cross sectional data set covering all of Tanzania. In chapter four, I use an extraordinary long
panel data set from Kagera, a predominantly rural region in Northwestern Tanzania, to analyse
households with completed fertility and completed schooling and thereby apply a more direct
test of the human capital portfolio model against the standard explanations given in the child
labour literature.
Chapter 1. Informal Institutions and Intergenerational Contracts: Evidence from
Schooling and Remittances in Rural Tanzania (joint with David Dreyer Lassen)
This paper explores the role of informal institutions in facilitating intergenerational contracts
governing investments in schooling and the payment of social security in the form of remit-
tances. Investing in schooling of children is characterized by a fundamental problem of inter-
generational contracting: parents cannot make a legal claim for return on, or even repayment
of, the investment. In some cases, this inability can make parents choose less schooling (?) and
instead rely on other modes of savings. In advanced economies, the state facilitates a political
equilibrium where the middle-aged pay for compulsory schooling in exchange for receiving tax-
nanced pensions in old-age. However, in less developed economies intergenerational contracts
are generally thought to be governed by informal institutions such as social norms. ? and
?, and many with them, point to the existence of social norms that can pressure children to
support parents in old-age in exchange for investments in schooling done by the parents, paving
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the way for investments to be made in the rst place. An impression strongly supported by
our qualitative eld data from Kagera.
The role of social norms and, more generally, informal institutions and the larger civil
society in enforcing the intergenerational contract associated with human capital investment
is, to our knowledge, largely unexplored. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework for
and an empirical investigation of the relationship between the informal social setting and the
fulllment of the intergenerational contract. The key idea of our paper is simple: Parents invest
in schooling for their children, partly with the aim of receiving a return on their investment.
The expected return on the investment depends on the probability of receiving remittances from
migrant children. If remittances are not paid, the child faces social sanctions from violating the
norm of repayment. Such sanctions are more likely to be carried out in villages characterized
by strong informal institutions. Thus, strong informal institutions increase the probability
of receiving remittances, which increases the expected return on education. This, in turn,
increases current investment in schooling.
To operationalize the role of social norms and measure the strength of informal institutions,
we make one key assumption: informal institutions guiding and enforcing the set of social norms
governing intergenerational exchange function better when a village is characterized by a higher
degree of tribal homogeneity.
We nd that village level tribal homogeneity is associated with both more schooling and,
conditional on schooling, a higher probability of receiving remittances from relatives living
elsewhere. This is consistent with the idea that informal institutions facilitate honouring the
intergenerational contract. Households living in villages with a higher degree of tribal frac-
tionalization choose less schooling for the children of the household, controlling for a wide
range of household, school, and village characteristics. We also examine several possible, and
possibly coexisting, explanations for the nding that tribal fractionalization is associated with
less schooling. To discriminate among these, which include the role of urban networks, credit
constraints, land availability and school characteristics, we rely on several additional sources
of data, including our own qualitative data from focus group interviews in Kagera villages,
collected partly for this reason. We nd strong support for the hypothesis that the inuence
of tribal fractionalization on schooling do indeed run through higher levels of remittances in
more homogenous villages with stronger informal institutions.
Chapter 2. Can Future Uncertainty Keep Children Out of School?
The most common argument for lack of primary schooling among children in developing coun-
tries is high direct and indirect costs of schooling, which cannot be overcome because households
are liquidity constrained. Indirect costs of schooling are mostly thought of as foregone earnings
associated with child labour, when children have to attend school rather than work. Although
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liquidity constraints and child labour are valid explanations for why some children are not at-
tending school, these explanations focus solely on the cost side of the investment decision and
the role of children in ex-post risk coping. It seems reasonable that households in risk prone
environments will, apart from their ex-post risk coping strategies, also consider the possibilities
of ex-ante risk diversication. In this paper, I therefore ask the following question: Can future
income uncertainty result in households keeping some of their children out of school as an
optimal ex-ante risk diversication strategy?
I hypothesise that when there is uncertainty about future income of children and when
parents rely on this income for their old-age support, diversifying the future income sources of
children becomes an important means of ex-ante risk management. In rural areas, the basis
for such a diversication is laid already in the human capital investment decision. Formal
schooling will direct children towards future urban employment, whereas traditional on-farm
learning-by-doing will direct children towards the agricultural sector. With such a sectoral
divide in returns to education, the need for risk diversication can result in households keeping
some of their children out of school.
This argument builds on insights from literatures other than the child labour and schooling
literature. When focusing on a broader perspective of the rural household and not only on
the direct and indirect costs of schooling of the individual child, it becomes clear that the
following factors may also inuence the joint human capital investment decision of children
in a household. First, future income is generally uncertain and thus returns to education
are uncertain. Second, in risk prone environments with very limited public pension schemes,
children may not only play an important role in current ex-post consumption smoothing, but
also function as future old-age security assets of their parents. Third, if there is uncertainty
about the future income of children, ex-ante risk diversication is an important means of income
smoothing. There is thus no apparent reason to assume that parents would consider the human
capital investment decision of each child independently of his or her siblings. Rather, if children
indeed are the old-age security providers, then parents should seek to optimize the portfolio of
joint human capital investment decisions of their children, such that they balance future returns
and risk exposure. Finally, work participation of children in household-based agricultural
production systems may itself entail an important element of training and, as such, be part
of a traditional education. In such a traditional rural environment, parents transfer specic
human capital when working with their children, directing these towards future agricultural
self-employment. Formal schooling, on the other hand, will direct them towards employment
in the modern urban sector, where general human capital skills are needed.
I develop an illustrative portfolio model of the joint human capital investment decision
of all children in a rural household, which incorporates these factors. The model is a two-
period unitary household model, where parents in the rst period decide on the optimal human
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capital portfolio allocation of their N children, where the choice is between either general
formal education (schooling) or specic traditional education (on-farm learning-by-doing). In
the second period, parents depend on the income of their adult children for consumption.
The formally educated children will earn income from the urban sector and the traditionally
educated children will earn income in the agricultural sector. Second period income is uncertain.
The analytical results of the model, as well as the calibration results, show that future in-
come uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on the proportion of children sent to school. A relatively
small degree of uncertainty, proxied by the income spread in survey data, is enough for the
optimal portfolio choice of the average household to be less than full school enrolment, even in
a world with perfect credit markets. This negative e¤ect on the optimal human capital port-
folio allocation can be surprisingly large, even in the presence of perfect credit markets. For
the average household, the pure e¤ect of uncertainty is so strong that actual school enrolment
rates could, in principle, be explained solely by the existence of uncertainty. Thus, the roots
of child labour and lack of schooling need not lie solely with incomplete credit markets and
immediate gains from child labour, but could also be caused by the fact that rural households
are not only concerned with securing their current, but also their future old-age income.
These ndings have direct policy implications for educational policies, the aim of which
tends to be full enrolment into primary school. Policies, which only act on the cost side of the
human capital investment decision may be insu¢ cient in terms of reaching full enrolment. It
may well be necessary to supplement such policies with some that also act on the return side
of the investment decision.
Chapter 3. Sibling Dependence, Uncertainty and Education: Findings from Tan-
zania
The purpose of this paper is to test the main prediction of the two-period human capital
portfolio model in chapter 2 on standard cross-sectional data. The main prediction being that
future income uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on the proportion of children sent to school.
However, it is, by denition, very di¢ cult to get a good measure of future uncertainty, and thus
virtually impossible to identify the actual e¤ect of uncertainty on the optimal human capital
portfolio of children in a household. An alternative is therefore to nd other implications of the
inuence of future income uncertainty on the joint schooling decision which can be estimated
in data and which are unlikely to be caused by other observationally equivalent explanations.
One possibility is to take advantage of the natural sequentiality in schooling between younger
and older siblings.
The two-period model is therefore extended to a three-period model, where older siblings
are educated in the rst period and workin the second and third period, whereas younger
siblings are educated in the second period and work in the third period. Old-aged parents rely
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on the income of children in the third period. This extension makes it possible to distinguish
between the causes of sibling dependence in the joint human capital investment decision of
parents. In a world of no uncertainty and no liquidity constraints, there would be no sibling
dependence. However, as uncertainty and liquidity constraints are introduced, either of these
can generate sibling dependence due to the need for risk diversication or due to sibling rivalry
over scarce resources in the liquidity constrained household, respectively. The sequentiality
in the schooling decision allows me to separate the implications of liquidity constraints versus
risk diversication when looking at the relationship between younger and older siblings in the
schooling decision. Calibrating, and partly simulating, the three period model yields testable
empirical implications. There will be a positive e¤ect of schooling of the older siblings on
the schooling of the younger, when households are liquidity constrained, because the older
cohort will be generating additional income. There will be a negative relationship if the overall
schooling decision of all children in the household is primarily determined by a need for risk
diversication.
Based on a nation-wide large scale cross-sectional household survey undertaken in Tanzania
in 1994, I nd evidence of sibling dependency consistent with risk diversication having a strong
inuence on the joint human capital investment decision of sons, but not of daughters. Results
are considerably stronger among rural households compared to urban households. These results
are consistent with the fact that most societies in Tanzania are patrilineal and therefore only
sons are of importance for old-age security, and with the fact that only rural households have
a credible option of educating their children traditionally through on-farm learning by doing.
Sibling dependence in the schooling decision might therefore not only be caused by sibling
rivalry for scarce resources, but can also be due to a need for risk management by diversifying
future income sources. These ndings have direct implications for educational policies, since
lack of enrolment might not only be a matter of costs of schooling, but also of content in terms of
a relevant curricula for future employment in the agricultural sector. In fact, when questioned
about which subjects should be taught in primary schools, parents invariably allocate top rank
to a hypothetical course in technical skills for agriculture and business.
Chapter 4. Human Capital Diversifcation: Findings from Rural Tanzania
The purpose of this chapter is, just as chapter 3, to take the human capital portfolio model of
chapter 2 to the data. However, the exercise in this chapter di¤ers in the sense that the data
set used is not standard household survey data, but rather a quite extraordinary panel data
set, which is perfectly suited for testing the model in question. The data set is from a rural
region in Northwstern Tanzania, Kagera. It is a panel data with an extraordinary long time
horizon of 13 years between the rst and the last wave and with information on all children of
household heads, irrespective of their residence. This allows me to analyse households, which
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in the last wave have completed their fertility as well as the education of all of their children,
while the rst wave gives me information of the socioeconomic status of the household at the
time of making the schooling decisions. In addition, I have qualitative data based on focus
group discussions with villagers from a quarter of the exact same villages as those surveyed
for the panel data. These qualitative data are essential for getting a closer understanding of
the inuence of social norms on the household decision making, this is particularly important
when the norms di¤er from ones own reference set.
The human capital portfolio model is calibrated using simple moments from the panel data,
and model assumptions and empirical implications are all taken to the qualitative and quanti-
tative data. By calibrating the model, I am able to separate implications of uncertain returns,
portfolio e¤ects, from implications of costs and liquidity constraints, constraint e¤ects on the
joint schooling decision. The key empirical implication of the human capital portfolio model
is then that portfolio e¤ects result in a positive relationship between fertility and schooling
within a household, whereas constraint e¤ects result in a negative relationship. I nd strong
empirical evidence of portfolio e¤ects consistent with human capital diversication happening
due to uncertainty, and for which I nd no other observationally equivalent alternative. Fur-
thermore, the positive portfolio e¤ects dominate only among sons and not among daughters,
which is exactly what the social norms would predict when consulting the qualitative data. All
model assumptions and other implications are also consistent with the data.
9
Dansk Resumé
I mange udviklingslande er der mangel på almindelig grundskoleuddannelse blandt en stor
andel af børnene. I Tanzania har under 70 % af den voksne befolkning fuldført 7 års skolegang.
Dette er problematisk, da uddannelse og almen human kapital i et lands befolkning ses som en
vigtig del af landets økonomiske vækst muligheder.
Der er selvsagt skrevet en del litteratur om hvorfor så mange børn ikke får de 7 års skolegang,
de er berettiget og forpligtet til. Langt størstedelen af denne litteratur bygger på, at forældrene
er fattige, uden videre lånemuligheder, og at de har brug for børnenes arbejdskraft til at generere
ekstra indtægter til familien. Dette er uden tvivl én af årsagerne til at nogle børn ikke går i
skole. Men det er en årsag, der udelukkende ser på omkostningssiden ved at investere i børns
uddannelse. I denne afhandling fokuserer jeg på forældrenes afkast ved at investere i deres
børns uddannelse.
De este ældre i udviklingslande er afhængige af deres børns støtte i alderdommen. Børnene
er det tætteste de kommer på en pensionsopsparing. For at sikre denne pensionsopsparing bedst
muligt er det derfor vigtigt for forældrene at sprede risikoen for at alle børnenes indtægtskilder
fejler på samme tid. Den bedste form for risiko spredning i pensionsalderen opnås ved at
have voksne børn med indtægtskilder fra forskellige sektorer, typisk ved at sikre sig at nogle
børn arbejder i bysektoren i et lønnet job, mens andre børn tjener penge i landbrugssektoren.
Slår høsten fejl i landbruget vil man altid kunne trække på børnene i bysektoren og omvendt,
er bysektoren præget af høj arbejdsløshed vil man kunne leve af de subsistensafgrøder der
dyrkes i landbrugssektoren. Et sådant behov for at sprede ens voksne børns indtægtskilder vil
automatisk have en indydelse på det uddannelsesvalg forældrene foretager på vegne af deres
børn allerede i grundskolealderen.
Grundskolen i Tanzania, som i så mange andre udviklingslande, er præget af et stærkt
fokus på den boglige viden. Børnene lærer foruden deres stamme modersmål også swahili og
engelsk, de har matematik og moralundervisning. Skolen er således i høj grad møntet på at
styrke de evner og færdigheder, der er nødvendige for at få et arbejde i den formelle bysektor.
Selvom størstedelen af børnene bliver i landbrugsområderne hele deres liv, tilbyder skolen
ikke undervisning i simple landbrugsteknikker eller specialiseret viden møntet på en fremtidig
karriere som selvstændig landmand. Denne form for landbrugsuddannelse står forældrene i
landdistrikterne traditionelt for. Børnene lærer hvordan man dyrker jorden og avler dyr ved
at indgå som en naturlig del af familiens egen lille landbrugsproduktion.
I kapitel 1 ser vi på hvordan der i nogle landsbyer er mindre usikkerhed omkring de penge
børn i byerne sender hjem fordi der er stærkere uformelle institutioner og sociale normer.
Dette fører til at forældrene i disse landsbyer i gennemsnit sender ere børn i skole. I kapitel
2 udvikler jeg en simpel model for hvordan fremtidig usikkerhed omkring de voksne børns
indkomster kan føre til at forældrene allerede i grundskole alderen beslutter sig for at uddanne
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nogle børn traditionelt derhjemme i landbruget, mens andre bliver sendt i skole. Dette er
således en alternativ forklaring på hvorfor ikke alle børn går i skole i udviklingslande. En
komplementerende forklaring der fokuserer på usikkerheden omkring forældrenes forventede
afkast fremfor omkostningen ved at sende børn i skole. I kapitel 3 og 4 tester jeg denne model
på to forskellige datasæt. Dels et data sæt, der dækker hele Tanzania (kap. 3) og som gør det
muligt at sammenligne husholdninger i landområderne med husholdninger i byområderne. Dels
et datasæt som dækker et mindre område i Tanzania, men hvor man til gengæld har fulgt de
samme husholdninger og alle deres børn i 13 år (kap. 4). Disse to datasæt gør det muligt at teste
forskellige aspekter af modellens forudsigelser om risikospredning i uddannelsesbeslutningen.
Resultaterne er konsistente med disse forudsigelser for sønner i landområderne, ikke for døtre
og ikke for byhusholdninger, der af naturlige årsager ikke har samme mulighed for at uddanne
deres børn traditionelt. Dette er et meget robust resultat idet de sociale normer dikterer at
forældrene udelukkende kan forvente støtte fra deres sønner i alderdommen, gifte døtre tilhører
helt og holdent svigerfamilien.
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This paper carries out a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of informal
institutions in facilitating intergenerational contracts governing investments in schooling
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1 Introduction
Investment in human capital in the form of schooling is one of the primary ingredients of
economic growth. In all developed countries, basic schooling is provided for free or at low cost
by the state, but both historically and in contemporary less developed economies, the most
common form of investment in human capital is parental, or family, investment in schooling on
behalf of children. Unlike other types of investments or saving instruments, however, investing
in children is characterized by a fundamental problem of intergenerational contracting: parents
cannot make a legal claim for return on, or even repayment of, the investment. In some cases,
this inability can make parents choose less schooling (Ben-Porath, 1967) and instead rely on
other modes of savings.
The basic problem is that children are not allowed to enter contractual agreements such
as promising to provide for their parents in exchange for schooling investments made by the
parents on behalf of their children. Becker and Murphy (1988) and Thompson and Ruhter
(1979) argue that a possible response to this time inconsistency problem is for the state to
provide schooling to young people and, at the same time, enforce old-age pensions such that the
working population, when making investments in schooling, would be entitled to a share of the
returns in the form of pensions paid out when they are old. This political equilibrium, denoted
a social compact by Becker and Murphy (1988, p. 9), separates the individual investment from
the individual return and makes enforcement a non-issue as both schooling and taxation is made
compulsory by the state.1 Recent analyses by Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2005)
provide a formal analysis of the Becker-Murphy argument, the latter focusing specically on
education and pensions, the former providing a general analysis of self-sustaining agreements
over intergenerational goods.
Such intertemporal social compacts require a state su¢ ciently strong that it can credibly
both raise taxes for (future) pensions and provide adequate schooling for children. However, a
dening feature of less developed economies is that the provision of many services takes place
through informal institutional arrangements, rather than the formal institutions embodied in
developed economies. What happens when the state is not that strong? The result may be
autarchy (Thompson and Ruhter, 1979) in which childrens human capital is not used for
savings at all, or under some circumstances, the result may be self-enforcing family equilibria
based on tit-for-tat type strategies by children towards defecting adult children (Ehrlich and
Lui, 1991; Cigno, 1993; Rangel, 2003). Becker and Tomes (1985) and Becker and Murphy
(1988), and many with them, point to the existence of social norms that can pressure children
1Given that all other children are educated and parents will receive old-age support from the state, a free-
riding problem emerges since parents could be tempted to have their own children working. See Thompson and
Ruhter (1979) for a complete framework that includes also compulsory schooling and child labor laws as well as
school leaving laws, and Goldin and Parsons (1989) for evidence from the U.S. in the 19th century.
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to support parents in exchange for investments in schooling done by the parents or extended
family on behalf of the children, paving the way for investments to be made in the rst place,
an impression strongly supported by our eld data from Tanzania; for example, one respondent
recalled a story where
In a neighboring village the father was neglected by the well-paid son that was
living in the distant city Dar [es Salaam]. The father arranged a trip to go to him,
but he was still betrayed. While he was in Dar, the father got assistance from others
and visited the sons employer and he was granted a monthly lump sum that was
deducted from the sons salary.[C13, Q8, translated].2
The case where the social compact is not enforced by the state is important, both historically
and in the contemporary developing world, and the role of social norms and, more generally,
informal institutions and the larger civil society in enforcing the intergenerational contract is,
while frequently referred to, to our knowledge largely unexplored.3 In this paper, we provide
a theoretical framework for and an empirical investigation of the relationship between the
informal social setting and the fulllment of the intergenerational contract.
The key idea of our paper is simple: Parents invest in schooling for their children, partly
with the aim of receiving a return on their investment. The expected return on the investment
depends on the probability of receiving remittances from migrant children. If remittances are
not paid, the child faces social sanctions from violating the norm of repayment. Such sanctions
are more likely to be carried out in villages characterized by strong informal institutions. Thus,
strong informal institutions increase the probability of receiving remittances, which increases
the expected return on education. This, in turn, increases current investment in schooling.
To measure the strength of informal institutions, we start from the recent conceptualization
of social capital. While social capital has come to mean many di¤erent things and is opera-
tionalized in many di¤erent ways, we follow Coleman (1988, 1990) in seeing social capital as
di¤erent entities that all consist of some aspect of social structures, and [...] facilitate certain
actions of actors [...] within the structure. (Coleman, 1988, S98). As noted by Bates (1999,
2000), ethnicity is one such structure. Ethnic or tribal a¢ liation, like kinship, carries with it
promises and obligations and provides, through traditions and social norms, what Coleman
calls a structure.
To operationalize the role of ethnicity in informal institutions, we use a tribal fragmenta-
tion index to capture the degree of population heterogeneity along tribal lines at the village
2Cluster 13, item 8, translated from notes in Swahili, as are following quotes.
3For example, The Department for Economic and Social A¤airs of the United Nations note in their 2005
Annual Report on the social situation of the world [t]he manner in which the intergenerational contract is
currently honoured varies across societies. In most developing countries, intergenerational support is sustained
within a wide kinship network and sometimes through community interaction, while in developed countries the
State mediates and/or supports the contract to varying degrees.(UN 2005, p. 82)
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level. There is considerable evidence that such heterogeneity is associated with less success
in overcoming collective action problems and providing public goods (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005). In our setting of sub-Saharan Africa, this is an appropriate measure of informal in-
stitution strength, as insurance and the provision of services with a public element typically
are organized through informal institutions grounded in kinship or tribal associations rather
than in the weak or developing state. Based on this, we make one key assumption: informal
institutions guiding and enforcing the set of social norms governing intergenerational exchange
function better when a village is characterized by a higher degree of tribal homogeneity. This
assumption, discussed in detail below, is widely supported in experimental and empirical work
on the role of identity in overcoming collective action problems.
We investigate the e¤ect of village level tribal fragmentation on schooling and remittances
using two di¤erent data sets from Tanzania, both collected in the early 1990s. One covers the
entire of Tanzania, another, with very detailed data on migrants and remittances, covers the
Kagera region, a rural region by Lake Victoria in the Northwestern part of the country. We nd
that village level tribal homogeneity is associated with both more schooling and, conditional
on schooling, a higher probability of receiving remittances from relatives living elsewhere. This
is consistent with the idea that informal institutions facilitate honouring the intergenerational
contract. Households living in villages with a higher degree of tribal fractionalization choose less
schooling for the children of the household, controlling for a wide range of household, school,
and village characteristics. This is the case in both data sets. In our preferred specication
on the Tanzania-wide data set, increasing tribal fractionalization by one standard deviation
decreases the probability of a child being in school by approximately six percentage points.
In our preferred specication on the Kagera data, increasing tribal fractionalization from its
minimum to its maximum level decreases the probability of observing remittances in the past
six months by eight percentage points.
We identify the e¤ect of tribal fractionalization on investment in schooling and remittances
by examining the potential endogeneity of the tribal composition of villages, the possibili-
ties of spurious e¤ects, which could arise if tribal fractionalization is correlated with other
between-village di¤erences, and the selectivity of youngsters migrating to di¤erent places. Eth-
nic land settlement in East Africa is largely determined by stable historical patterns (Miguel
and Gugerty, 2005; Miguel, 2004) and we show that residential mobility in and out of the
villages in our sample is very limited and unrelated to tribal fractionalization and school char-
acteristics, and that results are independent of mobility issues. Further, we compare a wide
range of socioeconomic, demographic, and school quality variables across homogenous and di-
verse villages, both for the entire distribution of tribal fractionalization and for villages in the
lowest and highest quintile of fractionalization, respectively, and nd tribal fractionalization to
be orthorgonal to all potentially confounding variables. Finally, we compare migrants residing
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in similar environments to each other, rather than migrants in the major cities with migrants
in nearby villages.
We examine several possible, and possibly coexisting, explanations for the nding that tribal
fractionalization is associated with less schooling. To discriminate among these, which include
the role of urban networks, credit constraints, land availability and school characteristics, we
rely on several additional sources of data. In addition to the Tanzania-wide data set, we
use supplementary data on social capital and inequality available for a subset of the sampled
households. As a supplement to the detailed Kagera region data, in order to learn more about
the causal path from tribal fractionalization to schooling and remittance, we use our own data
from group interviews in Kagera villages, collected partly for this reason. Finally, we rely
on the large anthropological and economic literature on tribes and kinship, and migration,
respectively.
The paper links with several entwined strands of literature. As noted above, a number of
papers examine implicit intergenerational contracts. Thompson and Ruhter (1979), Parsons
(1984), Becker and Murphy (1988), and Ehrlich and Lui (1991) all consider some variant of the
intrafamily intergenerational contract. Thompson and Ruhter (1979) and Becker and Murphy
(1988) focus on the role of the state in facilitating intergenerational contracts in the absence of
binding contracts with children, Parsons (1984) analyzes intergenerational transfers within the
economic framework of the family, and Ehrlich and Lui (1991) consider self-enforcing agree-
ments in an overlapping generations framework, though with a focus on fertility. Two recent
papers, Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2005) provide the game-theoretic foundations
for the discussion in Becker and Murphy (1988). Rangel analyzes the general case of (as he
calls them) forward and backward intergenerational goods, while Boldrin and Montes provide
a focused analysis of the role of the state in providing both education and pensions. We know
of only one paper that explicitly links tribal a¢ liation to the obligations to remit: Based on
eld work in the Luapula province in Zambia (Bates, 1976), Bates (2000) argues that ethnicity
empowers the elders with political control over land rights that are of crucial importance for
migrants wishing to return, but he does not consider the investment motive in education.
Second, the paper contributes to what is sometimes called the new economics of labor
migration (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark, 1991; Lucas, 1997), by explicitly linking migration
behavior and the decision to remit with schooling decisions. Lucas (1997, p. 750), summarizing
the large literature on internal labor migration in developing countries, concludes that it
seems plausible that education is part of an intertemporal arrangement; the family educates
members in order for them to migrate and gain urban entry, ultimately to repay the family
from town.4 As noted by Lucas, however, a di¢ culty with such an intertemporal arrangement
4A large literature has investigated the various motives for remittances. Cox and Rank (1992) nd support
for the exchange motive, Lee, Parish, and Willis (1994), and Lillard and Willis (1997, 2002) nd support for the
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is enforcement; however, to some extent, trust, tradition and altruism make the family a
natural enforcement unit. While the economic literature on migration and education has
rarely looked beyond the household, Lucas (1997) notes that a third level of factors, denoted
contextual e¤ects in the demography literature (e.g. Hugo, 1981; Findley, 1987; Bilsborrow et
al. 1987), comprises the inuence and composition of the sending community upon migration
decisions. Such contextual e¤ects remain largely unexplored in both theoretical and empirical
economics studies of migration-related issues, though some work has been done mainly in the
context of migration networks (Winters et al. 2001) and on the role of relative deprivation as a
cause of migration (Stark, 1991). This paper looks at how context informal institutions and,
to a lesser extent, social capital a¤ects education and remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985)
show that the prospects for inheritance matter: for example, sons of families with larger herds
remit more, as families have a better bargaining position in this case. In our empirical work,
we also control for institutions governing inheritance when estimating the e¤ect of informal
institutions on remittances.5
Third, as ethnicity is part of the broader concept of social capital, the paper contributes,
from a developing country perspective, to the mainly U.S.-centered literature on the e¤ects of
social capital on schooling decisions. Coleman (1988, 1990), who shares credit for introducing
the term social capital,examined the role of social networks (or fabric) in lowering the risk of
high school dropout, and Goldin and Katz (1999) argue that the expansion of higher secondary
education in the United States before WWII was inuenced to a considerable extent by social
capital. They measure social capital by the resources allocated by local communities to primary
schooling. As such, they consider only one part of the intergenerational contract, as do Miguel
and Gugerty (2005) in their careful analysis of how ethnic diversity hinders voluntary school
nancing in Kenya.
Finally, the paper contributes, though from a di¤erent angle, to the literature on the e¤ects
of ethnic diversity on public policy outcomes.6 Easterly and Levine (1997) note, examining a
cross-section of countries, that economic growth is negatively related to the degree of ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) nd that less funds are allocated to
local public goods provision in more racially diverse municipalities in the U.S., and Miguel and
Gugerty (2005) argue that it is the relative inability to impose sanctions across ethnic groups
repayment of implicit loan-hypothesis in South-East Asia, while Raut and Tran (2005) reject the loan motive in
favor of a reciprocity motive. Cox and Fafchamps (2008) provide a recent survey.
5Collier and Gunning (1999, p.78-9) notes on the African experience that [l]ineage rules of inheritance en-
forced intergeneration transfer payments. The kin group was able to enforce adherence to each particular rule
through the threat of exclusion from the entire package of benets. Bates (1999, 2000) provides a general
overview; see for example Snyder (1997) for specic evidence on the Iraqw of northern Tanzania, and Gul-
liver (1971) for an in-depth study of how kinship and tribal a¢ liation shaped interaction in Tanzania before
independence.
6A separate literature has considered the e¤ects of ethnic diversity on the risk of conict and internal warfare.
Bates (1999) provides an introduction to both topics.
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that can hinder cooperation and voluntary contributions to local public goods, illustrating
their point by a careful analysis of primary school funding in rural Kenya. While the existing
literature has examined the e¤ect of ethnic diversity on cooperative or public outcomes, such
as public goods provision, we consider the e¤ects of fractionalization on a seemingly private
decision: Investment in childrens schooling.
The next section introduces the Tanzanian setting, including impressions from our group
discussions, and section three sets up a simple model for how tribal fractionalization inuences
household decisions on schooling through its e¤ects on the e¢ cacy of social sanctions. Section
four presents the data, and section ve considers empirical issues related to analysis, including
identication. Section six reports results and section seven examines alternative explanations.
Section eight concludes.
2 Schooling and pensions in Tanzania: The setting
2.1 Education and Pensions in Tanzania
In the 1970s, under then-President Nyereres Education for Self-Reliance program, o¢ cial es-
timates put gross school enrolment rates for 7-13 olds at 95 %. By 1993, following years of
economic decline, the o¢ cial estimate was 70 %, well above our estimate of 55 %, based on
data from rural areas only.7 Compulsory schooling was re-introduced in 2001 by then-President
Mkapa, and free primary schooling, funded mainly by donor agencies, has boosted enrolment
rates; some concerns persist, however, about the quality of primary education.8 The rst
wide-spread funded pension system was introduced in 1997 as part of a comprehensive social
insurance legislation, but pension payments remain low and most people are reliant on the
family in old-age and in case of economic hardship.
2.2 Impressions from group discussions
Our empirical observation that tribal fractionalization, through informal institutions and so-
cial norms, a¤ects schooling can, as noted above, have many di¤erent explanations. To help us
identify potential alternative explanations for the observed association between tribal fraction-
alization and schooling, to distinguish among hypotheses that are observationally equivalent in
the reduced form econometric work and, if possible, to assist us in evaluating the relative merit
of these hypotheses, we conducted a series of group discussions and semi-structured interviews
in twelve KHDS villages in the Kagera District in Northwestern Tanzania in 2005, working
7See Buchert (1994) on the education in Tanzania. Numbers are from Gibbon and Raikes (1995).
8Milton Nkosi: Tanzania looks beyond free schooling.BBC News Africa, July 15, 2005.
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with the team that collected a new round of KHDS data in 2004.9
The quantitative data employed in the empirical analysis dates back to the early 1990s,
while the group discussions were conducted in 2005. The main change in the intervening
period is the re-introduction of compulsory schooling noted above, and all groups invariably
stated that primary schooling has become common for everyone, which was not the case before.
Respondents also argued that this to some extent also has diminished the value of primary
schooling, and increased the need for secondary schooling.
When asked to discuss the value of schooling, a standard reply was that schooling is for
the benet and development of the child, but a frequent additional explanation was often
given: one man argued that if you sow maize, you dont only want to look at the ower,
you also want to harvest [Cluster 19, item 2]. Generally, (primary) schooling is seen as a
better investment than giving the child land, as it is better to give education than to give a
shamba, with education a child can buy himself many shambas.[Cluster 4, item 2]. A major
motivation for schooling is to make the child self-reliant and thus no longer a nancial burden
to the parents, but there was also a clear expectation in the villages that formal education, in
particular secondary schooling, leads to migration and, not least, remittances. When asked to
rank proles of children with di¤erent educational levels, less educated children and children
staying nearby were expected to help with household chores (washing clothes, eld work) while
educated children, in particular those with secondary schooling, were expected to remit cash.
In general, (older) boys would receive priority in schooling investments, as girls by Tan-
zanian custom become part of their husbands family, and returns on education, as a result,
will not accrue to the household; there was some disagreement about the latter point, though.
In particular, girls were portrayed as more caring for their family, and examples were given of
daughters favouring their parents over her husbands parents. At the same time, pregnancy
was often mentioned as a reason both for girls dropping out of school and, as a result thereof,
9Documentation is found in Lassen and Lilleør (2008). Discussions were carried out in twelve villages,
selected among the KHDS villages to achieve a balance between high and low fractionalization villages. We did
two rounds of pre-testing of the focus group discussion (FGD) questionnaire, one in a high TF village and one
in a low TF village, with subsequent adjustments to the questionnaire. The nal questionnaire (available in
Lassen and Lilleør, 2008) is a mixture of open-ended and exploratory questions, group assessments of likelihoods
(e.g. for migrating and remitting for types of children), and closed form factual questions. In addition to the
questionnaire, a roster of participants was taken as they arrived. We also set up procedures for reporting of the
results so as to ensure a uniform reporting across villages
A typical session had a duration of three and a half hours including a break and included approximately ten
villagers with some knowledge of schooling, comprising all adult age groups and both men and women, selected
in cooperation with the village leader (an elected local) and the village executive o¢ cer (appointed by the central
government, not local). In high TF villages selection was done so as to have members from more than one tribe
present in the FGD (in Kagera, one tribe villages almost always means Haya villages, and the Hayas are often
the majority tribe in more mixed villages as well; see Reining, 1967, for an in-depth study of the Haya.) All
sessions were conducted with the same facilitator and the same note taker. Following each session, a subjective
evaluation of the degree of overall participation, the degree of equal participation and the degree of knowledge
of the participants was carried out.
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for not investing in secondary schooling for girls in the rst place.
According to the participants of the group discussions, the degree of sanctions or measures
(as they were invariably called by respondents) which can be taken against children failing to
remit or help out as they are expected to varies considerably. Sanctions range from having the
clan reprimand the non-remitting child [e.g. cluster 2, item 8] over imposing nes, or cursing
children, to reducing the amount or the quality of land to be inherited. The most serious,
and most common, sanction is to deny non-remitting children inheritance in the form of land,
including access to burial grounds. In one group discussion, a respondent provided an example
of a parent selling o¤ his land when his children in Dar Es Salaam did not send remittances; as
a result, the children began remitting [cluster 23, item 8]. Is such a threat credible, given that
major inheritance decisions are taken after the parentsdeaths? Respondents in one village
agreed with the statement by one man that the community may [...] intervene if the father
can say it before his death [cluster 4, item 8 and eld notes]. When asked whether it would
make a di¤erence if a non-remitting child comes from a good cooperation village (associated
by respondents primarily with homogeneous villages) as opposed to a poor cooperation village
(associated with heterogeneous villages), the general response was that children from good
cooperation villages should expect stronger measures: those from villages with good cooper-
ation will get stronger measures, because it is easy for the members to sit and discuss on the
measures to be taken, while it is di¢ cult for the village without good cooperation because it
is di¢ cult to reach the consensus. [cluster 8, item 8]. In another village, respondents stated
that all the measures depend on how the parent decides with blessings of the clan, in case
they belong to the strong one [cluster 7, item 8]. These statements support the notion that
social sanctions can indeed be used as an enforcement tool by parents, especially with the help
of their fellow clan/tribe members, and that this is likely to be more pronounced in tribally
homogenous villages.
3 Schooling, remittances, and informal institutions
Our approach is to follow the literature on the economics of labor migration in looking at
household, or broader family, strategies in devising implicit intertemporal agreements that
govern the allocation of resources towards investment in education, and the link to migration
and payment of remittances to the household when the migrant begins earning money in
town.10 We begin from a standard model of educational choice (e.g. Baland and Robinson,
10Thus, we focus on one particular set of strategies within a broader set of possible family strategies. Lucas
(1997) provides an overview of studies linking migration with fertility, marriage, and risk spreading, issues we do
not consider here. Regarding fertility, we nd below that household sizes across homogenous and heterogenous
villages are essentially identical, suggesting that it is not fertility as an omitted variable that is the cause of our
ndings.
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2000) without any altruism. Parents make a choice between child labor and schooling in the
rst period, when the child is a part of the household. In our model, formal education in the
form of schooling increases the probability of getting a high wage job in the urban sector. In the
second period, the child, now called the migrant, enjoys consumption on its own and can choose
whether or not to remit a share of its labor income to the household, which makes economic
decisions in the second period. As noted by Lucas and Stark (1985), when remittances are not
based on altruism alone, or at all, enforcement of the implicit intertemporal contract becomes
a key issue. This enforcement is provided through the family, the tribe and the urban network
(Ben-Porath, 1985) by appealing to norms, traditions and trust as well as to promises for
inheritance, possibilities of land allocations upon returning to their rural home, and access to
burial grounds.
In the model, the impact of informal institutions on remittersbehavior is thus based on
two key assumptions: First, that non-remitters are subject to social sanctions and, second, that
the e¢ cacy of these sanctions decreases in the degree of tribal fractionalization. The rst part
of the argument is widely supported by anthropological and recent economic studies. Migrants
are expected to remit and those who do not face sanctions upon returning to their village, for
example by being denied access to land or access to burial grounds (Gugler, 1968; Connell et
al., 1976; Bates, 1976, 1990, 1999; Collier and Gunning, 1999) or by receiving a reduced or no
inheritance (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Bernheim et al. (1985), La Ferrara, 2007); while the exact
sanctions used can di¤er between regions and among tribes, inheritance and access to family
burial grounds was mentioned repeatedly in the group discussions as the primary instrument
available to families for controlling migrantsbehavior. We model such measures or sanctions
as being applied without cost, which is a good approximation to the situation in rural East
Africa, where disputes are often over burial rights or access to land and sanctions are relatively
low-cost actions. Further, as is well known from the experimental literature, people readily
apply sanctions in e.g. public goods games even if dispensing such sanctions are costly to
them.
The second assumption also has support from a wide range of studies. Bates and Shepsle
(1997) investigate the impact of ostracism on non-contributers to public goods in games featur-
ing overlapping generations, and argue that such ostracism functions better within than across
ethnic groups. In a similar way, Bates (1999) argues that identity generally, and ethnicity
specically, serves to facilitate benecial economic interactions that would otherwise not have
taken place and he argues that it is precisely the ability of clans or tribes to levy and uphold
social sanctions that sometimes makes ethnicity a creative force in sub-Saharan Africa. Miguel
and Gugerty (2005) and Miguel (2004) present empirical evidence from East Africa that more
tribally fractionalized communities are less able to secure voluntary payments for local public
goods, and they attribute this to the fact that social sanctions function less e¤ectively across
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tribal groups.11
More direct evidence comes from Miguel and Posner (2006) who, based on cross-country
evidence, suggest that ethnic salience is higher in more homogenous places. If this is true
also within countries, it conrms why ethnic homogeneity is important for facilitating social
sanctions: if tribal or ethnic salience is low in heterogenous places, upholding norms and social
sanctions related to remittances is di¢ cult, while tribal a¢ liations are very much a part of
daily lives in homogenous places. In a similar spirit, Ross and Weisner (1977) argue that
the strength of networks in the sending community a¤ects the scope for sanctions. Recent
experimental evidence also supports the idea that the detrimental e¤ect of ethnic diversity
on public goods provision is through a lack of shared social norms and an inability to carry
out social sanctions. Habyarimana et al. (2007) experimentally test competing explanations
for the lack of success in providing public goods in heterogenous groups. They carry out
the test in a heterogenous community in Kampala, and nd no support for preference-based
and team-work explanations, but conclude that ethnically homogenous communities possess
both norms and networks that facilitate the sanctioning of community members who fail to
contribute to collective endeavors.(Habyarimana et al. 2007, p. 722). Further, they nd that
players cooperate more under the threat of sanctioning, that enforcers punish players when
enforcement is costly, that they punish defecting co-ethnics more than defecting non-co-ethnics
and that this is particularly true when a co-ethnic defects in a game with another co-ethnic.
This supports our assumption that villagers of another tribe are less likely to participate in the
sanctioning of a non-remitter.
Finally, this assumption is also supported in our own data, to which we return in more detail
below: Survey evidence from 69 villages reveals that a village-level average of trust in family
membersis negatively correlated with tribal fractionalization, as is a village-level average of
trust in fellow tribesmen.12 This supports our measure of lack of cooperation potential, the
validity of which could be weakened if intragroup relations strengthen as inter-group di¤erences
become more pronounced.
11 In formal models of these issues, the relation between ethnicity and punishment strategies in the forms of
social sanctions is rarely modelled directly but rather assumed, as we do below. In a related setting, however,
La Ferrara (2003) considers a microfounded model of credit in a dynastic environment, where punishments
for failure to repay loans are levied on dynastic descendants, endogenously making repayment an equilibrium
response.
12p-values for the correlations are :006 and :154; respectively. Data from the SCPS, described in the section
on data below. We also nd unity of the village, spirit of participation in the villageand group functioning
to be signicantly negatively correlated with tribal fractionalization across the 69 villages, ndings which are
conrmed in our group interviews where participants generally agreed that villages with one tribe (homogenous
villages) had better cooperation than mixed tribe villages, and that villages with good cooperation were generally
thought to be better able to sit down and discussappropriate measures to be taken against non-remitters (eld
notes, cluster 19).
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3.1 The model
The household lives for two periods, 1 and 2, and receives exogenous income A in each period.
The household H has a life time utility function, with a concave Bernoulli utility function v
over income. The household has a representative child, and we model the choice of schooling
as a continuous variable b 2 [0; 1] ; where b = 1 is full time schooling, for example through to a
completed secondary school degree, and b = 0 implies no schooling.13 The costs of education,
and subsequent migration, including uniform costs, school fees and relocation expenses, are
denoted e: Schooling increases the chance of getting a formal sector job. Denote by p (b) the
probability of getting a formal sector job as a function of human capital accumulation; we
assume that the probability of becoming employed depends positively on the level of schooling
such that p0 > 0: Child labor yields a wage wT per e¢ ciency unit. This wage is normalized to
one.
The household wishes to maximize expected lifetime utility, subject to the costs of educating
children and subject to the determination of the level of remittances taking place in the second
period. Hence, the households maximization problem is
max
b0
v (A+ (1  b)  be) + Ev (A;R; b) (1)
Ev (A;R; b) = p (b) v (A+R) + (1  p (b)) v (A)
where R is the level of remittances determined by the migrant in the second period.
In the second period, the migrant M gets a formal sector job, with wages wH ; with prob-
ability p (b) ; or an informal sector job, with wages wL < wH ; with probability 1   p (b) : If
he gets a formal sector job or other employment with high wages, he is expected to remit a
part of his earnings to the household. If he does not obtain a high income, he is not expected
to remit. We model this in the following simple way: Expected sanctions are a function of
remittances R  0 and carry a utility cost to the migrant, denoted    R R ; where  (0) = 0
(if remittances equal R);  0 > 0: This is the rst assumption referred to above. However,
in practice the ability of the rural community to sit down and discuss appropriate measures
depends in part on the civil society of the rural village. We model this by including the term
q (TF ) ; where q is the probability that such measures are implemented and q0 < 0 captures
that this probability decreases in the degree of tribal fractionalization; hence, with probability
1   q measures are not implemented and utility cost is zero, and if no measures are taken,
expected utility cost is zero. This is the second assumption referred to above.
13We abstract from the households choice of education for the group of children; modelling this empirically
using a count data model yields similar results. In practice, there is wide variation in the years of completed
schooling. In the Kagera data, migrant children report years of completed schooling and there is positive support
for the full range of school years from 1 to 11.
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Based on this, the migrant solves
max
R0
p (b)

u
 
wH  R  q (TF )   R R+ (1  p (b))u  wL
In that case, the rst order condition14 for an interior solution R becomes
u0
 
wH  R = q (TF ) 0   R R if R > 0 (2)
and for the corner
u0
 
wH

> q (TF ) 0
 
R

if R = 0: (3)
The rst order condition implicitly denes optimal remittances R as a function of tribal
fractionalization, TF: Knowing the level of remittances in the second period given a high wage
income, parents now solve (1) : We assume that there is an interior solution to this problem,
characterized by the rst order condition15
v0 (A+ 1  b (1 + e)) (1 + e) = p0 (b) [v (A+R)  v (A)] : (4)
We can now determine the e¤ect of the communitys ability to sanction non-remitters, charac-
terized by the tribal fractionalization of the village, on the amount on schooling as
db
dTF
=
db
dR
dR
dTF
: (5)
Straightforward di¤erentiation of (2) and (4) yields16
db
dR
> 0 and
dR
dTF
< 0
14The second order condition for a maximum is
u00

wH  R

  q (TF ) 00   R R < 0
which is satised if  00 > 0 or not too negative. We assume this to be the case.
15Again, the second order condition for a maximum is that v00 (A+ 1  b (1 + e)) (1 + e)2 +
p00 (b) [v (A+R)  v (A)] < 0 which is the case for example if p00  0.
16The expressions are, respectively,
db
dR
=
 p0 (b) v0 (A+R)
v00 (A+ 1  b (1 + e)) (1 + e)2 + p00 (b) [v (A+R)  v (A)] > 0
and
dR
dTF
=
 q0 (TF ) 0   R R
u00 (wH  R)  q (TF ) 00   R R < 0:
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which yields
db
dTF
=
db
dR
dR
dTF
< 0: (6)
Thus, increasing tribal fractionalization decreases the risk of being sanctioned by the commu-
nity, which decreases remittances sent. Households, recognizing this, respond by spending less
on education in the rst period. If R = 0 in the corner solution, there is no return on the
investment b and, in the absence of altruism and schooling laws, the optimal choice of b is
zero.17
In sum, this simple model predicts a reduced form causal relationship between village level
tribal fractionalization and schooling decisions. However, as noted in the introduction, there
exists a number of potential explanations that could account for such an empirical relationship
between tribal fractionalization and schooling. To discriminate between these competing expla-
nations, we utilize the additional structure provided by the model in the decomposition (5) to
test the hypothesis that the causal relation from tribal fractionalization to schooling is based on
the intergenerational contract, whereby social norms and the scope for social sanctions govern
payment of remittances, which in turn inuences the households decision to invest in schooling
in the rst place. We defer the investigation of alternative explanations to section six, below.
4 Data
We employ several data sets from Tanzania to investigate the hypothesis that tribal fractional-
ization a¤ects schooling decisions, and that it does so through the intergenerational contract.
This section describes the quantitative data, which consists of several large-scale household
surveys.
4.1 Quantitative data sources
Our main sources of data are two large-scale household data sets from Tanzania, both collected
in the early 1990s. One is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of 5184 households
from 1993-94, the Human Resource Development Survey (HRDS); the other is a detailed re-
gional four wave panel survey of over 800 households in 51 clusters, the Kagera Health and
Development Survey (KHDS), carried out in the Kagera region of Northwestern Tanzania from
1991-1994 at six month intervals.18 ;19 Both data sets sample rural households with school-aged
17Compulsory schooling laws were considerably strengthened in Tanzania in the late 1990s, after the period
from which our data stems. Our group interviews conrm much more widespread education than 10 years before.
18Both data sets are collected by the World Bank as Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS). They
can be downloaded from http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/
19Kagera borders on Rwanda and experienced a large inow of Rwandan refugees following the 1994 genocide
(see Center for the Study of Forced Migration, 2003). Our village-level measures are based on the rst wave of
the survey, carried out in 1991-92, and are not a¤ected by the mid-1990s refugee situation in Tanzania.
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children, but only the KHDS includes information on migrant children. We use the HRDS data
set whenever feasible, as it is both a much larger data set and nationally representative.
Our main empirical investigation is based on the HRDS, and this data set also allows us
to test three out of four alternative explanations referred to in the introduction. However,
when investigating our hypothesized causal path, that the negative e¤ect of TF on schooling
stem from lower levels of remittances and weaker intergenerational contracts between migrant
children and their parents, we have to use the more detailed regional survey as well as our
qualitative data, both from Kagera. In the KHDS, extraordinary care was devoted to collecting
data on children of the household living elsewhere. This includes their geographical location,
level of education, employment status and, not least, their level of remittances. This is unusual
for household surveys, which typically collects information only on current household members.
Finally, we also make use of a third data set, the Social Capital and Poverty Survey (SCPS)
collected in 1994-95 in most of the rural HRDS clusters.20 It is therefore possible to merge
HRDS and SCPS data at the village level, although the households surveyed are not identical.
We use the SCPS data for analyzing and testing some of our alternative explanations.
4.1.1 Sampling
The sampling in the HRDS is based on the sampling frame of the National Master Sample
collected by the Tanzanian Bureau of Statistics. It uses all the 222 clusters of the National
Master Sample, 100 of which are rural villages while 122 are enumeration areas in urban
settings. Within each cluster, 20-25 households were sampled at random, see Ferreira and
Gri¢ n (1996).
KHDS was originally collected to measure the impact of adult mortality and morbidity
on the welfare of individuals and households. Kagera was chosen mainly because it was the
epicenter of the East African AIDS epidemic. The sampling of KHDS therefore focused on
oversampling households with high probability of adult mortality. This resulted in a two-stage
stratied random sample, where the stratication was done over agronomic zones at the cluster
level and over joint morbidity and mortality status at the household level. This resulted in
51 clusters of 16 households in each, out of which 14 households were characterized as sick
and 2 households as wellduring the enumeration. Such a heavy stratication calls for careful
consideration in any estimation analysis. However, if the stratication is based on variables
exogenous to the question of interest, it can be ignored in the sense that any M-estimator will
produce consistent estimates and allow for valid inference (Wooldridge, 2002). We test for
di¤erences in results between welland sickhouseholds when using the KHDS data and nd
no e¤ects.
20SCPS was also collected by the World Bank, but not as part of the LSMS set-up.
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4.1.2 Tribal fractionalization measure
We measure the strength of informal institutions by the degree of tribal fractionalization. We
focus on tribal a¢ liation rather than clan membership, as we have no data on the latter and
recognizing, with Horowitz (1985, p.60), that [t]here is no bright line to be drawn between
kinship and ethnicity, especially in societies where the range of recognized family relationships
is wide and the importance of kinship ties is great. For a village k; the value of the tribal
fractionalization index TF is given by
TFk = 1 
X
h2Hk
2hk
where hk is the population share of tribe h in village k; and Hk is a partition of tribes in village
k such that the tribal shares sum to one in each village. The tribal shares hk are village level
estimates based on individual household responses in HRDS; while the empirical analysis below
concentrates on households with school age children, the estimates of the tribal shares are based
on the entire, substantially larger, HRDS sample. Figure 1 shows the distribution of villages
with respect to the fractionalization measure, both in total and for rural and urban areas
separately.
< Figure 1 here >
In the empirical specication below, we follow the recommendation by Vigdor (2002) by
including also tribal population shares on their own. Excluding tribal shares would imply the
behavioral restriction that all tribes have the same propensity to invest in education, regardless
of the tribal composition of their village. It could be the case that some tribes, possible for
reasons of tradition or degree of modernization, are more prone to investing in formal education,
and we capture this by including the individual shares.21 As we note below, the individual
tribal shares are jointly strongly signicant, also if we include the TF index.
5 Empirical specication and identication
The simple model above yields several testable empirical predictions, two of which stem directly
from the rst order conditions for schooling (4) and for remittances (2), respectively. These
rst order conditions can be directly translated into reduced form regressions.
Empirically, we model the households choice of education based on (4) as a binary variable,
which equals one if a school-aged child is enrolled in or has completed primary school, zero
21Some tribes have more traditions for migration, a necessary part of education paying o¤ (Connell et al. 1976,
ch. 2) while there are also di¤erences between tribes in their propensity to carry out punishments (McElreath,
2004).
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otherwise.22 The reduced form is estimated as a standard logit model, where a child is enrolled
if the optimal b from equation (4) is greater than or equal to the equivalent of seven years of
primary schooling, b. We know from the rst order condition that b can be characterized as a
function of direct and indirect schooling costs, household income in period 1 and period 2, the
urban employment probability function and tribal fractionalization through future remittances.
To the extent possible, these variables, or their close proxies, are included in the regression
model, along with a range of control variables, X; which have been found to a¤ect the choice
of schooling or might control for some of the unobserved future variables. Our main estimating
equation, the schooling regression, is given by
prob(b  b) = (0 + 1e+ 2wT + 3A1 + 4TF + X): (7)
Based on the model, our hypothesis is that 4 < 0: The estimation of (7) is based on a
sample of all children of household heads between 7-17 years of age23 drawn from the Tanzania-
wide HRDS data set. Households base their schooling decision on their expectations about
future remittances. This implies that there are two underlying conditions which must hold for
the schooling rst order condition, and thus the reduced form regression above, to be valid.
First, an underlying assumption of the model is that the probability of formal employment
must be increasing in b, i.e. p0(b) > 0: Second, the degree of tribal fractionalization must have
a negative e¤ect on remittances, dRdTF < 0: Both of these conditions relate to second period
variables for the migrant child. These are necessary, but not su¢ cient, conditions to identify
the model. To investigate these second period relations, we turn to the KHDS data with its
detailed information about migrant children.
We investigate the assumption that p0(b) > 0 by simply regressing the probability of formal
employment on the level of schooling of the migrant along with controls for age, gender, and
geographical location, W. We focus on formal employment which guarantees the migrant a
monthly wage as the distinction between unemployment and self-employment (e.g. as petty-
trader) or informal jobs is often very blurred in developing countries. We nd this to be the
case  primary schooling increases the chances for formal sector employment in a strongly
signicant way, as does secondary schooling.24
The second condition which must be satised for our main regression to be a valid reduced
form of the model relates remittances to the degree of tribal fractionalization; the migrants
22School enrolment reects the long run decision of the parents, whereas recent school attendance is subject
to temporary uctuations in household resources. Enrolment is also preferred over school attainment to ensure
a reasonable link between schooling decisions and current income levels.
23Since school enrolment is often delayed, we widen the o¢ cial school age with two years from 7-17 rather
than 7-17 years. We are not including foster children, or other children not directly related to the household
head, as their intergenerational contracts will be di¤erent. The sample is drawn from the Tanzania-wide data
set, HRDS. Results are replicated using the KHDS data with the same sample selection.
24Results are enclosed as table A.3.
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rst order condition (2) implies that dRdTF < 0: This translates into a regression of the level
of remittances on employment status, and the probability that sanctions for non-remitting
migrants are invoked, which depends on the time invariant variable TF . We estimate this as
a censored (or corner-solution) Tobit model, since we frequently observe remittances equal to
zero. The censored Tobit is set up in terms of a latent variable, where the optimal amount of
remittances for each individual is
Ri = 0 + 1w
H
i + 2TF + Zi+ui;
where Z is a set of control variables, including individual, household and village characteristics.
The model predicts that 1 > 0 and that 2 < 0: A necessary identication condition of the
model is thus that we do not reject 2 < 0. In principle, Ri can be negative if the migrant
would like to receive remittances from the family, but since this is not the migrants decision
to make and we do not observe such wishes, Ri is censored at the corner solution zero; in the
data, we observe Ri = max(0; Ri ). The conditional expectation of R given our explanatory
variables is then a composite measure of the probability of remitting and the expected value
of remittances, given that the migrant child is remitting.
E(RjwH ; TF;Z) = prob(R > 0jwH ; TF;Z)E(RjwH ; TF;Z;R > 0) (8)
We will primarily model the level of remittances as a Tobit model, which assumes homo-
geneity and normality about the error term ui for the -estimates to be consistent. To get
additional insights into the nature of remittances, we use a hurdle model, which is a decom-
position that essentially corresponds to a joint result of a probit model of the probability of
remitting and a linear regression of the conditional expectation of the level of remittances in
the uncensored part of the sample.
5.1 Identication
In the regression analysis below, we estimate investment in schooling and payment of remit-
tances on tribal fractionalization. For the resulting estimates to be interpreted as causal e¤ects,
we need to consider identication of the empirical model. First, the tribal fractionalization of
a village could be endogenous to school quality or variables related to this. Second, estimates
of 4 in (7) could represent e¤ects of other slow-moving village level variables on schooling and
remittances rather than TF having an e¤ect of its own.
Regarding the rst concern, we can rely on the historical fact that there has been relatively
stable tribal settlement patterns in rural Tanzania since the mid-1970s. Most villages in rural
Tanzania were established well before colonial rule ended, and from the mid-1970s up to the
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early 1990s, which is when the surveys that we employ were collected, mobility was limited
in Tanzania, though not non-existent, as has been the case in neighboring Kenya (see Miguel,
2003). The villagization program, Ujamaa, carried out in the mid-1970s, forced some rural
residents to move to other, often newly constructed, villages and in the following period rural
mobility has been severely restricted, to have increased only recently. This, in itself, suggests
that migration into rural communities, which are the focus of our investigation, has been
limited.
This is conrmed by data from the SCPS, where respondents were asked to rate whether
they perceived migration into their community as high. We code a village to have high frequency
of migration if more than a third of the respondents in the village think so. Even with this
generous denition, only nine percent of villages were classied as having a high frequency
of migration. There is no signicant di¤erence in the migration pattern across more and less
heterogenous villages, and excluding the high frequency villages from the analysis below does
not change results, see bottom panel of table 1 below.
Regarding the second concern, which is also related to possible alternative explanations
to which we return in section seven, we include a wide range of village level controls in the
estimating equations. As a more direct and transparent preliminary investigation, in table 1
we compare the most homogenous quintile of HRDS/SCPS villages with the most heterogenous
quintile across a number of variables that could be related to tribal fractionalization. Corre-
lations across the full sample yields similar results, but the comparison in table 1 facilitates
interpretation. The table reports mean values for the characteristics for the two groups of
villages, as well as the di¤erence and the resulting t-test values.
< Table 1 here >
The table suggests a well-balanced sample for household expenditure and hectares of land
owned with respect to tribal homogeneity, but household size (and thus fertility) is signicantly
higher in low TF villages. As for our alternative explanations, there is also support for some
of these. There is no direct evidence that perceived school quality is consistently higher in
low fractionalization villages, nor are there any signicant di¤erences in term of schooling
expenditure or school distance between high and low TF villages. Only among school supplies
do we nd a very marginal di¤erence in favour of low TF villages. This is as expected and
found by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) for Kenya. There is more support for the informal credit
and land scarcity explanations. In low TF villages, 21 per cent of the households report that
if they faced a sudden credit need of approximately 100 USD, then they would rst ask their
family, friends or relatives for assistance, as opposed to pawn shops, local traders, banks or
credit cooperatives. This is almost 10 percentage points higher than in high TF villages and
the one sided t-test is also clearly signicant with a p-value of 0.04. Likewise, 43 per cent of
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households in low TF villages report that land is very di¢ cult to obtain (although there is no
signicant di¤erence in number of ha of land owned), and 26 per cent of households that it
is mainly acquired through inheritance.25 These numbers are also signicantly higher than in
low TF villages. This shows the importance of also testing the signicance of these di¤erent
variables in the schooling regression along with TF. Including these variables as controls will
ensure that their e¤ects on schooling are captured separately from any e¤ect of TF.
6 Results
6.1 Schooling, informal institutions and tribal fractionalization
The results from the estimation of the relationship between school enrollment and tribal frac-
tionalization (equation (7)) is shown in table two, with standard errors corrected for clustering
at the village level in parentheses. Model 1 includes a constant, the tribal fractionalization
index, TF, and controls for the tribal population shares at the village level. This simple model
shows that there is a signicantly negative e¤ect of TF on the probability of a child being
enrolled in school; model 2 adds regional controls, which does not a¤ect the estimated e¤ect
of TF ; in any case, the magnitude of this estimated e¤ect is likely to be biased due to omitted
variables.26
Model 3 includes a set of key explanatory variables, some originating from the theoretical
discussion above, some being standard controls in the literature on school enrolment. These
include the household expenditure level as a measure of the households resources,27 and mea-
sures of direct and opportunity costs of schooling. The latter are present if a household owns
land, has direct agricultural income, or has a herd, in which case the need for (possibly, part
time) child labor is higher, increasing the opportunity cost of educating children formally.28
Additionally, distance to school matters as children who spend more time travelling to school
are less available for part-time work, such as fetching water or caring for younger siblings. Fur-
thermore, we include prospects of non-agricultural employment (measured by the proportion
of the adult village population in formal or informal employment).
25As several group discussants noted, parents have an obligation to give their children either a shamba (a plot
of land) or an education (and sometimes both). If land is scarce, the only possiblity for giving your children a
piece of land is by subdividing your own shamba, which would show up in the data as a smaller average shamba
size.
26The corresponding summary statistics are shown in Table A1 in the appendix
27The e¤ect of household incomes on the child labor vs. schooling choice is not unambiguous. See Baland and
Robinson (2000) and Rogers and Swinnerton (2004).
28Land and herd ownership can inuence the choice of education in other ways as well. As noted by Lucas
and Stark (1985), households with inheritable assets receive more remittances. In our framework, household
assets can be used in the bargaining over remittances to increase the ow of funds from migrants to parents,
increasing the expected return on schooling.
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< Table 2 here >
Finally, model 4 includes school quality indicator variables to control for the e¤ects identied
by Miguel and Gugerty (2004) that ethnically diverse communities in Kenya are less successful
in securing voluntary contributions for funding primary schools, which could conceivably a¤ect
perceived quality of such schools. In our case, however, including school quality variables a¤ects
the estimated e¤ect of TF only marginally, echoing the small di¤erences across homogenous
and heterogenous villages observed in table 1.
The estimated coe¢ cients on tribal fractionalization are reasonably stable across the speci-
cations, and the TF coe¢ cient is negative and signicant at the 5 % level throughout. Based
on model 4 in table 2, the marginal e¤ect of increasing tribal fractionalization equals  0:23;
thus, increasing tribal fractionalization by one standard deviation (.26 in our sample) lowers
the probability of being in school by 6 percentage points. The remaining explanatory variables
all have the expected sign, but a few are insignicant. The level of household expenditures has
a positive signicant impact on the schooling decision, but it is reduced when the main income
source is agricultural and children thus are needed for help; a similar conclusion comes from
the negative e¤ect of the household having a herd. Furthermore, girls are enrolled in school
more often than are boys, while a greater distance to school, measured as the average at the
cluster level, decreases school enrollment.
Table 3 shows results divided by gender. The e¤ect of TF on schooling is larger for girls
than for boys, as there is more variation in the schooling of girls, but both estimated e¤ects
are signicant and sizeable. Additionally, we see that it is the education of girls that drives
the result on income. The education of girls thus seem to be somewhat more of a luxury
decision, made when there are funds for it. This is conrmed by the group interviews, where the
education of boys is always preferred over the education of girls, partly because the education of
girls is perceived to be associated with more risk for two reasons: rst, girls might get pregnant
when attending school (especially secondary school) and subsequently drop out; second, once
married, the obligations of a woman lie primarily with her husbands family and not her own.
Her parents can therefore not expect or demand assistance from her, but only hope for it.
< Table 3 here >
As for the marginal e¤ects of TF on the schooling probability of girls and boys, the e¤ects
remain signicantly negative and of the same order of magnitude; the probability of school
attendance of girls is reduced by almost 25 percentage points and of boys by 20 percentage
points when moving from a complete homogenous village to a heterogenous village. The results
are thus robust to choice of specication.
The result that increasing tribal fractionalization decreases the probability of school en-
rollment is the rst step in showing how informal institutions inuence the intergenerational
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contract. We now turn to the second step, examining in more detail the more specic partial
derivatives predicted by the decomposition of the reduced form relationship.
6.2 Remittances and tribal fractionalization
Out of the 714 rural households observed in the rst wave of KHDS, 76% of all households
received remittances within the past 12 months of the interview, and 52% of all households have
received remittances from Children Living Elsewhere (CLE), i.e. individuals about whom we
have additional information such as educational background and economic activity. There is a
signicant positive di¤erence between remittances sent from children with primary education or
more and children without education, conrming that households are rational when expecting
remittances to increase with education; we return to this below.
We also nd that there are signicant positive di¤erences in the proportion of households
receiving remittances in low TF villages compared to high TF villages; this is the case both for
all remittances received and for remittances from children. In the most homogenous villages, the
average proportion of households receiving remittances is 76%, and 53% of households receive
remittances from their children, compared to average proportions of 69% receiving from anyone
and 47% receiving from children in the most heterogenous villages. This is supportive of our
second assumption, and is conrmed in the regression analysis below.
For the regression analysis, we focus on the migrants decision to remit to a household in
his or her village of origin. For sample migrants who live within the region of Kagera, 12 %
(n = 1309) remitted in the past six months of the survey, while for migrants living outside
of Kagera, 22 % (n = 554) remitted. However, migrants living nearby often assist families
in various ways beyond, or instead of, monetary remittances, types of assistance which are
substitutes for monetary transfers, but not captured by the survey used here. Thus, including
nearby migrants with faraway migrants can bias results related to monetary remittances. As
a consequence, we focus on the sample of migrants outside of Kagera, as they do not have
the opportunity of providing in-kind assistance to the same extent. At the same time, there
is ample evidence that migrants, and in particular migrants to faraway towns, are a selective
sample (Stark, 1991). While we do control for available individual characteristics, it remains
likely that migrants leaving Kagera are di¤erent from those staying put on a number of, possibly
unobservable, dimensions. This provides another reason for focusing on the sample of migrants
outside of Kagera.
Table 4 relates the payment of remittances by migrants to characteristics of the individ-
ual CLE, the recipient household, and the village of the recipient household, see equation (8)
above29. As noted in the introduction, most of the economic literature on remittances has fo-
29The corresponding summary statistics are shown in table A2 in the appendix.
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cused on sender and recipient characteristics, while some work in demography has also included
a limited selection of village-level characteristics.30 We base our choice of control variables on
the standard of the remittances literature (see, e.g., Vanwey, 2004), but include also additional
village level characteristics that can be thought to inuence the intergenerational contract,
including various inheritance rules and traditions.
< Table 4 here >
In the sample of migrant children living outside Kagera, 78 % choose the corner solution
of no remittances in the rst wave (equation (3) above). This number increases in subsequent
waves due to the very short time span of six months between each wave. The censoring means
that OLS estimation will produce inconsistent estimates, but the OLS results reported in table
1, model 1, nevertheless provide a benchmark for more complex models, and, furthermore,
assists us in assessing the appropriateness of subsequent specications below. For now, we
simply observe that the negative estimated e¤ect of TF is statistically signicant.
In reality, remittances are either positive (interior solutions) or zero in the corner solution.
Model 4.2 present results from a Tobit model, which allows for corner solutions in a natural
way. In this specication, the estimate on TF is negative and strongly signicant, consistent
with parents in more heterogenous villages expecting remittances to be lower. The overall e¤ect
is not big: Increasing TF from the minimum to the maximum in the sample, 0 to .66, increases
the (latent variable) amount paid by 1100 shillings, the equivalent of USD 2.40; note, however,
that this is the amount sent within the last six months, meaning of course that the total return
is much larger. The low magnitude of the (latent variable) estimate reects the substantial
mass point at zero. If we look at the two marginal e¤ects separately, we nd that the marginal
e¤ect conditional on paying is indeed quite small, while the e¤ect of TF on the probability of
receiving a positive amount (which can be calculated from the probit model, described below),
as compared to zero, is reasonably large; increasing TF from 0 to .66 decreases the probability
of observing positive remittances by 8 percentage points.
The results on controls are also of interest. First, we note that having a formal sector job
and completed primary or secondary education strongly increases the probability of sending
remittances. We obviously encounter the problem that TF can have inuenced schooling in the
rst place, as demonstrated above, but our estimate of the direct e¤ect is not greatly a¤ected
by the in- or exclusion of the schooling variables. The main e¤ect of excluding the schooling
variables is that TF becomes signicant at the 1% level.
In addition, girls remit more than boys (but see below), and households with more land
receive more remittances. Households in communities with mutual aid among farmers, possibly
30Denoted contextual e¤ects in the demography literature, such village level characteristics often include
history of migration or village level measures of economic conditions.
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representing higher social capital or cooperation in general, receive more remittances. This is
consistent with remittances being sent not to alleviate household idiosyncratic income shocks,
but rather to be in good standing with the community. The same interpretation can be applied
to the result that households in communities that have experienced inheritance disputes in the
past year receive higher remittances: if inheritance rules are not fully agreed upon, it can
be important to maintain a good relationship with the household (see also Lucas and Stark,
1985). Overall, remittance patterns di¤er somewhat between tribes, and in general remittances
decrease from the rst wave to the subsequent three, reecting that in the rst wave respondents
were asked about receiving remittances in the past 12 months, while subsequent waves asked
about remittances in the past six months.
6.3 Robustness
In model 3, table 4, we model the sending of remittances as a binary decision, equal to one
if remittances are sent and zero otherwise. We estimate this using a probit model; again, TF
enters in a negative and statistically signicant way. This specication also allows us to assess
the appropriateness of the Tobit-model. Under the assumption of normality,   = where 
is the coe¢ cient on TF in the probit specication,  the corresponding coe¢ cient in the tobit
specication and  the standard error of the tobit (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, p. 521). Using
the estimation counterparts, we nd that ^ =  :98 and that ^=^ =  10:48=11:10 =  :94;
which does not suggest misspecication of the tobit model. As another check, we note that
the share of observations with positive remittances (= :13) multiplied by the tobit estimate on
TF ( 10:48) yields  1:36 which is quite close to the OLS estimate of  1:07, as should be the
case under assumptions of joint normality under censoring from below at zero (Wooldridge,
2002).31
In model 4, table 4, we estimate an OLS model conditional on remittances being positive.
The size of the estimated coe¢ cient is roughly as in model 4.1, but the standard error somewhat
larger as the number of observations has dropped by almost a factor of 10. Models 4.3 (probit)
and 4.4 (OLS conditional on sending) together approximate a hurdle model, which allows for
the e¤ects of the explanatory variables to di¤er between the qualitative choice of choosing no or
positive remittances, and the quantitative choice of choosing the amount of remittances.32 We
nd that TF a¤ects negatively both the decision to send remittances at all and the decision on
how much to send, conditional on sending, which accords well with the corner solution structure
of the model; the estimated coe¢ cients suggest, as discussed above, that the quantitatively
31Additional specication checks for heteroscedasticity were carried out based on the probit model. We found
little evidence of heteroscedasticity, and in the few case where some was present, notably primary education and
formal sector jobs, it did not a¤ect results.
32Alternatively, we could have modelled the continuous sending decision by a truncated regression model; this
strengthens results on TF somewhat, but have no other e¤ects.
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important e¤ect is on sending vs. non-sending rather than on the amount sent. While the
smaller sample of the conditional OLS model requires careful comparisons, some variables are
seen to a¤ect the decisions whether to send and how much to send in di¤erent ways. In
particular, girls tend to send at a much higher frequency than boys, but they send smaller
amounts; thus, the sign on girls is positive in the binary sending model, while it is negative,
albeit insignicant, in the model of how much to send. While beyond the scope of this paper,
the hurdle model suggests that the factors a¤ecting the act of sending remittances at all, which
signals a willingness to send, can be di¤erent from the factors determining the amount sent.
7 Alternative explanations
A number of alternative explanations for the observed reduced form results exist: First, consider
the role of urban networks. Urban networks can be important by helping arriving migrants
get housing and work, and networks can also monitor migrants and remind them of their
obligations towards those at home. Thus, strong urban networks increase the expected return
on schooling and migration. If the functioning of urban networks is better when they are rooted
in more homogenous villages, stronger urban networks, rather than a higher risk of sanctions,
could explain the observed relationship between TF and schooling. We cannot observe the
number of migrants in a city that come from a particular village, but one direct test for
the inuence of home village tribal fractionalization through urban networks is to model the
probability of getting a formal sector, high paying job as a function of TF directly. While
we nd that schooling dramatically increases the probability of getting a formal sector job,
as discussed above, we nd no signicant direct e¤ects of TF (table A.1). Respondents in
the group discussion were generally sceptical of urban networks acting on behalf of village
households, arguing for example that securing remittances is not an objective of the network,
and that information about individualsbehavior is generally not available [Cluster 2, item 8].
Second, from our group interviews it became clear that ethnically homogenous villages are
often associated with being ancestral villages, where land is scarce, whereas heterogenous vil-
lages could be of more recent and uncertain origin and have a higher degree of land availability.
Therefore, if parents are faced with the choice of either giving their child a plot of land or an
education (cf. note above), the relative cost of providing children with a shamba would be
lower in villages where land is available, which may happen to be where tribal fractionalization
is high. We cannot observe village age in our data, but we do observe individual and average
land holdings. In table 1, we saw that average shamba sizes were approximately equal across
homogenous and heterogenous communities, and we control for household land holdings in
regressions. For the detailed Kagera data, the bivariate relationship is in fact the opposite:
more homogenous villages also have larger land holdings, which would tend toward choosing
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less schooling for the children of the household.33 Table 5 shows results from including into
the main specication additional explanatory variables. While the rst column reproduces our
main choice of specication from table 2, columns 2 and 3 include, respectively, a measure of
limited land availability and an indicator variable for land being mainly inherited. Neither of
these are signicant, and interactions with TF does not suggests any such e¤ects.
< Table 5 here >
Third, living in an tribally homogenous village can increase the probability that a household
hit by a negative shock receives assistance from fellow villagers, as part of an informal insurance
system. At the same time, it can facilitate cooperation on sending children to school or funding
migration for educated children. While a full investigation of the relationship between credit
availability, insurance and tribal fractionalization is beyond the scope of this paper, we do have
some evidence on (the lack of) a relationship between these. From table 1 we see that there are
marginally better informal credit opportunities in the most homogenous villages compared to
the most heterogenous villages, but as seen in model 4, table 5, this result does not carry over
to a regression framework; the e¤ect of informal credit availability is itself insignicant in the
schooling regression, and does not a¤ect the estimated e¤ect of TF.34 Furthermore, we could
not nd evidence to suggest that the e¤ect of TF on schooling depends on the availability of
credit opportunities; interacting TF with household expenditures (our equivalent of A1 in the
model) did not yield any results. As already mentioned, the other part of the intergenerational
contract, the payment of remittances, was not a¤ected by the existence of local insurance
arrangements, measured by the availability of mutual aid among farmers in a village, even if
the latter itself in some specications did appear to be associated with higher remittances.
Finally, tribal fractionalization could be correlated with school quality, as suggested by
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) in the case of Kenya. Better school quality would increase the
demand for schooling, due to an expectation of better schooling outcome and thus urban
labour market prospects. As we noted above, tables 1 and 2 show that school quality does
not appear to be associated with tribal fractionalization and, furthermore, does not a¤ect the
estimate of the e¤ect of TF on school enrolment decisions.
33Gulliver (1961) suggests that rural land scarcity in colonial times provided a catalyst for change of inheritance
rules. Less available land meant that sons had a harder time acquiring land on their own, which led to pressure
on, and in turn change of, past inheritance norms by which brothers were the rst to inherit. In turn, this
created incentives for sons to inuence the division of the inheritance, in part by remaining in good standing
with the home village.
34 In addition, group interview respondents in all villages strongly disagreed with the idea that families would
jointly raise money for funding migration for particular children; this was simply unheard of.
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8 Discussion
The intergenerational contract has two components: investment in schooling and payment of
pensions. While intergenerational contracts in developed economies are generally managed by
the state, in developing economies with weaker state structures and less scal capacity, in-
tergenerational contracts are generally thought to be enforced by traditions and social norms,
often rooted in tribal or ethnic a¢ liations. The analysis presented in this paper takes a compre-
hensive approach to analyzing intergenerational contracts in developing economies, including
decisions on both schooling and pensions (in the form of remittances), joined together by and
enforced through tribal identity.
Our ndings are at odds with the notion that all traditional institutions are a hindrance
to development. In rural Tanzania, it is exactly traditional institutions that help overcome
enforcement problems inherent to the family bargaining underlying educational choice, migra-
tion, and remittances. If such traditions weaken, and social structures lose some of their power,
the move towards more education and, ultimately, a higher standard of living, could be delayed
or impaired if other institutions do not take their place. Therefore, while informal institutions
would not necessarily be a part of the rst best solution in a fully modernized state, they may
be able to correct, at least partially, distortions arising from underdeveloped credit markets.
insu¢ cient social insurance systems and lack of scal capacity.
At the same time, the interconnection between tribal or ethnic identity and the provision of
schooling and pensions suggests that successful government involvement in, say, basic school-
ing, can have implications for the informal provision of pensions as well as patterns of tribal
a¢ liations. Conversely, policies directed at national identity or unity can have consequences for
the provision of both schooling and pensions. This is important as the weakening of traditional
institutions are sometimes an independent policy initiative of national governments. In Tan-
zania, in particular, there has been consistent e¤orts since the 1960s to create a nation state
to replace tribal communities. While this e¤ort has been successful in many ways (Miguel,
2004), including creating a strong national identity, the results of this paper suggest that tribal
a¢ liation still has implications for the daily lives of Tanzanians, an impression strongly sup-
ported by our group interviews. A main reason for this, of course, is that existing authority
structures such as tribes and elders do not simply sit around and wait for their authority to
be challenged by government strategies aimed at replacing traditional allegiances. As noted
by Bates (1999), in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa the notion that villagers must be buried
in the place they were born is actually quite recent, dating from the 1970s when youth began
to question the eldersauthority and, hence, the reason to remit and stay on good terms with
the rural community. Similarly, Snyder (1997) reports that the continuation of religious rituals
among the Iraqw of northern Tanzania is closely linked to the legitimacy of political authority;
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if the role of the religious ritual is weakened, so is the eldersauthority which involves allocating
land and settling disputes.
We see the results of this paper as a testimony to the fact that ethnicity, and more broadly
identity, can sometimes help create and support important economic transactions which would
otherwise not be realized due to weak formal institutions or underdeveloped markets. The
absence of ethnic a¢ liation would not necessarily imply that more benecial transactions would
be undertaken; rather, as noted by Carr and Landa (1983), or Greif (1993) in the context of
Mediterranean traders in fourteenth century Europe, existence of an ethnic identity can help
sustain exchange where there would otherwise be none.
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Table 1: Di¤erences across homogenous and heterogenous communities
Cluster means Low TF High TF Di¤erence t-test p-value
HRDS variables
Household size 6.47 5.94 .52 1.84 .07
Hhd expenditures per a.e. .80 .89 .09 1.05 .30
Land (ha) 12.21 10.59 1.62 0.91 .37
School expenditures 6.66 5.83 .83 0.67 .51
Distance to school 1.61 1.77 .16 0.57 .57
School quality variables
Teachers good/adequate* .73 .80 .07 1.40 .91
School supplies g/a* .42 .36 .06 0.95 .17
Environment g/a* .54 .50 .04 0.72 .23
Swahili lessons g/a* .83 .90 .07 1.39 .91
English lessons g/a* .56 .63 .07 1.47 .93
Math lessons g/a* .73 .82 .09 1.88 .97
SCPS variables
High migration freq. .06 .10 .04 0.64 .52
Informal credit* .21 .12 .09 1.82 .04
Limited land availability* .43 .22 .21 2.03 .02
Land mainly inherited* .26 .15 .11 2.01 .03
Note: Numbers may not add up due to rounding. Di¤erences and t-test statistics are absolute numbers. The
t-tests have 43 d.f. and are assumed to have equal variances. # clusters in low TF is 23 and in high TF is 22.
*p-values are for one-sided hypothesis testing of better school quality, better informal credit opportunities and
less access to land, respectively, in low TF villages. Sample is based on rural HRDS and SCPS clusters.
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Table 2: School enrolment and tribal fractionalization
School logits (1) (2) (3) (4)
TF -0.641*** -0.688** -0.848** -0.777**
(0.238) (0.282) (0.343) (0.339)
Age 2.018*** 2.029***
(0.140) (0.140)
Age^2 -0.069*** -0.070***
(0.006) (0.006)
Birth order -0.050 -0.043
(0.036) (0.036)
Girl 0.261*** 0.262***
(0.085) (0.086)
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 1.083*** 1.144***
(0.412) (0.427)
Agriculture is main income 0.239 0.235
(0.320) (0.331)
HH exp*Agricultural income -0.771* -0.805*
(0.448) (0.461)
School expenditure, cluster av. 0.000 -0.007
(0.027) (0.027)
School distance, cluster av. -0.237*** -0.238***
(0.087) (0.088)
Household has herd -0.332*** -0.345***
(0.104) (0.107)
Total number of children 0.064*** 0.063***
(0.022) (0.022)
Land (ha) 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.007)
Land^2 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Tribal population shares no yes*** yes*** yes***
Region controls no yes yes** yes**
School quality controls no no no yes*
Observations 3826 3826 3826 3826
Pseudo R-squared 0.005 0.019 0.285 0.288
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at the village level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results on included constant term not reported.
Table 3: School enrolment and tribal fractionalization by gender
School logits (1) (2) (3)
All Girls Boys
TF -0.776** -0.893** -0.702**
(0.339) (0.413) (0.357)
Age 2.029*** 1.931*** 2.162***
(0.140) (0.207) (0.178)
Age^2 -0.070*** -0.066*** -0.075***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Birth order -0.038 -0.049 -0.022
(0.036) (0.047) (0.047)
Girl 0.263***
(0.086)
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 1.144*** 1.254*** 1.147*
(0.427) (0.481) (0.646)
Agriculture is main income 0.235 0.020 0.522
(0.331) (0.366) (0.545)
HH exp*Agricultural income -0.805* -0.911* -0.828
(0.461) (0.526) (0.708)
School expenditure, cluster av. -0.007 -0.003 -0.010
(0.027) (0.036) (0.026)
School distance, cluster av. -0.238*** -0.256** -0.213**
(0.088) (0.117) (0.092)
Household has herd -0.346*** -0.442*** -0.270*
(0.107) (0.164) (0.138)
Total number of children 0.061*** 0.064* 0.055**
(0.022) (0.035) (0.026)
Land (ha) 0.009 0.015* 0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Land^2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -12.443*** -11.227*** -13.695***
(0.947) (1.228) (1.269)
Tribal population shares yes*** yes*** yes***
Region controls yes** yes yes***
School quality controls yes* yes yes*
Observations 3826 1895 1931
Pseudo R-squared 0.288 0.286 0.298
Results on included constant term not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Remittances and tribal fractionalization
1 2 3 4
OLS Tobit Probit OLS
log(remit) log(remit) remit n/y log(remit)
TF -1.07** -10.48** -0.98** -1.11
(0.49) (5.17) (0.47) (0.68)
Formal sector job 1.15*** 5.73*** 0.54*** 0.25*
(0.17) (0.89) (0.09) (0.14)
Completed primary school 0.48*** 7.41*** 0.67*** 0.19
(0.13) (1.32) (0.12) (0.14)
Completed secondary school 1.04*** 8.38*** 0.76*** 0.48***
(0.34) (1.55) (0.16) (0.16)
Girl 0.36** 3.27*** 0.31*** -0.18
(0.14) (0.94) (0.09) (0.15)
Age 0.08*** 1.04*** 0.09*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.23) (0.02) (0.06)
Age^2 -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(mean) hhsize -0.02* -0.07 -0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02)
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) -0.08* -0.89 -0.09 0.14
(0.05) (0.55) (0.06) (0.14)
Agriculture is main income -0.04 0.98 0.11 -0.68**
(0.13) (0.86) (0.09) (0.27)
Log(Land (ha)) 0.20** 1.56*** 0.15*** 0.11
(0.08) (0.57) (0.06) (0.10)
Household has herd -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01)
Mutual aid among farmers 0.18 1.56* 0.14 0.02
(0.12) (0.89) (0.09) (0.16)
Community population size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inheritance disputes past 12m 0.22* 1.32* 0.13* -0.01
(0.11) (0.76) (0.07) (0.18)
Can wife inherit land 0.16 1.24 0.11 0.10
(0.12) (0.75) (0.07) (0.15)
Funeral arranged by family or clan -0.24* -1.70* -0.16* -0.04
(0.14) (0.97) (0.09) (0.13)
Tribe of HH head§ 0.000 0.015 0.008 0.087
Village level tribal shares§ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Religion§ 0.499 0.394 0.315 0.219
Survey wave§ 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.350
sigma^hat 11.10***
(0.32)
Sample Full Full Full remit > 0
Observations 2875 2875 2852 346
R-squared 0.161 0.116 0.219 0.290
No. of clusters 40 40 40 39
log likelihood -1843.0 -822.9
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at village level in parentheses.
A constant was included but is not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
§ Reports p-values for F-tests that all variables within category are zero.
Table 5: Alternative explanations
School logits, HRDS sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
TF -0.776** -0.781** -0.786** -0.765**
(0.339) (0.339) (0.341) (0.351)
Limited land availability -0.186
(0.242)
Land mainly inherited -0.357
(0.600)
Member of major tribe in cluster 0.015
(0.157)
Informal credit
Tribal population shares yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Region controls yes** yes** yes** yes**
School quality controls yes* yes* yes* yes*
Observations 3826 3826 3826 3826
Pseudo R-squared 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288
Regressions included additional control variables as in table 2, model 4: Age, Age^2, Birth-order, Gender, 
 HH expenditure, agriculture income, school expenditure, school distance, herd, no. of children
 land holdings, interaction terms and a constant.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A1. Summary statistics for HRDS sample
Variable Mean SD Min Max
TF 0.345 0.264 0.000 0.903
Age 11.558 3.142 7.000 17.000
Birth order 2.366 1.954 0.000 16.000
Girl 0.495 0.500 0.000 1.000
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 0.724 0.490 0.054 5.213
Daily HH expenditure per AE, squared 0.764 1.630 0.003 27.177
Agriculture is main income 0.893 0.309 0.000 1.000
HH exp*Agricultural income 0.637 0.495 0.000 4.863
School expenditure, cluster av. 6.118 3.413 1.718 19.281
School distance, cluster av. 1.471 0.989 0.185 5.417
Household has herd 0.386 0.487 0.000 1.000
Total number of children 5.068 2.856 0.000 19.000
Land (ha) 15.203 17.916 0.000 190.000
Adequate/good teachers 0.747 0.435 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good headmaster 0.814 0.389 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good school supplies 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good environment 0.549 0.498 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good self-reliance 0.774 0.418 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good Swahili 0.865 0.342 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good English 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good mathematics 0.768 0.422 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good moral classes 0.724 0.447 0.000 1.000
Limited land availability 0.324 0.355 0.000 1.000
Land mainly inherited 0.205 0.178 0.000 0.733
Informal credit 0.183 0.172 0.000 0.600
Member of major tribe in cluster 0.777 0.416 0.000 1.000
Observations 3826
Data source: HRDS
mean sd min max
Log(remittances) 0.969 2.655 0.000 12.553
TF 0.172 0.198 0.000 0.660
Formal sector job 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000
Completed primary school 0.379 0.485 0.000 1.000
Completed secondary school 0.153 0.360 0.000 1.000
Girl 0.330 0.470 0.000 1.000
Age 28.741 9.354 15.000 68.000
HH size 8.398 4.841 1.000 36.000
Mutual aid among farmers 0.722 0.448 0.000 1.000
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 0.439 0.682 0.000 9.023
Agriculture is main income 0.793 0.405 0.000 1.000
Log(Land (ha)) 0.669 0.772 -2.109 4.123
Household has herd 1.929 6.733 0.000 94.000
Community population size 3195.621 3078.783 525.000 18526.000
Catholic 0.552 0.497 0.000 1.000
Muslim 0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000
Protestant 0.183 0.387 0.000 1.000
Inheritance disputes past 12m 0.558 0.497 0.000 1.000
Can wife inherit land 0.357 0.479 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mhaya in village 0.665 0.396 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mnyambo in village 0.090 0.255 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mhangaza in village 0.095 0.274 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Msubi in village 0.022 0.088 0.000 0.500
Proportion of Mzinza in village 0.007 0.024 0.000 0.150
Proportion of Other tribes in village 0.163 0.292 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Kishubi in village 0.015 0.041 0.000 0.222
Funeral arranged by family or clan 0.703 0.457 0.000 1.000
Observations 2875
Table A2. Summary statistics KHDS sample
Table A.3. The effect of education on formal sector employment.
1 2 3
Some primary school 0.461* 0.480** 0.394
(0.243) (0.243) (0.257)
Completed primary school 1.185*** 1.196*** 1.074***
(0.267) (0.266) (0.287)
Completed secondary school 2.288*** 2.295*** 2.129***
(0.293) (0.293) (0.330)
Age 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.270***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.056)
Age^2 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Girl -0.680*** -0.681*** -0.726***
(0.144) (0.145) (0.148)
TF -0.236 0.012
(0.463) (0.600)
Village level tribal shares No No Yes
Survey wave Yes Yes Yes
Place of residence Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observations 2723 2723 2723
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant included, but results not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Data source: KHDS
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Figure 1: Tribal fractionalization in rural and urban clusters
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Abstract
There is little doubt in the literature, that poverty and liquidity constraints can drive
children out of school and into child labour in developing countries. But are there other
important explanations for low primary school enrolment rates? The child labour and
schooling literature often ignores that uncertainty about future returns results in a need for
risk diversication, that children function as old-age security providers when there are no
available pension systems, that the human capital investment decision of one child is likely
to be inuenced by that of his/her siblings, and that rural parents face a choice of investing
in either specic or general human capital of their children. In this paper, I investigate
the e¤ects of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital investment decision of
children in a household. I develop and calibrate a simple illustrative human capital portfolio
model and show that existing levels of uncertainty can indeed result in less than full school
enrolment within a household, even in a world of perfect credit markets. The paper thus
o¤ers an alternative explanation for why it might be optimal for rural parents not to send
all of their children to school.
Keywords: Schooling, child labour, specic human capital, traditional education, intergenera-
tional transfers, old-age security, uncertainty, income source diversication, liquidity constraints
Chapter 2 of PhD thesis
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1 Introduction
Primary school enrolment rates are low in many developing countries, and generally lower than
what policy makers aim for. This is problematic since schooling and human capital is central
for economic development. In the economic literature on child labour and schooling, the main
explanation for this lack of schooling is the inability of parents to borrow against the future en-
hanced earnings of children in order to nance their schooling today, e.g. Baland and Robinson
(2000), Ranjan (2001), Edmonds (2007). Most rural households live in a high risk environment
with incomplete credit and insurance markets, and virtually no social security system. Faced
with poverty or periodic income short falls, households have to resort to informal insurance
mechanisms to smooth consumption. It is often argued that one important mechanism is ad-
justing the labour supply of children as a means of ex-post risk coping. Liquidity constrained
households thus borrow on the human capital market rather than on the incomplete nancial
capital market. The focus on the constraints and costs side of the human capital investment
decision and on the use of child labour as a means of ex-post risk coping is the essence of the
explanations given in the child labour and schooling literature on why enrolment rates are low
and child labour widespread. Although these are valid explanations for why some children are
kept out of school in rural areas of developing countries, they might not constitute the full
explanation. It seems reasonable that households in risk prone environments will, apart from
their ex-post risk coping strategies, also consider the possibilities of ex-ante risk diversication.
In this paper, I therefore ask the following question: Can future income uncertainty result in
households keeping some of their children out of school as an optimal ex-ante risk diversication
strategy? I hypothesise that when there is uncertainty about future income of children and
when parents rely on this income for their old-age support, diversifying the future income
sources of children becomes an important means of ex-ante risk management. In rural areas,
the basis for such a diversication is laid already in the human capital investment decision.
Formal schooling will direct children towards future urban employment, whereas traditional
on-farm learning-by-doing will direct children towards the agricultural sector. With such a
sectoral divide in returns to education, the need for risk diversication, due to future income
uncertainty, can result in less than full enrolment into primary schools among siblings being an
optimal human capital investment strategy for the household. I nd that this is the case even if
there are perfect credit markets and schooling is the most protable human capital investment
choice for the individual child.
My main argument, that uncertainty and thus the need for risk diversication inuence
the joint schooling decision of children in a household, primarily grew out of insights from
literatures other than the child labour and schooling literature. These literatures will all be
reviewed in turn below, but the key points follow here. When focusing on a broader perspective
of the rural household rather than on the direct and indirect costs of schooling of the individual
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child, it becomes clear that the following factors may also inuence the joint human capital
investment decision of children in a household. First, future income is generally uncertain and
thus returns to education are uncertain. Second, in risk prone environments with very lim-
ited public pension schemes, children may not only play an important role in current ex-post
consumption smoothing, but also function as future old-age security assets of their parents.
Third, if there is uncertainty about the future income of children, ex-ante risk diversication
is an important means of income smoothing. There is thus no apparent reason to assume that
parents would consider the human capital investment decision of each child independently of
his or her siblings. Rather, if children indeed are the old-age security providers, then par-
ents should seek to optimize the portfolio of joint human capital investment decisions of their
children, such that they balance future returns and risk exposure. Finally, work participation
of children in household-based agricultural production systems may itself entail an important
element of training and, as such, be part of a traditional education. In such a traditional
rural environment, parents transfer specic human capital when working with their children,
directing these towards future agricultural self-employment. Formal schooling, on the other
hand, will direct them towards employment in the modern urban sector, where general human
capital skills are needed.
Building on these insights from the literature, I develop an illustrative portfolio model of
the joint human capital investment decision of all children in a household. The model is a
two-period unitary household model, where parents in the rst period decide on the optimal
human capital portfolio allocation of theirN children, where the choice is between either general
formal education (schooling) or specic traditional education (on-farm learning-by-doing). In
the second period, parents depend on the income of their adult children for consumption.
The formally educated children will earn income from the urban sector and the traditionally
educated children will earn income in the agricultural sector. Second period income is uncertain.
In the model I abstract from liquidity constraints and child labour in order to focus on the
pure e¤ects of future income uncertainty on schooling. My purpose is not to argue against
the inuence of poverty and credit constraints on schooling, but rather to complement these
existing explanations by analysing the human capital investment decisions of siblings jointly
and from an ex-ante risk management perspective. I wish to emphasise that the model is
only applicable to rural households where children can be engaged in traditional agricultural
production. Child labour is thus viewed solely as work participation in familiy-based farming.
The analysis should not be applied to children working as wage workers or otherwise under
hazardous or exploitative conditions.1
The analytical results of the model show that future income uncertainty has a negative
1See Edmonds (2007) for an overview of which types of economic activities working children engage in. Based
on cross-country UNICEF data sources, he estimates that 8% of children are engaged in wage work outside the
household.
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e¤ect on the proportion of children sent to school. However, this is a qualitative result and it
does not indicate whether existing levels of uncertainty could potentially keep some children
out of school purely due to future risk diversication, even if households are not liquidity
constrained in any way. The model is therefore calibrated using numerical values based on
household averages from a national household survey undertaken in Tanzania. As opposed to
two recent papers, which have also introduced uncertainty about the returns to schooling2, I
am able to show that a relatively small degree of uncertainty taken from a simple income spread
measure is enough for the optimal portfolio choice of the average household to be less than full
school enrolment, even in a world with perfect credit markets. Existing levels of uncertainty
can indeed result in parents only sending some, but not all children to school. This negative
e¤ect on the optimal human capital portfolio allocation can be surprisingly large, even in the
presence of perfect credit markets. For the average household, the pure e¤ect of uncertainty
is so strong that actual school enrolment rates could, in principle, be explained solely by the
existence of uncertainty. Thus, the roots of child labour and lack of schooling need not lie solely
with incomplete credit markets and poverty, but could also be caused by the fact that rural
households are not only concerned with securing their current, but also their future old-age
income. Future income uncertainty may constitute a very important element in the schooling
decisions of households and the need for future income source diversication and ex-ante risk
management can have direct implications for the optimal composition of a households human
capital portfolio of children. This adds a new perspective to the child labour debate, which has
previously been centered around the need for ex-post consumption smoothing in the liquidity
constrained household. These ndings have direct policy implications for educational policies,
the aim of which tends to be full enrolment into primary school. Policies, which only act on
the cost side of the human capital investment decision may be insu¢ cient in terms of reaching
full enrolment. It may well be necessary to supplement such policies with some that also act
on the return side of the investment decision.
Before turning to the details of the model, the next section looks at how this paper links
with existing papers on schooling and child labour, uncertainty about income, intergenerational
transfers and sibling dependence. The model is presented in section 3. Three di¤erent types of
preference structures are considered in slightly lengthly detail, mainly to ensure that prudence
is not generating the results. However, there is no indication of this being the case and the use
of standard CRRA preferences is probably the most appropriate choice. Calibration results are
shown in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2See Pouliot (2005) and Estevan and Baland (2007). Although the latter focuses on mortality risk of young
adults, this is in some sense also a source of uncertainty about returns to schooling seen from the parental point
of view. However, as Estevan and Baland (2007) argue, young adult mortality risk may in regions of sub-Saharan
Africa dominate the intrinsic uncertainty associated with returns to education.
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2 Related Literature
As mentioned above, the idea that uncertainty and risk diversication can inuence the joint
schooling decision of all children in a household grew out of insights from literatures on uncer-
tainty, income and consumption smooting and risk diversiation, on retuns to specic versus
general human capital, on sibling dependency, and on intergenerational transfers and children
as old-age security assets. Drawing on these literature, a broader basis is formed for analysing
the human capital investment decisions of a household as a whole, rather than for the individual
child.
2.1 Income and consumption smoothing
It is well-known that most rural households in developing countries live in a high risk envi-
ronment with incomplete credit and insurance markets, very limited public pension schemes
and virtually no social security system. In such an environment, children may provide an
important source of informal insurance, consumption smoothing and future old-age security.
That is, they may play an important role both as providers of additional sources of income,
when anticipated income of parents is low in old-age; and in the risk management strategies
of the household aimed at shielding consumption from income variations. These strategies are
generally two-fold; ex-ante risk management through income smoothing or ex-post risk coping
through consumption smoothing, see e.g. Morduch (1995) and Dercon (2002), and for a more
detailed analysis see Fafchamps (2003). I return to the role of children as old-age security
providers in section 2.6 below.
Ex-ante, households smooth income by diversifying their income sources, labour supply
and investments. The farm household diversies income sources in part by diversifying the
household labour supply between on-farm and non-farm economic activities, but also by di-
versifying the on-farm investments and production portfolio between a variety of crops, land
holdings and animal stock. Examples of widespread use of on-farm/non-farm diversication
of labour supply are found in Reardon (1997), C.B. Barrett and P.Webb (2001) and Dercon
and Krishnan (1996). Morduch (1990), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), and Dercon (1996)
all show that both the composition of agricultural investments and the production portfolio
are inuenced by the degree of income variability faced by a farm household. This results in
lower protability when income variability is high, because production portfolios with less risk
exposure and lower returns are chosen in high risk environment.
Ex-post, households shield consumption from idiosyncratic income shocks by obtaining
credit, depleting of assets and bu¤er stocks, readjusting the labour supply of household mem-
bers, and seeking assistance from the extended family or other informal risk sharing arrange-
ments, see Kotliko¤ and Spivak (1981), Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994). However, as
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Townsend (1994) showed, households are generally uninsured against covariate income shocks
at village level, typically due to adverse weather events. Under such circumstances, spatial
diversication of the extended family becomes an important informal insurance arrangement
through intergenerational transfers and remittances, see Rosenzweig (1988), Rosenzweig and
Stark (1989), and Appelbaum and Katz (1991).
Income and consumption smoothing mechanisms thus have important implications for the
allocation of labour and the investment portfolios of a household. The child labour literature
reviewed below has a strong emphasis on the role of children in achieving ex-post consumption
smoothing through increased child labour rather than schooling. However, the child labour
literature is virtually silent, when it comes to analysing the role of children in the ex-ante
income smoothing strategies of a household through future income diversication and informal
insurance possibilities, as suggested in the fertility literature, see below.
2.2 Child labour and schooling
There is, by now, an impressive number of articles in the child labour and schooling literature,
so many that various literature surveys have already been undertaken, see for example Basu
(1999), Andvig (2000), Brown, Stern, and Deardor¤ (2003), Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003)
and Edmonds (2007). I will therefore not even attempt at making an exhaustive review of the
literature, but rather focus on the subjects that this paper links with directly.
In general, the literature on child labour and schooling has focussed on one major reason
for children being sent to work: binding credit constraints which tend to go hand-in-hand with
poverty. Households are not able to cover the current costs of schooling. Most of the literature
is based on the intertemporal human capital investment model by Ben-Porath (1967). He
simply suggests that each individual must invest in an additional year of education as long as
the increase in the discounted future earnings is larger than the current direct costs (e.g. school
fees) and indirect costs (foregone earnings) of schooling. It is assumed that the individual can
borrow against his/her future earnings to nance each additional year of schooling at perfect
capital markets.
However, in developing countries, nancial capital markets are far from perfect and the
banking sector is almost non-existent. Credit sources are therefore often informal social net-
works or local moneylenders with high interest rates, see Udry (1994) and Deaton (1997, ch.6.3).
Such credit sources seldom provide a plausible means of nancing long term human capital in-
vestments, although they can be used for smoothing consumption in the short run when faced
with income shocks.
Basu and Van (1998), Baland and Robinson (2000) and Ranjan (1999, 2001) all analyse,
theoretically, how liquidity constraints can increase child work and reduce schooling because
parents are unable to reduce current consumption by the direct and indirect costs of schooling
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due to poverty and they are unable to borrow against the future earnings of their children.
The fact that parents cannot borrow against the future income of their children, arise for two
reasons. One is the incomplete credit market, which limits intertemporal transfers. The other
is the problem of agency, or what Baland and Robinson (2000) model as insu¢ cient levels
of altruism between parents and children, which limits intergenerational transfers, see also
Parsons (1984), and Becker and Murphy (1988). The agency problem arises from the fact that
parents cannot strictly enforce repayment of the educational expenses when children become
adults and experience returns to the human capital investments made by parents when young.
However, although the theoretical papers, and in particular Baland and Robinson (2000), focus
on these two main reasons for child labour and lack of schooling, the corresponding empirical
literature has virtually only focussed on the e¤ect of binding credit constraints and poverty.
Few papers have analysed the link between child labour and intergenerational transfers, I will
return to this below.
Although there is general agreement, theoretically, about the negative e¤ects of poverty and
credit constraints on schooling, causal e¤ects and not mere correlations are hard to identify
empirically. Some studies have found the expected negative correlations between credit con-
straints, poverty and schooling, but this is at best suggestive evidence consistent with theory,
see Jacoby (1994), Jensen and Nielsen (1997) and Bhalotra (2007) for examples on household
data, and Krueger (1996) and Dehejia and Gatti (2002) for cross-country evidence. Yet, other
studies have found mixed evidence, no signicant correlations or even signicantly positive cor-
relations between income or wealth and child labour, see Coulombe and Canagarajah (1998),
and Ray (2000). Bhalotra and Heady (2003) emphasise that there can be a wealth paradox
in relation to child labour, which arise when there are imperfections in the land and labour
markets. If the demand for labour cannot be met, farm households may have to use own labour
resources, including those of their children.
A second group of studies have analysed the relationship between poverty and child labour
over the full income range. They all nd that it can be highly non-monotonic, locally. Edmonds
(2005) and Bhalotra (2007) base their theoretical set-up on the notion from Basu and Van
(1998) that only households which cannot a¤ord otherwise in terms of subsistence, send their
children to work. Edmonds (2005) nds that there is dramatic non-linearityin the relationship
between child labour and household expenditure in the neighbourhood of the poverty line.
The expected negative relationship generally only appears for households above the poverty
line. Bhalotra (2007) nds that sons in Pakistan do indeed engage in wage-work because
of subsistence poverty. Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) take a theoretical approach and use
the model in Baland and Robinson (2000) to show that rising incomes can lead to more child
labour. This happens when income rises enough to reduce old-age transfers from adult children
to parents, but not enough for the credit constraints not to bind and thus for parents to send
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their young children to school purely out of altruism. The result is that the relationship between
income and child labour may be neither monotonically decreasing nor continuous. All three
papers show that there is an overall negative relationship between income and child labour,
but local estimates can very well produce a positive or insignicant relationship due to local
non-monotonicities.
A third group of studies have focussed on estimating the e¤ect of exogenous transitory
variations in income on child labour and schooling. By choosing such an estimation strategy,
these studies come closer to identication of a causal relation between child labour and income
and, thus, of the possible e¤ect of credit constraints and consumption smoothing. Jacoby and
Skouas (1997), Jensen (2000) and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006) all estimate the e¤ect of
current transitory income shocks, either due to adverse weather or accidental unanticipated crop
loss (e.g. due to insects or re), on human capital investment or child labour. They nd clear
indications of self-insurance strategies resulting in a reduction of human capital investments
and/or increasing levels of child work. These adverse e¤ects of income shortfalls are contributed
to the lack of ex-post consumption smoothing possibilities on the local incomplete credit market.
Edmonds (2006) propose an alternative way of estimating the e¤ects of credit constraints on
child labour and schooling. He uses the timing of a fully anticipated age-dependent increase in
income, pensions. If credit markets are complete, the announcement of a permanent increase
in income should have an immediate e¤ect on schooling. If credit markets are incomplete and
households face borrowing constraints, the e¤ect on schooling will only occur after the increase
in income has actually taken place. He nds indications of credit constraints, especially in rural
areas.
The literature on how poverty and/or credit constraints a¤ect child labour and schooling
decisions concentrates on the need for ex-post consumption smoothing to overcome income
uctuations and current uncertainty. However, in this paper, I argue that the ex-ante need
for risk diversication might also be an important factor in the allocation of childrens time
between schooling and work. If schooling is considered an investment, any future uncertainty
about its return should have an impact on the decision to invest.
2.3 Uncertainty about future returns
A recent issue of Labour Economics (vol 14, issue 6) was devoted to research on education and
risk. Although the papers focus on education in the context of a developed country, several
points stand out. It is noted that even though investments in human capital are often thought
of in the same way as investments in nancial or physical capital, the concept of risk in returns
or future uncertainty is often missing in the discussion of schooling decisions, e.g. Hogan and
Walker (2007). And, importantly, Cunha and Heckman (2007) point to the fact that ex-ante,
not ex-post, returns are what agents act on, when making their schooling decision.
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In the literature on child labour and schooling in developing countries, very few papers
have looked at the e¤ect of future uncertainty. Fitzsimons (2007) estimates the e¤ect of future
uncertainty in parental income, predicted by past rainfall variability, on education choices of
children. Appelbaum and Katz (1991) analyse a similar problem theoretically. Both papers
nd negative e¤ects of future uncertainty in parental income on schooling when credit markets
are incomplete. Pouliot (2005) uses the Baland and Robinson (2000) model to show that
when there is incomplete insurance and uncertainty about returns to education, then the level
of child labour will be ine¢ ciently high, even when there are perfect credit markets and no
poverty (positive bequests from parents to children in old-age). However, Pouliot (2005) does
not consider the e¤ects of uncertainty on schooling and child labour, when parents rely on the
income of their children for old-age support, nor does he consider how much uncertainty is
necessary for child labour to dominate schooling. Estevan and Baland (2007) argue that only
high mortaility rates among adult children can generate enough uncertainty for parents to alter
their human capital investment decision.
Although this paper is closely related to the models of Pouliot (2005) and Estevan and Ba-
land (2007), it di¤ers in two fundamental ways. First, because the negative e¤ect of uncertainty
of schooling is established not only analytically, but also numerically by calibrating the model
using household survey data showing that existing levels of income variation is indeed enough
to predict strong negative e¤ects of uncertainty on schooling. Second, because the e¤ect of
future uncertainty on schooling is analysed for the full set of children at household level.
2.4 Siblings
Allowing for sibling dependency and portfolio e¤ects, which can yield very di¤erent predictions
compared to one-child models and, not least, provide an alternative explanation for sibling
di¤erences. There is a variety of papers analysing sibling di¤erences in educational attainment
and child labour. These papers are roughly grouped by two di¤erent approaches. One group
focus on explaining positive birth order e¤ects on schooling. Di¤erent explanations, which
are not simply attributed to parental preferences, have been given. If the household faces
credit constraints, older children might have to work to help nance the education of the
younger siblings, see Willis and Parish (1993), Emerson and Souza (2002) and Manacorda
(2006). The birth order e¤ects could also be due to the fertility decision being ruled by the
genetic endowment of the last born child. If the youngest child is high-ability, Ejrnæs and
Pörtner (2004) argue, then parents are more likely not to have additional children compared
to a situation where the youngest child is low ability. This results in a higher probability
of schooling among the youngest children. Edmonds (2006b) argue that older siblings (lower
birth order) have a comparative advantage over the younger ones in household production and
therefore are less likly to be sent to school.
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The other group of papers focus on explaining sibling di¤erences in general. Horowitz
and Wang (2004) also point to the fact that there might be heterogeneity in the ability of
children, which can lead to one child having a comparative advantage over other children in
the accumulation of human capital. Dahan and Gaviria (2003) show that di¤erences can also
arise, even for completely identical siblings, as long as households are credit constrained and
there are increasing returns to human capital investment (e.g. due to sheepskin e¤ects of school
diplomas). Their model has a clear empirical implication, very poor households will not be
educating any children, middle income households will be educating some and rich households
will be educating all children. Their ndings from Latin America are broadly consistent with
this prediction of the model. Morduch looks at, what he terms, sibling rivalry, see Garg and
Morduch (1998) and Morduch (2000). He argues that the competition for resources within
the household is gender specic and nds that moving from an all-brothers to an all-sisters
household can be benecial in terms of schooling (in Tanzania) or health (in Ghana). Bommier
and Lambert (2004) follow up on this and propose a test for whether such dependency among
siblings is due to competition for resources or a result of more complicated interactions between
siblings, say as being substitutes or complements for each other in the household production
function or in the parental utility function. Their empirical ndings are in favour of a model
with interaction, although their test does not allow them to identify where these interactions
originate from.
In the majority of these papers, sibling di¤erences stem from poverty or binding credit
constraints and the need for ex-post consumption smoothing. Only Bommier and Lambert
(2004) discuss the possibility that sibling di¤erences could arise due to explicit dependencies,
rather than dependency arising because of a common credit constraint.
By analysing the joint human capital investment decision for all children in a household,
I allow for dependency among siblings. The dependency in the model of this paper stems
purely from the need for future irisk diversication. Uncertainty about future returns a¤ects
the optimal human capital portfolio choice of the household in their balancing of risk exposure
against the level of returns. If there is no uncertainty about future returns, the model collapses
to a model of N identical and independent children for whom the educational choice will all
be the same and thus directly resembles standard child labour models in the literature.
2.5 Specic vs. general human capital
In some of the early economics literature on child labour and schooling, one can still come across
more positive aspects of child labour. For instance, in their classic survey, Rodgers and Standing
emphasise that (...) it is important not to confuse schooling with education. Many other
activities contribute to education, and some forms of economic activity are among them. and
(...) work itself may be an important component of "education" especially in household-based
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production systems (...)", Rodgers and Standing (1981, p.10 & p.33, respectively.). Bonnet
(1993) notes that work participation is part of a traditional educational process in Africa and
that this traditional education may o¤er the best survival prospects for the future, i.e. also
better than formal education. Here Bonnet, implicitly, touches upon two di¤erent aspects
of why children are working. One is the social anthropological aspect of work participation
being an important component of the traditional education and the socialisationof a child;
the other is the economic aspect focusing on the returns to traditional education compared to
formal education.
In the social anthropological literature, there is a clear distinction between traditional
education based on indigenous knowledge, and formal education based on Western principles.
In traditional education, children learn by participating in the work of, in the early years, their
mothers and, later for the boys, in the work of their fathers, Bradley (1993). Child labour is
regarded as the accumulation of specic human capital through learning-by-doing; it is a way
of socialisingthe child, i.e. of adapting it to its environment and teaching it the life skills
necessary for survival, Andvig (2000). African parents term it responsibility training, Agiobu-
Kemmer (1992). However, it should be emphasised that this type of traditional education is
concentrated in rural areas and less applicable to children in urban areas. Bekombo (1981)
notes, the productive activity of a child living in a rural and traditional environment is a means
of social integration and cannot be likened to paid work.But in a modern urban environment,
when childrens work is no longer integrated into an educational system it becomes a "deviant"
and "delinquent" activity (...), Bekombo (1981, p.114).
Bock (1998, 2002) takes the analysis of the educational element in child work particiption
one step deeper. He notes that parents are faced with a choice, when allocating their childrens
time to di¤erent tasks. Some tasks are more complex than others and therefore have a higher
learning potential. Parents thus have to make the trade-o¤ between letting their children do
simple (often boring) tasks with low learning but an immediate return, or letting them do more
di¢ cult tasks with high learning, more supervisional needs and only future returns in the form
of higher specic human capital. Child work may therefore not always bring immediate returns
as it is generally assumed in the recent economic child labour literature, but might even be
costly and time consuming for parents, the stronger the educational element. Bock emphasises
that there is a trade-o¤ between task complexity and immediate output within traditional
education and that parents are well aware of the need for generating learning opportunities for
their children to ensure future agricultural returns.
According to the social anthropological literature, the introduction of formal education
based on Western principles has not been unproblematic in Africa. The traditional concept of
knowledge was suddenly questioned. Western knowledge is seen as de-contextual and rational,
rather than ethical, Daun (1992). It is argued that Western education has induced unfavourable
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changes in the behaviour of students away from the African sense of collective concern towards
Western individualism, it has weakened the gerontocracies, threatened the continuation of
traditional values and way of life, and resulted in brain drain of the rural villages, see for
instance Schildkrout (1981), Daun (1992) and Odora (1992). Equally problematic, though, is
the perceived lack of returns of schooling, Rodgers and Standing (1981) and Bonnet (1993).
Agiobu-Kemmer (1992) notes that where traditional education hardly ever left an individual
jobless, formal Western education entails a risk of future urban unemployment. If this is,
indeed, the perception or even the reality of formal education in rural Africa that it broadens
your mind, but it does not tell you how to surviveas an African commentator puts it3, then
local reservations toward schooling and a continued emphasis on traditional specic learning is
fully understandable.
The economics literature on returns to schooling conrms that there are limited or even
no returns to formal education in simple traditional agricultural production systems. A key
contribution in this area is Rosenzweig (1995). He argues that there has to be productive
learning opportunities for schooling to result in positive returns. When the production tec-
nology is simple, schooling does not increase productivity. Children accumulate the necessary
human capital through specic experience when working along side their parents, Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1985). This is typically the case in traditional agricultural household-based pro-
duction systems, where best practises have been known for and passed on by generations,
Rosenzweig (1996). Returns to formal education are only positive, when new complex tech-
nologies are introduced, creating an environment for productive learning opportunities. An
example of this is the introduction of high-yielding variety seeds under the Green Revolution
in India, where Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) nd increasing returns to primary education
during periods of technical progress. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) and Jolli¤e (2004)
conrm the ndings by Rosenzweig of low or no returns when agricultural technologies are
simple. They use data from rural Pakistan and rural Ghana and show that on-farm returns to
education are low, but o¤-farm returns can be high. This results in a shift of educated labour
resources within the farm household away from farm activities and towards non-farm economic
activities. Likewise, Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) nd that on-farm child labour drops and
schooling attendance increases with urban proximity, which they interpret as a reection of
local labour market possibilities. They note that participation in subsistence work - primarily
farming - may be seen as a benecial activity by parents, probably because it teaches important
skills to children, (Fafchamps and Wahba (2006)).
From this dispersed literature on the training component in on-farm child work, there
are two main points to emphasise; rst that child labour may be an important element in a
traditional educational system, which emphasises the accumulation of specic human capital
3Agiobu-Kemmer (1992, p.7)
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through experience; and second that returns to specic human capital might match or even be
higher than returns to general human capital acquired through formal schooling in traditional
rural environments. These two points seem largely ignored in the child labour literature, only
Bommier and Lambert (2000) and de Vreyer, Lambert, and Magnac (1999) have followed the
line of thought of distinguishing between specic and general human capital to explain delayed
enrolment into primary schools and sibling di¤erences in educational attainment. Surprisingly,
child work is generally modelled purely as an additional current income source, e.g. Basu and
Van (1998) and Baland and Robinson (2000) and the papers, which have followed in their
wake. Bommier and Dubois (2004) even go one step further and introduce disutility of labour
among children without adding the investment aspect4. These approaches are highly relevant,
when considering disturbing images of hazardous and exploitative child labour or even simple
wage work. Less so, when considering children engaged in traditional agricultural work on the
familiy-run farms or household plots. Indeed, the vast majority of the many working children
in Sub-Saharan Africa are engaged in these household-based production systems, see Bhalotra
and Tzannatos (2003).
In this paper, there is a clear distinction between traditional and formal education that
is between specic human capital aimed at the agricultural sector and general human capital
aimed at the modern urban sector. Child labour is thus seen as an educational alternative
to formal schooling with di¤erent future prospects. My purpose is not to argue against the
importance of child work in overcoming poverty, credit constraints and income shocks, but
simply to point to the fact that the role of children and their economic activities might be
more complex than that in a traditional agricultural environment.
2.6 Intergenerational transfers and children as old-age security
A central assumption in the portfolio model in section 3 is that parents depend on the income
of their children for old-age support. This assumption is based on the fertility literature, and
supported by empirical literature on intergenerational transfers.
In the fertility literature, the argument for having children often extends beyond a pure
consumption argument of parents deriving utility from having children, just as they derive
utility from consuming goods. This is especially the case, when analysing fertility decisions of
households faced with considerable risk, incomplete credit and insurance markets and highly
inadequate or no public pension or social security schemes. In such an environment, it is often
argued that children may function as security assets. Generally, the old-age security aspect of
children is emphasised and Nugent (1985) is, by now, a classic reference on the subject. Children
may also function as security assets in terms of insurance, because their future income sources
represent additional risk diversication possibilities, in particular Appelbaum and Katz (1991)
4They also do not consider the possibility that children might experience disutility of schooling.
13
emphasise the risk diversication aspect, but Cain (1981, 1983) and Pörtner (2001) also discuss
the insurance role of children. In the fertility literature, children are thus naturally considered
as part of the ex-ante risk management strategies of a household. If children indeed play the
role of security assets, this is likely not only to a¤ect fertility, but also the human capital
investments in these children.
In the child labour and schooling literature, the old-age security motive for investing in the
general human capital of children, has often been dismissed due to agency problems, see e.g.
Udry (2004). That is, it is impossible for parents and children to engage in an intergenerational
enforceable contract of parents nancing the human capital investments of children in return
for future old-age transfers, Parsons (1984) and Becker and Murphy (1988). Thus, unless there
are high degrees of altruism between parents and children, old-age support is not seen as a
motive for human capital investments, e.g. Baland and Robinson (2000).
Nugent (1985) is aware of the problems of agency, in what he terms, loyalty of children to
their parents in old-age. He claims, however, that there is scope for loyalty training, which, he
argues, is facilitated by cultural norms in traditional societies. Norms is often argued to be an
e¤ective means of overcoming agency problems, see for instance De Vos (1985) and Lucas and
Stark (1985), but also chapter 1 of this thesis for a more recent discussion5.
Despite possible agency problems, there is ample empirical evidence that intergenerational
transfers from children to parents do occur, e.g. Lee, Parish, and Willis (1994) and Lillard
and Willis (1997, 2002). And some suggestive evidence that such transfers are in fact part of
an informal old-age support system, Nugent and Gillaspy (1983) and De Vos (1985). More
recent studies achieve better identication of this informal support system, because they show
that the introduction of public security schemes, at least partially, crowd out private transfers,
see Cox and Jimenez (1992) for evidence from Peru, and Jensen (2003) for even more robust
evidence from South Africa. It therefore seems resonable to assume that parents rely on some
support from their children in old-age, although they might not be able to fully control it.
Recently, a few theoretical papers on child labour and schooling have acknowledged the
importance of future intergenerational transfers for the human capital investment decisions
today. Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) use the link between schooling and expected future
transfers from children to parents to show that the relationship between child labour and
parental income need not be monotonically decreasing, see above. Chakraborty and Das (2005)
argue that there is positive relationship between life expectancy and human capital investment,
because only parents that actually reach old-age will be able to benet from their educational
investments in their children. Raut and Tran (2005) suggest that if intergenerational transfers
5There is some discussion in the literature on intergenerational transfers about whether transfers from children
to parents occur as pure repayments of human capital investments, due to altruism or simply because social
norms dictate it, see e.g. Lucas and Stark (1985), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko¤ (1997) and more recently Raut
and Tran (2005). This is a separate question, beyond the scope of this paper.
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are simply an alternative means of nancing schooling, then parental investment in eduaction is
socially optimal. Although, if intergenerational transfers are based on altruism and reciprocity,
then some parents will underinvest in their childrens human capital and their is scope for policy
intervention. Their ndings, using Indonesian data, support the latter hypothesis. These three
papers are the rst attempts at establishing a link between the literatures on child labour
and intergenerational transfers. By adding uncertainty about future income of children to the
equation, this paper is an additional contribution to such a link.
3 Theoretical Framework
The model developed in this paper di¤ers from most of the models in the existing child labour
literature in four ways. First, the model introduces uncertainty about the future returns to
education, i.e. about childrens future income. Second, parents rely on the future income of
their children for old-age support. This gives parents a clear incentive to choose an optimal
human capital portfolio of their children in terms of balancing returns and risk exposure,
given their degree of risk aversion. Third, the model is not a one parent - one child model
of human capital investment, but rather a one parent - N children model, where the human
capital investment decision of children is modelled jointly, thus allowing for sibling dependence.
Fourth, there is a clear distinction between general human capital acquired through schooling
and specic human capital acquired through work experience. Child labour is thus modelled as
an educational alternative, which directs children towards future agricultural income sources,
whereas formal schooling directs children towards future urban income sources.
A theoretical framework is designed, which emphasises the e¤ect of future uncertainty and
the need for risk diversication on the allocation of children between schooling and labour in a
household. To exhibit clearly what the e¤ects of uncertainty and risk diversication are, I begin
by abstracting from the conventional explanations for child labour and low school enrolment.
That is, I assume that credit markets are perfect, such that households do not face any liquidity
constraints, and that there are no agency problems between generations, such that parents can
rely on full old-age support from their children. Later both liquidity constraints and child
labour are introduced allowing me to compare model predictions under di¤erent scenarios.
The basic model set-up gives a general understanding of how uncertainty can a¤ect the
human capital investment allocation. By specifying a simple preference structure and the
sources of uncertainty, it is possible to arrive at closed form solutions. It is straightforward to
show analytically that uncertainty about future returns can have a negative e¤ect on schooling
both in a one-child model and for N children. However, the question of interest is whether
the negative e¤ect is large enough for the model to predict lower levels of schooling given
realistic levels of uncertainty about childrens future income. In section 4, the model is therefore
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calibrated using data driven numerical values for a variety of di¤erent preference structures and
under di¤erent scenarios.
3.1 The basic model
The model is a two period unitary household model, where parents function as a unied sole
decision maker. There is no discounting of the future and no interest rate on savings or credit.
In the rst period, parents earn agricultural income Y1; which they allocate between rst period
household consumption c1, savings s; and the education expenses for their N children. N is
assumed to be exogenously given, since the emphasis here is not on the e¤ect of uncertainty
on fertility decisions, but on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the joint human capital investment
decision of children, given the fertility of the household.6
There are two types of education in the model, general formal education achieved through
primary schooling and specic traditional education achieved through on-farm learning-by-
doing. Traditional education directs children towards future employment in the agricultural
sector (a), whereas formal education directs children towards future employment in the non-
agricultural urban sector (b) in the second period. Parents thus face a discrete choice for each
of the N children of whether he or she should be educated traditionally or formally. A child
can only receive one type of education7. In the second period, traditionally educated children
earn agricultural income, ya2 , whereas formally educated children earn urban income, y
b
2:
Parents do not generate any income in the second period, but rely fully on their savings
and the joint agricultural and urban income transfers from their N children for second period
household consumption, c2. Second period income is uncertain. Parents therefore maximise a
joint von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility function dened over and separable in house-
hold consumption, ct, where t = 1; 2: The utility function is assumed to be concave, such that
U 0(c) > 0 and U 00(c) < 0: The household solves the following maximisation problem
max
;s
EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2) (1)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb   s (2)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2) + s
6 It is conceivable that the fertility decision and the human capital investment decision of the born and unborn
children are both inuenced by the parentspreference for old-age security, which suggests modelling the two
decisions jointly. However, to keep things simple, I focus on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the human
capital investmnet decision of children conditional on the household having completed their fertility.
7This is a simplifying assumption. The choice here is not on how many hours a child spends in school or
working, but rather whether he or she graduates with full primary school education or not.
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where  is the proportion of children, which parents have chosen to educate formally through
schooling. That is,  is the portfolio allocation of children between traditional and formal
human capital investments. The number of children who receive schooling in the rst period is
thus given by N and the number who are educated within the traditional agricultural based
system is (1 )N .8 The total amount of educational expenses is (1 )Nea+Neb; where ea
is the educational expenditure for each child in traditional education, e.g. supervisional costs
of parents, and eb is the educational expenditure for each child in formal education, e.g. tuition
fees and uniform costs. Educational expenditures are allowed to di¤er over the two sectors,
and they are considered both non-negative.9
Savings can be negative, and both the discount rate and the interest rate are normalised to
unity and are thus explicitly left out of the model for simplicity. By assuming perfect credit
markets, I can ignore any e¤ect of liquidity constraints on the schooling decision and thus focus
on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital portfolio decision of all
N children in the household. The question is: can this alone result in less than full school
enrolment among siblings, i.e. a model prediction of  < 1 solely due to uncertainty.
Second period consumption will equal any capital transfers from period one in terms of
savings or dissavings, s plus a fraction, 1=N; of total income of all children, which is given
by the income of children in the agricultural sector (1   )Nya2 ; and the income of children
in the urban sector Nyb2. Children are thus assumed to transfer a certain fraction of their
income to their parents. The fraction is the same for all children, irrespective of their sector of
employment, but it depends on their number of siblings for  > 0: In principle,  2 [0; 1]; but
in the following I will assume that  2]0; 1[ to ensure that there is a positive, but diminishing
marginal e¤ect of having more children on second period income. When  = 0, children share
all their income with their parents. When  = 1 children share only a fraction 1=N of their
income with their parents, resulting in parents receiving the equivalent of one full income from
their children in total. If there is only one child in the household that child will be the sole
breadwinner of the family in the second period and is forced to share his/her full income with
the parents, irrespective of the size of :
Parents are faced with two choice variables; how much to save or dissave s; and which
proportion of their children to educate formally through schooling . The rst order condition
with respect to s is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2) (3)
8For analytical simplicity,  is written as continuous in the theoretical model, but it will be treated as discrete
in the calibrations and in the empirical model.
9While the literature on child labour and schooling generally set ea as negative and thus as a source of income,
I here follow Bock (2002) in stating that the overall learning potential in the tasks completed by children in
agriculture is higher than the immediate return. If children were only undertaking tasks with no learning, but
high immediate output, such as fetching water or rewoods, there would be no transfer of farm-specic human
capital from parents to children and therefore no future agricultural return from such activities.
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That is, savings s will be chosen such that marginal utility in period one equals the expected
marginal utility of period two. The rst order condition with respect to  is given by equation
(4), where  is the optimal solution for the maximisation problem above
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for 0 <  < 1
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) > E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 0
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) < E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 1
(4)
where
E[N1 (yb2 ya2)U 0(c2)] = E(N1 (yb2 ya2))EU 0(c2)+cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) cov(N1 ya2 ; U 0(c2))
Uncertainty about second period income results in two covariance terms, both negative, between
the second period income variables, ya2 and y
b
2, and marginal utility, U
0(c2). These terms will,
when they are strong enough, pull the optimal portfolio allocation,  away from each of the
two corner solutions. Uncertainty in the agricultural sector will have a positive e¤ect on 
because it will increase the right hand side of the rst order consition for  and pull towards
the  = 1 corner solution. Uncertainty in the urban sector, on the other hand, will have a
negative e¤ect on  because it will decrease the right hand side of the the rst order condition
for  and thus pull towards the  = 0 corner solution.
In the following, I assume that there is no covariant uncertainty between second period
income from children in the urban sector and children in the agricultural sector. This allows
me to simplify the problem by normalising uncertainty about income from the agricultural
sector to zero, and thus solely focus on the e¤ect of uncertainty of urban income on the
optimal proportion of children in formal schooling. Going back to the rst order condition
for ; equation (4), this means concentrating on the covariance term, which can reduce the
right-hand side of the rst order condition and thus reduce the optimal : That is, focusing
on the somewhat more relevant question of what can result in an optimal  below 1, rather
than what can result in an optimal  above 0.
This is not to say that there is no uncertainty in the agricultural sector, but rather that
uncertainty associated with income transfers from distant migrant children in the urban sector
is higher. These migrant children may face higher income levels, but also relatively more
variation, since the urban labour market entails a risk of unemployment, which is not present
among subsistence farmers in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, parents may also perceive
the size and the frequency of income transfers from urban migrant children to be more uncertain
compared to the daily support and in-kind assistance from home children engaged in local
agricultural sector10. The uncertainty, that parents face about income transfers from migrant
10The uncertainty could thus also, in e¤ect, be an intergenerational agency problem between parents and
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children in urban sector is modelled as a simple mean-preserving spread. Each migrant child
can either get a good (typically formal sector) job or not, where the probability of a good draw
in the urban labour market is given by p = 0:5. Migrant children in good jobs have an urban
income of yb2 =  + ", whereas migrant children without good jobs have an urban income of
yb2 =   ":11 This means that second period urban income is given by
yb2 =
(
+ "
  "
w.p.
w.p.
p = 0:5
(1  p) = 0:5
The mean and the variance for each child in the urban sector is E(yb2) =  and V ar(y
b
2) = "
2:
Given this specication of uncertainty, the rst order condition for  rewrites (4) as
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]  0
where the specication of the covariance term will depend on the degree of risk correlation
in the urban labour market outcome. The expected total income transfers from all the N
children, which have gone to the urban sector, is simply E(N1 yb2) = N1 ; independent
of the degree of risk correlation among migrant siblings. But the variance of their expected
total income, V ar(N1 yb2) and the covariance above, cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) will both depend
on the degree of risk correlation in urban income.
I consider the two extremes where income transfers from siblings in urban employment are
either perfectly correlated or uncorrelated. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between. When
there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban employment, all siblings will either have
a good draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (+"); or they will all have
a bad draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (  "), hence the variance
is V ar(N1 yb2) = 2N2 2"2 . When there is no risk correlation among siblings, they all
face the same urban labour market lottery irrespective of the labour market outcomes of their
siblings. The variance under no risk correlation is thus smaller and depends on the binomial
coe¢ cient
 
N
i

, where i denotes the number of successful siblings in the urban labour market
(i.e. those where yb2 = + ") and N is the total number of siblings in the urban sector in the
second period, V ar(N1 yb2) = N 
NP
i=0
 
N
i

1
2N
(i"  (N   i)")2 = N1 "2:
As long as uncertainty in the agricultural sector and the urban sector do not covary, house-
migrant children. Their degree of success is harder to monitor and lack of family control increases with the
distance. Social sanctions are often mentioned as e¤ective means in overcoming such agency problems and
thereby helping to reduce at least one source of future uncertainty. In chapter 1, we analyse the e¤ect of such
sanctions on the demand for formal schooling.
11 I do not explicitly consider a mortality risk of young adults as in Estevan and Baland (2007). However, the
model could easily be extended to include such risk, but if mortality risk is exogenous to choice of education, it
would simply just add a higher level of uncertainty in both the agricultural and urban sector. The qualitative
ndings of the model would not change.
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holds will have an incentive to diversify their human capital investments to reduce future risk
exposure. If the need for diversication is strong enough, this will have a negative impact on the
proportion of children sent to school in the optimal human capital portfolio of the household.
3.2 Specication of preferences
The choice of preference structure and degree of risk aversion is crucial for the model predictions.
In the following, analytical results are derived for the quadratic utility function to allow for
risk aversion without prudence. Prudence is introduced later, rst by introducing a very small
cubic term in the quadratic utility function, and second simply by looking at a standard CRRA
utility function, which incorporates both risk averison and prudence. Analytically, a model with
quadratic preferences is much more tractable than CRRA preferences, making it possible to
arrive at an analystical solution for  and to look at its derivatives. Numerically, however,
there is no di¤erence in tractability, and, CRRA preferences are likely to be a more realistic
preference structure. An additional benet of CRRA preferences is that only one parameter
needs to be determined exogenously, the relative degree of risk aversion, . The model is
calibrated for all three types of preferences in section 4, but the reported results will be mainly
on the model predictions based on CRRA preferences.
3.2.1 Quadratic utility
It seems plausible to expect households in developing countries to be both risk averse and
prudent. However, to keep these two matters apart and to ensure that results are not driven
by prudence in the preference structure, but only by risk aversion, assume for now that the
utility function is quadratic and thus that the third derivative is zero, i.e. no prudence. This
implies that there is certainty equivalence in the marginal utility, E(U 0(ct)) = U 0(E(ct)); since
marginal utility is linear in ct: Dene
U(ct) =Mct   1
2
ct
2 (5)
for both periods. M is the bliss point of maximum consumption. So utility increases in ct,
U 0(ct) = M   ct > 0; but at a decreasing rate, U 00(ct) =   < 0 and U 000(ct) = 0. It should
be noted that the quadratic utility function does not belong to the class of CRRA or CARA
utility functions, but has the rather awkward feature of increasing absolute risk aversion, when
the consumption level increases. I will return to this below.
Given the quadratic utility function, the rst order condition for s simply rewrites as
M   c1 =M   Ec2
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so the perfect credit market ensures that consumption in period 1 equals the expected con-
sumtion in period 2. From this it is also clear that in this simple model, endogenous N would
result in an innite number of children in each household as long as second period earnings
are higher than rst period education expenditures. Thus, since the choice of schooling is the
focus of this analysis, and not the fertility choice, N is modelled as an exogenous variable.
The rst order condition for the proportion of children in schooling,  under perfect risk
correlation becomes
N(eb   ea)(M   c1) = N1 (  ya2)(M   Ec2)  N2 2"2
and the equivalent equation under no risk correlation among siblings in second period urban
income is given by
N(eb   ea)(M   c1) = N1 (  ya2)(M   Ec2)  N1 2"2
Thus, only the covariance terms di¤er for these rst order conditions for . Under perfect risk
correlation cov(Nyb2; U
0(c2)) =  N2 2"2; and under no risk correlation cov(Nyb2; U 0(c2)) =
 N1 2"2; see appendix A1.
The rst order conditions are given by two equations in two unknowns, s and ; which
can be solved for analytically. When there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban
employment, the optimal educational allocation for the household in period one will be
cor =

 
N2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea)

 [N2 + 2N"2]
(6)
where  = (  ya2) N(eb   ea): The corresponding choice under no risk correlation among
urban employed siblings is
uncor =

 
N2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea)

 [N2 + 2"2]
(7)
If formal education is more costly than traditional education, but also su¢ ciently more prof-
itable in expectation such that  > 0, then  will always be positive, the question is if it
will ever be less than unity. From equation (6) and (7), it is clear that cor < uncor, the
optimal allocation of children into formal education will always be lower when there is perfect
risk correlation, compared to no risk correlation, among urban employed siblings. The optimal
choice of savings will di¤er correspondingly, scor > suncor: Only when there is no uncertainty,
" = 0; or only one child in the household, N = 1; will cor = uncor. It should be noted that if
" = 0 and N = 1; then this model collapses to a standard model of human capital investment
used in the child labour literature. Since there are no liquidity constraints or agency problems,
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the model will always predict full school enrolment when there is no uncertainty, irrespective
of the number of children in the household as long as returns to formal education are higher
than returns to agricultural education that is as long as  > 0.
The real question of interest here is whether uncertainty alone is enough to drive  below
unity even under perfect credit markets. From the analytical solutions for ,(6) and (7), it
is clear that an increase in uncertainty measured by " or similarly an increase in the variance
of urban income, "2; will always have a negative e¤ect on the optimal proportion of children
in formal education, . Under perfect risk correlation among siblings in the urban labour
market, the derivate is given by
@cor
@"2
=  2N(N
2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))
 [N2 + 2N"2]2
< 0
and under no risk correlation by
@uncor
@"2
=  2(N
2M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))
 [N2 + 2"2]2
< 0
However, although the partial derivative of  with respect to " is clearly negative and stronger
uncer perfect risk correlation than in the uncorrelated case, it is uninformative about the size
of " necessary for the model to predict an optimal  below unity. To answer such question,
numerical solutions are needed, for this see calibration results in section 4.
Another partial derivative of interest is the e¤ect of belonging to a household with more
children, compared to one with less, on the optimal proportion of children in school, all else
equal. Given the portfolio approach in setting up the model, intuition says that the optimal
proportion of children in school should be reasonably constant for varying levels of N once N
is large enough to allow for some exibility in the somewhat discrete . E.g. for N = 2; 
can only take the follwoing three values [0; 12 ; 1]: Irrespective of the degree of risk correlation,
the derivates cannot be signed, indicating either a non-monotonic relationship or simply a not
very strong relationship. The partial derivatives with respect to N is given by
@cor
@N
=
0(2NM   (NY1  N1+ea)) 00Nya2 +N1+ea
N [N2 + 2N"2]
 (2N
M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))(2   2N(eb   ea) + 2"2)
 [N2 + 2N"2]2
7 0
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under perfect risk correlation, and under no risk correlation by
@uncor
@N
=
0(2NM   (NY1  N1+ea)) 00Nya2 +N1+ea
N [N2 + 2"2]
 (2N
M   (NY1 +Nya2  N1+ea))(2   2N(eb   ea))
 [N2 + 2"2]2
7 0
where both 0 = (  ya2)  2N(eb  ea) and 00 = (  ya2)  (1+)N(eb  ea) are positive.
These partial derivatives are of particular interest when compared to the ones produced by a
similar model with liquidity constraints. Liquidity constraints are likely to create sibling rivalry
over the limited resources, as suggested by the literature reviewed above, and one should expect
a clear negative e¤ect of coming from a household with more children compared to one with
less when both households are liquidity constrained, see section 3.3.
Finally, the model can also easily be extended to show the recently much debated empirical
result of non-monotonicity in income12. Since the model only applies to rural households, it is
reasonable to assume that the earning abilities of children working in the agricultural sector in
the second period are positively correlated with the income generated by their parents in the
same sector in the rst period. Such a positive relationship can be expected partly because
parents transfer specic human capital to their children when educating them traditionally,
and partly because children entering the agricultural sector would typically be endowed with
parental farm land or other local land with similar characteristics and thus similar earning
potentials, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985). By simply dening second period agricultural
income as a function of parental rst period income, such that ya2 = f(Y1); f
0 > 0, non-
monotonicity between proportion of children in school and parental rst period income is
generated. The partial derivative of  with respect to Y1 becomes ambiguous.
@
@Y1
=
 f 0(Y1)(2NM   (NY1 +Nf(Y1) N1+ea) + N)  N

+
2N2(2NM   (NY1 +Nf(Y1) N1+ea)f 0(Y1)
2
7 0
where  = N2 + 2N"2 under perfect risk correlation and  = N2 + 2"2 under no risk
correlation.
The non-monotonicity result is rather intuitive. If the agricultural sector generates high
levels of income, traditional education becomes a relatively more attractive alternative to formal
education, which will shift  more towards zero and thus change the composition of the optimal
household human capital portfolio away from schooling. This is particularly interesting in the
12See Bhalotra (2002), Bhalotra and Heady (2003), Edmonds (2005) and Rogers and Swinnerton (2004), as
well as section 2.2 for a discussion of these references.
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case where liquidity constraints are binding, because the positive e¤ect of higher parental
income is then counterbalanced by the agricultural sector becoming relatively more protable
compared to the urban sector and thus generates an inverse U replationship between  and
Y1, see section 3.3.
It should be noted that under quadratic preferences and no liquidity constraints, the direct
e¤ect of an income increase in Y1 without considering the correlation with ya2 has, counterin-
tuitively, a negative e¤ect on : Since  is already at its optimum regardless of rst period
income, an income increase translates directly into a consumption increase and thus an increase
in risk aversion. There is then an overall negative impact on investment in the risky compared
to the risk free asset. This is, as mentioned above, a rather awkward feature of the quadratic
utility function. Although quadratic preferences are more tractable analytically, they are less
attractive because they lack the constant relative risk aversion characteristic over consumption.
However, before turning to the more common class of CRRA utility functions, I will briey
analyse the e¤ect of prudence on the optimal human capital portfolio of the household.
3.2.2 Cubic utility
The quadratic utility function was chosen to ensure that the existence of prudence is not in
itself generating the results, and it will be shown below that the e¤ects of prudence might
be somewhat surprising. In order to be able to analyse the direct e¤ects of prudence on the
human capital investment decisions of the household, I will simply add a small cubic term to
the quadratic utility function in equation (5). This introduces prudence, as the third derivative
is now positive.
The cubic utility is given by
U(ct) =Mct   1
2
c2t +
1
6
c3t (8)
Where the prudence parameter is ; which is very small and postive. Now U 0(c) = M   c+
1
2c
2 > 0; U 00(c) =   + c < 0 (by assumption on the size of ), and the third derivative
is positive and given by the prudence parameter, U 000(c) =  > 0: Notice that there is no
longer certainty equivalence in the marginal utility due to the postive prudence parameter
EU 0(c2) > U 0(Ec2).13 This utility function is only well behaved for very small values of ;
which is all that is needed for determining the e¤ect of introducing prudence on the household
proportion of children in school, : This is simply given by the derivative of  with respect to
 measured at  = 0, @@

=0
: The optimal portfolio allocation  and savings level s under
prudence are found by solving the two rst order conditions. The maximisation problem is
the same as above. Under perfect risk correlation in the labour market outcome among urban
13See appendix A2:
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siblings, the rst order conditions with respect to s and ; (3) and (4), are now
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
(Ec2)
2 +
1
2
(N1 ")2
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
(N1 ")2

  (   (  + ))N2 2"2
respectively, where EU 0(c2) =M   E(c2) + 12E(c2)2 + 12(N1 ")2:
And the corresponding rst order conditions under no risk correlation are
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   E(c2) +
1
2
E(c2)
2 +
1
2
N1 2"2
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
N1 2"2

  (   (  + ))2N1 2"2
for s and ; respectively, and EU 0(c2) =M   E(c2)+ 12E(c2)2+ 12N1 2"2: See appendix
A2 for derivations. Again, this gives two equations, which can be solved for the two unknowns,
s and .
It can then be shown, through implicit derivation of the analytical solutions for  with
respect to  that introducing prudence will have a positive e¤ect on the proportion of chil-
dren sent to school, @

@

=0
> 0: This may seem puzzling, since schooling is the more risky
investment. However, by setting up the cubic utility function, risk aversion and prudence are
two separate parameters. Prudence increases the preferences for precautionary savings and,
somewhat surprisingly, at the same time  has a negative impact on the relative risk aversion.
This can be seen from the specication of the degree of relative risk aversion under cubic pref-
erences:  cU 00(c)=U 0(c) = c(   c)=(M   c + 12c2). Introducing prudence thus makes it
optimal for the household to reduce consumption today and postpone it for the future, which
here results in allocating a larger proportion of children to the more costly and more risky type
of education, schooling.
3.2.3 CRRA utility
The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions are among the most commonly
used utility functions. They allow for the presence of both risk aversion and prudence at the
same time, and as the name indicates, the relative degree of risk aversion does not change as
consumption levels increase, contrary to the quadratic utility function. It is therefore likely
to be a more realistic preference structure. Especially so, when looking at poor households
in developing countries. Analytically, however, the standard CRRA utility function is less
tractable than the quadratic utility function. The comparison of the two sets of preferences
will therefore be based on the calibration results, rather than on the analytical results.
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The CRRA utility function used in the calibrations below is given by
U(ct) =
 c1 t
1  ; for  6= 1
ln(ct); for  = 1
The constant relative risk aversion parameter is given by  =  cU 00(c)=U 0(c); where U 0(c) =
c  and U 00(c) =  c  1: Prudence is positive as can be seen from U 000(c) = (+ 1)c  2 >
0. The degree of relative prudence is also constant in consumption and given by  + 1 =
 cU 000(c)=U 00(c): Thus, here it is not possible to separate out the e¤ect of risk aversion from
the e¤ect of prudence, since they are both captured by :
3.3 Introducing liquidity constraints
The model described in section 3.1 with an unspecied preference structure di¤ers funda-
mentally from most models on child labour and schooling by including both future uncertainty
about returns to schooling, no liquidity constraints, no agency problems and N children. When
comparing this to the, by now, benchmark model developed by Baland & Robinson (2000), this
corresponds a situation, where uncertainty is added to their world of perfect capital markets
and two-sided altruism. This di¤ers from Pouliot (2005), who introduces uncertainty into the
parallel world of one-child households with one-sided altruism, positive bequests and perfect
capital markets, i.e. parents do not rely on their child for old-age support. As Pouliot, I nd a
clear negative e¤ect of uncertainty on schooling. The e¤ect is strengthened by the introduction
of a liquidity constraint and even more so if agency problems are also introduced because this,
in e¤ect, simply just increases the amount of uncertainty.
Most papers on child labour and schooling operate in a world with strong liquidity con-
traints. Shutting down the perfect credit market is a simple way of introducing such liquidity
constraints in the human capital porfolio model above. By doing so, the model predictions be-
come more directly comparable with the standard theories of child labour reviewed in section
2. In a world with no credit markets the households are faced with the following maximisation
problem
max

EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2)
There is now one rst order condition with one unknown, ; the analytical solution for which
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is
cor =
N1 y(M   N1 ya2) Ne(M   (Y1  Nea))
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]
under perfect risk correlation in the urban labour market outcome among siblings and
uncor =
N1 y(M   N1 ya2) Ne(M   (Y1  Nea))
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2]
under no risk correlation. For both, y =    ya2 and e = eb   ea: From these analytical
solutions it is clear that now the relative size of the marginal utility in period one compared to
period two is important for determining the size of : If marginal utility in period one is very
high, the second term of the numerator is high, which in principle can run  below zero if it is
strong enough. The e¤ect of uncertainty on  (when  > 0) is now also stronger, especially
if N is high and for uncorrelated risk.
@cor
@"2
=  N
3 3y(M   N1 ya2) N3 2e(M   Y1 + Nea)
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]2
< 0
@uncor
@"2
=  N
2 3y(M   N1 ya2) N2 2e(M   Y1 + Nea)
 [N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2]2
< 0
The e¤ects of fertility on the proportion of children in school are also altered. They are
still ambiguous, but more likely to be negative than the corresponding derivatives under no
liquidity constraints, especially so if N is large or if  is close to 1 under no risk correlation
among urban siblings. The two partial derivatives are now given by
@cor
@N
=

N
 
 
(1  )N1 2(ya2 + 2y) + N (M   N1 ya2)

y
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y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2]
 N(e
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(2  2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7 0
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Finally, the non-monotonicity result with respect to parental income carries over to the
situation with liquidity constraints. For the liquidity constrained household there is a clear
direct positive e¤ect of an increase in rst period parental income
@cor
@Y1
=
Ne
N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N2 2"2
> 0
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@uncor
@Y1
=
Ne
N2 2y2 +N2e2 +N1 2"2
> 0
but the e¤ect is counterbalanced by the negative e¤ect of the corresponding increase in second
period agricultural income when ya2 = f(Y1); f
0 > 0, such that the overall e¤ect of an increase
in parental income becomes ambiguous
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both under perfect risk correlation and no risk correlation among siblings in the urban labour
market.
In previous literature, the non-monotonicity in the relationship between schooling or child
labour and income or even the lack of signicance in the correlation is generally explained by
either (i) a dramatic drop in the need for child labour as soon as the household is able to meet
subsistence needs based purely on parental earnings, which generates strong non-linearities in
the demand for child labour in the neighbourhood of the poverty line, Basu and Van (1998) and
Edmonds (2005); (ii) missing or incomplete markets which can lead to the wealth paradox,
when child labour has to compensate for incomplete labour markets as in Bhalotra and Heady
(2003); (iii) or agency problems if parents cannot rely on getting the expected old-age support
from their children because these consider the second period parental income too high to be
in need of support, Rogers and Swinnerton (2004). All three explanations generate local non-
monotonicities, while maintaining a global postively monotonic relationship between schooling
and parental income.
In this paper, the non-monotonicity between income and schooling stems from the relative
attractiveness of the agricultural sector compared to the urban sector, and from the assumption
that there are no additional returns from formal compared to traditional education in the
traditional agricultural sector. This generates global non-monotonicity with a positive e¤ect of
parental income on  for lower levels of Y1 and a negative e¤ect for higher levels of Y1, since
Y1 and second period agricultural income ya2 are highly positively correlated.
4 Calibrations
Although one can nd analytical solutions for the optimal proportion of formally educated
children,  and show analytically that there is a negative e¤ect of income dispersion or uncer-
tainty, @@" < 0, this does not indicate whether existing levels of uncertainty in urban income can
actually result in less than full enrolment within a household. Only by calibrating the model,
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using actual levels of school expenditures and income, is it possible to determine whether exist-
ing urban income dispersion, V ar(yb2) = "
2 is enough for the model to predict that at least one
child will be educated traditionally and thus result in  < 1 even when there are no liquidity
constraints: That is, whether existing levels of urban income uncertainty could potentially keep
some children out of school purely due to future income diversication. Here it should be noted
that, for calibration purposes, I am essentially equating uncertainty with income dispersion,
and that the number of children in the calibration analysis is discrete.
In the following, there is a brief description of the data used and the assumptions made,
when determining the size of the exogenous variables in the calibrations. In section 4.2, I
show the results when calibrating the model from section 3 under quadratic, cubic and CRRA
preferences. The focus is on how schooling,  react to future income uncertainty, " when there
are no liquidity constraints and no child labour; and on how the model derivatives with respect
to N and Y1 compare to the calibration results. These are important for future empirical
testing of the model implications. In section 4.3, I introduce liquididity constraints and child
labour and compare these e¤ects to the e¤ects of uncertainty on schooling when there are no
child labour or liquidity constraints. The introduction of liquidity constraints and child labour
is meant as an illustrative example of how the model captures the main components of the child
labour literature, while allowing for the separate e¤ects of uncertainty on school enrolment.
Section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 Data
The model is calibrated using simple summary statistics from a large-scale nationwide house-
hold survey from Tanzania undertaken in 1994, the Human Resource and Development Survey
(HRDS)14. It is a nationally representative survey of 5,000 households out of which more than
half of the households have school-aged children. The HRDS data contains detailed information
on individual household members, their educational status and current economic activity. At
household level, it includes location, main source of income, detailed assets and expenditure
information and, not least, schooling expenditures information. For calibration purposes only
rural households with children of school-age are included, which results in a sample of 1982
households.
14The Tanzanian Human Resource and Development Survey (HRDS) is a nationally representative survey
from 1994 of 5,000 households. The survey was a joint e¤ort undertaken by the Department of Economics of
the University of Dar es Salaam, the Government of Tanzania, and the World Bank, and was funded by the
World Bank, the Government of Japan, and the British Overseas Development Agency. For more information
or access to the data see www.worldbank.org/lsms
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Table 1. Summary statistics of HRDS variables and their model equivalents.
HRDS variable HRDS data normalised Model
AE daily HH expenditure, urban sector mean 1.84 2.42 yb2
s.d. 2.02 1.99 "
AE daily HH expenditure, agri sector mean 0.76 1 Y1= ya2
s.d. 0.51 0
Annual school expenditure, cluster mean mean 5.96 0.02 eb
Total number of children in HH mean 3.91 N
Proportion of children in/through school mean 0.63 
# observations 1982
Data source: HRDS data. Note, yb2 is the household expenditure among urban households, where the main source of
income is urban. ya2 is the household expenditure among rural households, where the main source of income is agricultural.
All expenditure amounts are in USD. An exchange rate of 1 USD = 455 Tsh is used. AE is short for adult equivalent
The model is thus calibrated for the average rural household is school-aged children in 1994
Tanzania. Calibrating the model using data driven numerical values is helpful in determining
the relative levels of exogenous variables.
Rural and urban income levels are proxied by the adult equivalent household expenditure
levels for households in rural and urban areas, respectively. Expenditure measures in the data
include values of home production. Agricultural income, Y1 and ya2 are assumed to be of
the same size, and expected future urban income, E(yb2) =  is simply set to current adult
equivalent expenditure levels of urban households whose main income source is also urban.
The educational expenditure associated with schooling, eb is directly given in the data
as the cluster average of primary school expenditures. Since the model is set up for rural
households, the mean for rural clusters is used. The educational expenditure associated with
traditional agricultural education is not observable. If ea is negative, it can be thought of as the
opportunity costs of time children spend in school, and thus as a measure of income generated
by child labour. If ea is positive, it can be thought of as the opportunity costs of parentstime
spent supervising the children in traditional education. When calibrating the model with no
child labour and no liquidity constraints, I simply proxy ea by half of the costs associated with
formal schooling. Traditional education is then cheaper than formal education, but also less
protable.
Agricultural income levels in the two periods are normalised to unity, Y1 = ya2 = 1 with
zero standard deviation. This results in E(yb2) =  = 1:84=0:76 = 2:42 and " = s:d:(y
b
2) =p
(2:022   0:512)=0:76 = 2:24:15 The actual cost of schooling in rural areas is very low and only
15The expenditure standard deviation among urban households is very high due to a long right hand side tail
in the expenditure distribution. Alternatively, I therefore cap " at the value of , such that the urban uncertainty
is an uncertainty which either drives income in zero or doubles it, i.e. "b = 2:42  0:51=0:76 = 1:75
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2% of household expenditures, thus eb = 0:02 and ea = 0:01: These schooling expenditures do
not include indirect costs of schooling, such as distance, and should therefore be seen as a lower
bound. They do, however, include uniform costs. It should be noted that all of these amounts
are measured in USD and adult equivalent terms.
When calibrating the model, I primarily allow " andN to vary. The urban income dispersion
or uncertainty, " runs in the [0; 2:4] interval with steps of 0.1. Thus the degree of uncertainty
can run roughly from 0 to 100 per cent of average income level. The number of children, N
is allowed to be 1, 2, 4, or 6 children, i.e. the model is calibrated for discrete numbers of
children only and  can therefore also only take a limited number of values. N = 1 is included
to allow comparisons with the standard models of child labour and schooling in the literature.
According to the summary statistics in table 1, rural households have an average almost 4
children. The schooling rate among the 7-17 year olds in rural areas was 63% in 1994 (as
opposed to 66% at national level). Unless mentioned otherwise,  = 0:95. I choose a high
 in order to make rst and second period income levels comparable and to avoid strong
consumption smoothing mechanisms. The e¤ect of changing  is shown below.
As in the analytical set-up, the model is calibrated with two choice variables,  and s,
which are chosen to maximise the household utililty function (1) given the budget constraints
(2). The calibration results for  will show how large the dispersion in urban income, "2,
has to be for the model to produce realistic enrolment rates under the three di¤erent types of
preferences.
4.2 Preference structures
4.2.1 Quadratic utility
In order to calibrate the model for the quadratic utility function, it is necessary to specify the
preference parameters parameters, M and . In a world of no consumption smoothing, rst
period consumption would be below 1, whereas expected second period consumption would be
around 2 if all children are sent to school and  is close to 1. For these levels, M = 7 and the
risk aversion parameter,  = 2 ensure that marginal utilities of the two periods are positive
given the allowed variations in income.
The results for the optimal portfolio choice of the proportion of children in school,  are
summarised in gure 0 for the case of no risk correlation and perfect risk correlation in siblings
urban labour market outcome and for the specic case of N = 4. Figure 0 is meant as an
introduction to the following gures and therefore includes data points. Uncertainty measured
by " is on the X-axis, the optimal proportion of children in school,  is on the Y-axis. The
left panel shows the e¤ect of uncertainty on the optimal proportion of children in school, when
there is no correlation among migrant siblingsurban income risk. The right panel show the
e¤ect of uncertainty, when there is perfect correlation among siblingsurban income risk. When
31
uncertainty is perfectly uncorrelated (left panel), the model calibrations predict full enrolment
( = 1), given the parameter specications, as long as "  2:3: Remember, everything is
discrete. Thus, when epsilon jumps to " = 2:4;  = 0:75 meaning that the household now
chooses only to educate 3 out of 4 children formally, i.e. one child is educated traditionally. In
the right panel, less uncertainty is needed before it is optimal for the household to only send
3 out of 4 children to school. Already for " = 1:7;  = 0:75: As epsilon increases, the optimal
proportion of children in school drops, but in a discrete manner. For "  2:1; only 2 out of 4
children are sent to school.
[Figure 0]
Thus, as it was shown analytically above, there is a clear negative e¤ect of " on : The
important information is, however, that the negative e¤ect of uncertainty is present in the
neighbourhood of the actual level of urban income spread, that is for " = 2:24: As expected,
the e¤ect is stronger under perfect risk correlation compared to no risk correlation. Figure 0 is a
representation of the average household without any liquidity constraints or immediate returns
to child labour. The negative e¤ects of uncertainty on the optimal proportion of children
in school is purely driven by the need for risk diversication and thus future income source
diversication. When there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in their urban labour
market outcomes, the only source of risk diversication is between the agricultural and the
urban sector. On the other hand, when uncertainty about the urban labour market lottery
is perfectly uncorrelated across siblings, the risk diversication can happen both between the
agricultural and the urban sector, and among the migrant children in the urban sector, the
negative e¤ect of uncertainty is therefore substantially reduced.
In gure 1, I allow for di¤erent household sizes by letting the total number of children N
equal 1, 2, 4 or 6. It is clear that no matter how many children the household has, if parents
face no uncertainty about the future income of their children (" = 0); then they will always
educate all of their children irrespective of N: This is an obvious implication of the fact that
there are no liquidity constraints.
[Figure 1]
However, as uncertainty increases, there are clear portfolio e¤ects in households with more
than one child. For N = 1 there is no di¤erence between being in the world of perfectly
correlated or uncorrelated "s. This is natural, since the correlation is between migrant siblings
in urban areas. Comparing the two panels of gure 1 also gives an indication of the importance
of allowing for sibling dependence in the portfolio model. Assuming that the human capital
investment decision of each child in the household is made independently of all of his/her
siblings (which corresponds to the N = 1 case) and then just adding over the total number of
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children in the household will yield very di¤erent predictions from a model, where such sibling
dependence is taken into account, say for N = 4; in particularly so for correlated "s.
4.2.2 Cubic utility
Calibrating the cubic utility function as opposed to the quadratic is simply done by substituting
the utility function in (5) with the one in (8) using the same parameter values as above,
M = 7;  = 2 and now allowing the prudence parameter to vary at low values,  = [0:1; 0:4], to
ensure that U 00(c) will always be negative. The results are as expected. Introducing prudence
has a positive impact on the optimal proportion of children sent to school , which is mostly
evident from the case of perfect risk correlation in the urban labour market outcomes, see gure
2 for N = 4.
[Figure 2]
Figure 2 shows that for uncertainty levels of " = 2 and a prudence parameter  < 0:3,
households will educate 1 out of 4 children traditionally ( = 0:75) if there is perfect correlation
among siblings in the urban labour market, whereas they will educate all children formally
( = 1) if the urban labour market draws are perfectly uncorrelated over migrant children. For
  0:3 and "  2, all four children are sent to school. Compared to the quadratic preferences,
slightly higher levels of uncertainty is now necessary for it to be optimal for the household to
keep at least one child at home for traditional education. Formal education is simply a better
savings strategy than traditional education.
4.2.3 CRRA utility
Deciding on the parameter values for the quadratic and cubic preferences is somewhat arbitrary
in the sense that they are sensitive to the level of consumption and are chosen to ensure that
marginal utilities in both period one and period two are non-negative. The remaing results
are therefore all based on CRRA preferences. The value of the relative risk aversion parameter
of  is allowed to vary and all calibrations are done for  = 1, 2 and 3, although the results
reported in the text below are for  = 2: See appendix A3 for all CRRA calibration results.
In general, the larger  is, the more sensitive  is to changes in the exogenous variables and
increasing the relative risk aversion has the expected e¤ect of shifting the graphs downwards
and thus reducing the optimal proportion of children sent to school. Looking at the graphs,
there are indications that the chosen preference parameters of the quadratic and cubic utility
functions most closely resemble the case of log utility and  = 1:
[Figure 3]
33
Figure 3 corresponds to gure 1 above, now based on CRRA preferences with  = 2: First, as
for the case of quadratic utility, households will always send all their children to school if there
is no uncertainty. Second, as the level of uncertainty about future urban income increases, the
need for risk diversication gets stronger and the optimal human capital portfolio shifts towards
traditional education for one or more children. Under CRRA preferences, the model predicts
that the average household with 4 children will educate at least one child traditionally if the
dispersion in urban income " > 1:5 under perfect risk correlation in the urban labour market.
More uncertainty is needed when the urban labour market draws are perfectly uncorrelated
across migrant siblings, only when " > 2:1 will the household need to diversify income sources
not only within the urban sector, but also between the urban and the agricultural sector.
Again, the adjusted observed spread in urban income, " = 1:75; lies well within the span of
these two extremes. Third, the portfolio e¤ects of having more than one child are now more
pronounced compared to quadratic utility, higher N and thus higher consumption levels no
longer results in higher risk risk aversion as it is the case under quadrati preferences. There
are clear positive portfolio e¤ects of belonging to households with more children compared to
less when the urban labour markets draws are perfectly uncorrelated, more children makes
it possible to increase the diversication of the urban income risk reducing the need for the
agricultural sector in achieving the optimal risk diversication. The results are more ambiguous
when there is perfect correlation in the urban labour markets draws.
The important thing to notice here is that existing levels of uncertainty can indeed result in
parents only sending some, but not all children to school. This negative e¤ect on the optimal
human capital portfolio allocation is surprisingly large, taking the perfect credit markets into
consideration. Even for moderate levels of uncertainty, which match the actual income spread
among urban households, and without any liquidity constrainst or child labour, the model is
able to predict an interval of optimal school enrolment rates within which the actual enrolment
rate of  = 0:63 lies. For the average household, the pure e¤ect of uncertainty is thus so strong
that actual school enrolment rates could, in principle, be explained solely by the existence
of uncertainty. Hence, the roots of child labour and lack of schooling need not lie solely
with incomplete credit markets and poverty, but could also be caused by the fact that rural
households are not only concerned with securing their current, but also their future old-age
income.
The calibration of this simple human capital portfolio model thus shows that realistic
levels of uncertainty about future income of children can indeeed have a negative impact on
the optimal proportion of children in school within the household, even under no liquidity
constraints and only future returns to children engaged in traditional education. This central
implication of the model relies upon the assumptions of parents depending on their children
for old age security, of no covariant risk between urban and agricultural income, as well as on
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the sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education. Assumptions which might
not be standard in the child labour and schooling literature, but which each have substantial
support in other literatures, all reviewed above.
4.3 Introducing child labour and liquidity constraints
Literature on child labour and schooling focuses on explaining the existence of child labour and
lack of schooling as consequences of ex-post risk coping mechanisms when households are faced
with negative income shocks and of the inability of parents to borrow against the future returns
of schooling of the children. That is, they assume liquidity constraints and immediate net
returns to children working in the traditional agricultural sector as opposed to future returns.
In the following, I allow for both. Child labour thus still carries an element of education in the
sense that there are returns to learning-by-doing and ya2 >  ea. By introducing both liquidity
constraints and child labour, I am able to compare the model predictions under uncertainty
(" > 0) and sibling dependence (N > 1) with those of standard child labour models under no
uncertainty (" = 0) and one-child households (N = 1); as well as with the two recent papers
where uncertainty has been introduced into one-child households.
In gure 4, simple liquidity constraints have been introduced in the portfolio model above
under CRRA preferences. Households can now save, but they can no longer borrow on the
credit market, s  0. Figure A3 in appendix A3 shows the corresponding gures under di¤erent
degrees of relative risk aversion. Comparing gure 3 and 4 (as well as gures A1 and A3),
it easily shows that - given the numerical values for the average household, where costs of
schooling are relatively low and returns are 1.5 times larger than in the agricultural sector - the
introduction of a liquidity constraint has virtually no e¤ect16. Only once immediate returns to
child labour are also introduced such that one child in the agricultural sector generates exactly
enough income to cover the schooling expenses of a sibling ea =  eb; is there a clear negative
e¤ect.
[Figure 4 & 5]
The introduction of child labour as an immediate return to traditional education generates
a possibility of transferring income from period two to period one via the human capital market,
given the incompleteness of the nancial capital market. This does not seem to be necessary
for households with 4 children or less, but for households with 6 children it is now optimal
to always educate one child traditionally, even when there is no uncertainty. Comparing the
isolated e¤ect of uncertainty in gure 3 with the isolated e¤ect of liquidity constraints and
16 In chapter 4 of this thesis, the same model is calibrated using numerical values from a di¤erent data set
where costs of schooling is slightly higher and returns are lower, and there are more children in the average
household. This results in more markedly e¤ects of introducing liquidity constraints.
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child labour for " = 0 in gure 5, it is clear that uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on the
optimal choice of education of all children, whereas the constraint and child labour e¤ects only
really dominate in households with more children than the average N = 4: This emphasises the
importance of allowing for N children, rather than just one child. Assuming that the optimal
solution for one child carries through for all N children of the same household is clearly not
correct, regardless of the degree of uncertainty. Under no uncertainty, even if the immediate
returns to child labour were of the same size as current parental income or future returns to
traditional education, i.e.  ea = Y1 = ya2 = 1; the optimal solution for the one child would still
be schooling, unless future returns are discounted enough to drop below current returns. As
uncertainty about future urban income increases, the importance of allowing for some degree
of sibling dependency is clear from the portfolio e¤ects implied by di¤erences in fertility. These
portfolio e¤ects seem even more pronounced in gure 5, compared to gure 4.
The main conclusion to take from these calibration results is that although the combination
of child labour and liquidity constraints can have negative e¤ects on the optimal proportion of
children in school, these e¤ects are strengthened partly by the introduction of N > 1 children,
and partly by the existence of uncertainty " > 0, which also in itself has strong negative e¤ects
on the optimal human capital portfolio. While the existing explanations in the literature for
low enrolment rates into primary schools are focussed on the inability of parents to meet the
direct and indirect costs of schooling and the role of children in ex-post risk coping mechanisms,
the calibrations show that the ex-ante risk diversication strategies of a household may be at
least equally important for the human capital investment decisions of the household. The
introduction of uncertainty into a simple human capital portfolio model, which allows for a
joint schooling decision of children in a household thus o¤ers an alternative and complementary
explanation to why it may be optimal for parents not to send all of their children to school,
even if they can a¤ord to do so.
In addition, the portfolio model o¤ers a simple explanation for a non-monotonic relationship
between child labour, schooling and income. The di¤erence in returns between the agricultural
sector and the urban sector generates global non-monotonicity, as discussed above. This is
obvious from gure 6, which shows the e¤ect on di¤erent income levels Y1 = [0:5; 3] on the
optimal human capital portfolio  for the average household with N = 4 under liquidity
constrainst and with immediate returns to child labour. For the very low levels of (agricultural)
income there is a positive e¤ect of income increases on  driven by the fact that the household
is constrained and income increases allow households to allocate more children to the most
protable educational alternative, schooling. However, if the rst period parental income is
very high, so is the expected second period agricultural income and thus the relative returns
to traditional education compared to formal education increase, making traditional education
relatively more attractive. It is therefore optimal for the household to educate some children
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traditionally. This shift toward traditional education happens earlier the higher the level of
uncertainty in the urban sector relative to the agricultural sector, which here is normalised to
be risk free. This provides an alternative explanation for the mixed empirical evidence with
respect to income, schooling and child labour.
[Figure 6]
Finally, it should be noted that there is one parameter in the calibration, which has not yet
been discussed, : This determines the fraction of income that each child shares with his/her
parents in the second period. When  = 0, children share all of their income with parents,
when  = 1 children share 1=Nth of their income with parents. In all of the calibrations above
 = 0:95 and thus children share slightly more than 1=Nth of their income with parents, such
that parents in the second period in total receives slightly more than one full income. This
number is, of course, chosen arbitrarily. From the three panels of gure A7, it shows that
the e¤ect of changes in  are fairly small when there is no immediate return to child labour,
but large and negative as  approaches zero and there are immediate returns to child labour.
This e¤ect is purely a result of consumption smoothing. For very low ; parental income
in the second period can be more than N times the current rst period income and the only
possibility of transferring resources from the second period to the rst period is to shift children
from formal education to traditional education, which now generates not only future but also
immediate returns. Thus for low levels of ; the negative e¤ects of the combination of liquidity
constraints and child labour are strengthened.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper I asked the question of whether future income uncertainty can result in households
not educating all their children formally as an optimal risk diversication strategy to secure old-
age subsistence of parents. To answer the question I develop a simple portfolio model of human
capital investment of all children in a household. The model di¤ers from most models of child
labour and schooling by analysing the human capital investment decisions from the broader
perspective of a rural household, allowing for future income uncertainty and considering both
the old-age dependency of parents on children and the sibling dependency. When focusing
on the human capital investment decisions of all children, it becomes obvious that several
factors can inuence such the joint decision. The basis for the model and its assumptions build
on insights from di¤erent strands of literature with the aim of incorporating the variety of
factors, which could be of importance. The emphasis is placed on ex-ante, rather than ex-post,
risk diversication as a means of income smoothing, on the strong sectoral divide between the
agricultural and urban sector and the dichotomy in the returns to specic versus general human
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capital, on the role of children as old-age security assets of their parents, and on the dependency
that this creates among siblings because educational choices are not made independently for
each child, but rather as a joint decision over siblings giving natural rise to sibling di¤erences,
which is not in any way driven by heterogenity or adverse economic conditions.
It is straightforward to show analytically that uncertainty about future income transfers
from children, which in essence is uncertainty about returns to the human capital investments,
has a negative e¤ect on investments in the most uncertain type of human capital, here schooling.
This result hinges upon the assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional
education for which there is ample evidence in the literature, e.g. Rosenzweig (1995), Foster
and Rosenzweig (1996) and Fafchamps and Wahba (2006).
The analytical result is, however, a qualitative nding and it does not indicate whether
actual levels of uncertainty have any e¤ect on the optimal proportion of children in school.
The actual level of uncertainty could in principle be too low for the household to consider it
worth giving up income in return for less risk exposure. The model is therefore calibrated
using data driven numerical values and a variety of di¤erence preference specications. I nd
that moderate levels of uncertainty, based on the spread of income observed in data, is enough
uncertainty for the average household choose a suboptimal human capital portfolio allocation
of their children compared to a situation of no uncertainty. The need for risk diversication can
thus result in parents only sending some, but not all, children to school. The negative e¤ect of
uncertainty is surprisingly large. Comparing the isolated e¤ect of uncertainty with the isolated
e¤ect of liquidity constraints and child labour, it is clear that uncertainty inuence the optimal
choice of education of all children, whereas the constraint and child labour e¤ects only really
dominate in households with more children than the average N = 4: Although fairly robust to
the choice of preference parameters, these results are based on simple moments taken from the
data. The logical next step is therefore to nd empirical implications of the model, which can
be estimated and tested on a full data set.
However, based on the ndings of the model calibrations, it does seem safe to conclude that
future income uncertainty can indeed result in less than full school enrolment among siblings
of a household. The focus on ex-ante income smoothing adds a new perspective to the child
labour debate, which has previously been centered around the need for ex-post consumption
smoothing for the liquidity constrained household. It also has direct implications for educa-
tional policies aimed at ensuring full enrolment, since lack of enrolment might not only be a
matter of costs of schooling, but also of content. If the dichotomy in the educational system
force parents to diversify human capital investments of their young children between traditional
agricultural education and modern formal schooling in order to achieve future income source
diversication, then an obvious policy implication is to increase the returns of formal schooling
in the agricultural sector. This can be done either by shifting part of the traditional educa-
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tion, currently undertaken by parents, into the formal schooling system, thus teaching children
specic agricultural skills along with more general skills, such as writing and alegra; or by
modernising the agricultural sector to create learning opportunitesand thus increase returns
to formal schooling in the agricultural sector, see Foster and Rosenzweig (1996). Households
are likely still to diversify future income sources, but it need no longer be a diversication
decision taken at an early stage of human capital investments.
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6 Figures
Figure 0. Quadratic preferences (M = 7;  = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of
children in school, 
Figure 1. Quadratic preferences (M = 7;  = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of
children in school,  over number of children in the household, N:
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Figure 2. Cubic preferences (M = 7;  = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of
children in school,  over di¤erent degrees of prudence,  and for xed N = 4
Figure 3. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of children in
school,  over number of children in the household, N
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour
48
Figure 4. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of children in
school,  over number of children in the household, N
- under liquidity constraints and no child labour
Figure 5. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of uncertainty, " on proportion of children in
school,  over number of children in the household, N
- under liquidity constraints and child labour
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Figure 6. CRRA preferences ( = 2), e¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on proportion of
children in school,  for N = 4
- under liquidity constraints and child labour
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7 Appendix A1
The covariance term cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) di¤er depending on whether there is perfect risk
correlation or no risk correlation between the second period urban labour market outcome of
siblings. Under perfect risk correlation and quadratic preferences, the covariance term is given
by
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
=
1
2
[(N1 (+ ") N1 )(fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N(+ ") + s)g
 fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N+ s)g)]
+
1
2
[(N1 (  ") N1 )(fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N(  ") + s)g
 fM   (N (1  )Nya2 + N+ s)g)]
=
1
2
[ N2(1 )"2] + 1
2
[ N2(1 )( ")2]
=  N2 2"2
Under no risk correlation, it is given by
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( N1 (yb2   ))]
=  N 2E[fN(yb2   )gfN(yb2   )g]
=  N 2
NP
i=0

N
i

1
2N
f[(1  )N + i]"  [N   i]"gfi"  [N   i]"g
=  N1 2"2
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8 Appendix A2
Deriving rst order conditions under the cubic utility function. The rst order condition for
savings, s under perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban labour market is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
E(c22)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
E([(1  )N1 ya2 + N1 yb2 + s]2)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
(Ec2)
2 +
1
2
(N1 ")2
and under no risk correlation is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2
E(c22)
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   Ec2 +
1
2

NP
i=0

N
i

1
2N
[Ec2 +N
 ((N   i)"  i")]2
M   c1 + 1
2
c21 = M   E(c2) +
1
2
E(c2)
2 +
1
2
N1 2"2
The covariance term in the rst order condition for the proportion of children in formal
education,  under perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban labour market is then
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( (c2   Ec2) +
1
2
(c22   E(c2)2   (N1 ")2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( N1 (yb2   )
+
1
2
((N1 yb2)
2 + (N1 )2 + 2 N1 (yb2   )2   (N1 ")2))]
= (  + (  + ))N2 2"2
where   = (1  )N1 ya2 + s. The rst order condition for  under perfect risk correlation is
then given by
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
(N1 ")2

  (   (  + ))N2 2"2
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while under no risk correlation the covariance is
cov(N1 yb2; U
0(c2)) = E[(N1 yb2  N1 )(U 0(c2)  EU 0(c2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( (c2   Ec2) +
1
2
(c22   E(c2)2   N1 2"2))]
= E[N1 (yb2   )( N1 (yb2   )
+
1
2
((N1 yb2)
2   (N1 )2 + 2 N1 (yb2   )  N1 2"2))]
=
NP
i=0

N
i

1
2N
[N 2(  + (  + ) ((N   i)"  ((1  )N + i)")2)
+
1
2
N 3(
 
(N   i)"  ((1  )N + i)")3    (N   i)2"3 + ((1  )N + i)2( "3)]
= (  + (  + ))2N1 2"2
where   = (1  )N1 ya2 + s. The rst order condition for  under no risk correlation is then
given by
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)

U 0(Ec2) +
1
2
N1 2"2

  (   (  + ))2N1 2"2
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9 Appendix A3: CRRA gures
Figure A1. E¤ect of uncertainty " on  under no liquidity constraints and no child labour.
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Figure A2. E¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on  under no liquidity constraints and no
child labour.
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Figure A3. E¤ect of uncertainty " on  under liquidity constraints and no child labour.
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Figure A4. E¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on  under liquidity constraints and no child
labour.
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Figure A5. E¤ect of uncertainty " on  under liquidity constraints and child labour.
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Figure A6. E¤ect of agricultural income Y1 on  under liquidity constraints and child
labour.
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Figure A7 E¤ect of changes in  on 
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour
- under liquidity constraints and no child labour
- under liquidity constraints and child labour
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Abstract
Primary school enrolment rates are continuously low in many developing countries. The
main explanation in the economic literature on schooling is focused on credit constraints
and child labour, implying that the indirect cost of schooling in terms of foregone earnings
is too high. This paper investigates the e¤ects of future income uncertainty on sibling
dependence in the schooling decisions of rural households in developing countries. Schooling
tends to direct skills towards future urban employment, whereas traditional rural education
or on-farm learning-by-doing tends to direct skills towards future agricultural employment.
Given this dichtomy, the question is then: Does future income uncertainty inuence the
joint educational choice made by parents on behalf of their children and is it possible
to test this on simple cross-sectional data? I extend a simple human capital portfolio
model to a three period setting. This allows me to explore the natural sequentiality in the
schooling decision of older and younger siblings. The model can generate testable empirical
implications, which can be taken to any standard cross-sectional data set. I nd empirical
evidence of negative sibling dependence in the educational decision, which is consistent
with a human capital portfolio theory of risk diversication and which cannot be explained
by sibling rivalry over scarce resources for credit constrained households. The paper thus
provides a complementary explanation to why enrolment rates in developing countries are
often continuously low.
Keywords: Schooling, human capital investment, specic human capital, old-age security, un-
certainty, risk and income source diversication, liquidity constraints, Tanzania, Africa
Chapter 3 of PhD thesis
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1 Introduction
Primary school enrolment rates are continuously low in many developing countries. The main
explanation in the economic literature on schooling is focused on credit constraints and child
labour, implying that the indirect cost of schooling in terms of foregone earnings is too high, see
Edmonds (2007) for a detailed literature review as well as chapter 2 of this thesis. Government
policies focusing on lowering the direct costs of schooling in terms of tuition fees, availability of
books and uniforms might ameliorate the problem, but if high indirect costs are the main reason
for low enrolment rates, such policies will not be enough to overcome the household budget
constraint. In Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in rural areas where household-based production
systems dominate the agricultural sector, the concept of foregone earnings of sending children to
school becomes more vague and, more importantly, on-farm child work may itself be an essential
component of traditional education, a possible alternative to formal schooling, as suggested
by Rodgers and Standing (1981), Bekombo (1981), Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), and more
recently and in more detail by Bock (2002). Furthermore, rural areas su¤er from missing capital
and pension markets, generating a need for informal insurance and savings mechanisms to shield
consumption against income failure and secure old-age subsistence. Liquidity constraints and
high foregone earnings of child labour may therefore not be the only explanations for low
enrolment rates in primary schools.
In this paper, I argue that the rural-urban divide and uncertainty about future income of
children, upon which parents rely for old-age security, combined with the fact that most children
have siblings and parents are therefore likely to make a joint human capital investment decision
regarding all their children, can make it optimal for parents to send some, but not all, of their
children to school. Lack of schooling might therefore not only be due to cost side constraints
in the human capital investment decision, but could also be due to uncertainties about the
return side. However, the vast majority of papers on child labour and schooling focus on the
cost side of the human capital investment decision (Edmonds (2007)), and on the role of child
labour when households are exposed to transitory income shocks, e.g. Jacoby and Skouas
(1997), Jensen (2000) and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006). This paper contributes to the
existing literature by focusing on the uncertainty associated with the future returns of the
human capital investment decision. The purpose being to complement the exisiting, and by
all means valid, cost side explanations for child labour with an additional explanation that,
given the empirical ndings, sheds new light on the human capital investment decisions faced
by parents in rural areas.
Most developing countries have a large agricultural sector and a somewhat smaller urban
sector. There will always be uncertainty about future income in both of these sectors, but the
uncertainties across sectors may largely be uncorrelated. As long as schooling tends to direct
children towards future urban sector employment, and on-farm child work or learning-by-doing
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is thought of as a traditional way of educating a child for future employment in the agricultural
sector, then it can be shown that enough uncertainty about future income can prevent full
school enrolment among siblings, even in a world with perfect credit markets. Missing capital
markets can thus inuence parental choice of schooling in two additional ways, apart from the
standard credit constraint argument. First, income source diversication becomes an important
means of income smoothing, as Morduch (1995) puts it, for households to minimise the risk of
complete income failure both at present and in the future. Second, children play an important
role of being old-age pension providers for their parents, since both private and public pension
schemes are very limited. Future earnings and future income source diversication of children
therefore become important for parents to secure their old-age subsistence.
Using a simple two-period human capital portfolio model for the joint educational decision
of siblings, I show that future income uncertainty can indeed have a negative e¤ect on the
proportion of siblings in school. Model calibrations show that the negative e¤ect can be sur-
prisingly large even for moderate levels of uncertainty. Although model calibrations are based
on simple data moments, the ndings give some indications of the importance of uncertainty in
the human capital investment decision. A logical extension would be to estimate the e¤ect of
future uncertainty on the actual proportion of children in school. However, it is, by denition,
very di¢ cult to get a good measure of future uncertainty, and thus virtually impossible to
identify the actual e¤ect of uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio of children in
a household. An alternative is therefore to nd other implications of the inuence of future
income uncertainty on the joint schooling decision which can be estimated in data and which
cannot be caused by any other observationally equivalent explanations. One possibility is to
take advantage of the natural sequentiality in schooling between younger and older siblings.
The two-period model is therefore extended to a three-period model, which yields direct impli-
cations for the nature of sibling dependency caused by risk diversication and di¤erent from
sibling dependency caused by sibling rivalry over scarce resources, as suggested by Morduch
(2000). The three period model allows for younger and older cohorts of siblings and analyses
the e¤ect of schooling of the older cohort on the younger one. Lack of schooling due to child
labour or credit constraints result in a positive relationship between the schooling of the older
and younger siblings, because the older cohort generate income when the school fees of the
younger cohort have to be paid. However, lack of schooling due to risk diversication result in
a negative relationship between the older and younger cohorts within a household, even when
credit markets are perfect. Calibrating, and partly simulating, the three period model yields
testable empirical implications, which can be taken to standard cross-sectional data set with-
out any requirements about only observing households with completed fertility and completed
schooling among their children.
Based on a nation-wide large scale cross-sectional household survey undertaken in Tanzania
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in 1994, I nd evidence of sibling dependency consistent with risk diversication having a strong
inuence on the joint human capital investment decision of sons, but not of daughters. Results
are considerably stronger among rural households compared to urban households. These results
are consistent with the fact that most societies in Tanzania are patrilineal and therefore only
sons are of importance for old-age security, and with the fact that only rural households have
a credible option of educating their children traditionally through on-farm learning by doing.
Sibling dependence in the schooling decision might therefore not only be caused by sibling
rivalry for scarce resources, but can also be due to a need for risk management by diversifying
future income sources. This has direct implications for educational policies, since lack of
enrolment might not only be a matter of costs of schooling, but also of content in terms of a
relevant curricula for future employment in the agricultural sector. In fact, when questioned
about which subjects should be taught in primary schools, parents invariably allocate top rank
to a course in technical skills for agriculture and business, indicating a demand for skills
diversication in formal education.
In section 2 the theoretical framework is outlined describing both the two-period model and
the three-period extension as well as the results of the model calibrations. Data is described in
section 3, whereas section 4 has a description of the empirical specication used for estimation,
and the empirical results are analysed and discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The model developed in this section di¤ers from most of the models in the existing literature
in two ways. First, the model is not a one parent-one child model of human capital investment,
but rather a one parent-N children model thus allowing for dependency among siblings in the
joint human capital investment decisions of the parents. Second, the model introduces future
income uncertainty, which means uncertainty about the returns to education. A matter which,
despite the importance for the investment decision, has largely been ignored in the literature1.
The two period model is a direct replication of the two period model in chapter 2 of this thesis.
The contribution of this chapter is the extension to a three period model, which generates
testable empirical predictions that can be taken directly to any standard cross sectional data
set.
In the following section, the basic two-period model set-up gives a general understanding of
how uncertainty can a¤ect the human capital investment allocation. The model is calibrated
using information from a nationwide large-scale household survey in Tanzania in section 2.2.
The three period model is laid out in section 2.3 and calibration results are described in section
2.4.
1Two exceptions are recent papers by Pouliot (2005) and by Estevan and Baland (2007)
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2.1 The basic two-period model
The model is a two period unitary household model, where parents function as a unied sole
decision maker. There is no discounting of the future and no interest rate on savings or credit.
In the rst period, parents earn agricultural income Y1; which they allocate between rst period
household consumption c1, savings s; and the education expenses for their N children. N is
assumed to be exogenously given, since the emphasis here is not on the e¤ect of uncertainty
on fertility decisions, but on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the joint human capital investment
decision of children, given the fertility of the household.2
There are two types of education in the model, general formal education achieved through
primary schooling and specic traditional education achieved through on-farm learning-by-
doing. Traditional education directs children towards future employment in the agricultural
sector (a), whereas formal education directs children towards future employment in the non-
agricultural urban sector (b) in the second period. Parents thus face a discrete choice for each
of the N children of whether he or she should be educated traditionally or formally. A child can
only receive one type of education3. In the second period, traditionally educated children earn
agricultural income, ya2 , whereas formally educated children earn urban income, y
b
2: Second
period income of children in the agricultural sector will be a function of the rst period parental
income under the assumption that children will be working in similar agricultural production
systems as their parents, and parents transfer specic human capital skills to their children as
part of their traditional education. Thus ya2 = f(Y1); f
0(Y1) > 0:
Parents do not generate any income in the second period, but rely fully on their savings
and the joint agricultural and urban income transfers from their N children for second period
household consumption, c2. Second period income is uncertain. Parents therefore maximise a
joint von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility function dened over and separable in house-
hold consumption, ct, where t = 1; 2: The utility function is assumed to be concave, such that
U 0(c) > 0 and U 00(c) < 0: The household solves the following maximisation problem
max
;s
EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2) (1)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb   s (2)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2) + s
2 It is conceivable that the fertility decision and the human capital investment decision of the born and unborn
children are both inuenced by the parentspreference for old-age security, which suggests modelling the two
decisions jointly. However, to keep things simple, I focus on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the human
capital investment decision of children conditional on the household having completed their fertility.
3This is a simplifying assumption. The choice here is not on how many hours a child spends in school or
working, but rather whether he or she graduates with full primary school education or not.
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where  is the proportion of children, which parents have chosen to educate formally through
schooling. That is,  is the portfolio allocation of children between traditional and formal
human capital investments. The number of children who receive schooling in the rst period is
thus given by N and the number who are educated within the traditional agricultural based
system is (1 )N .4 The total amount of educational expenses is (1 )Nea+Neb; where ea
is the educational expenditure for each child in traditional education, e.g. supervisional costs
of parents, and eb is the educational expenditure for each child in formal education, e.g. tuition
fees and uniform costs. Educational expenditures are allowed to di¤er over the two sectors,
and they are considered both non-negative.5
Savings can be negative, and both the discount rate and the interest rate are normalised to
unity and are thus explicitly left out of the model for simplicity. By assuming perfect credit
markets, I can ignore any e¤ect of liquidity constraints on the schooling decision and thus focus
on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital portfolio decision of all
N children in the household. The question is: can this alone result in less than full school
enrolment among siblings, i.e. a model prediction of  < 1 solely due to uncertainty.
Second period consumption will equal any capital transfers from period one in terms of
savings or dissavings, s plus a fraction, 1=N; of total income of all children, which is given
by the income of children in the agricultural sector (1   )Nya2 ; and the income of children
in the urban sector Nyb2. Children are thus assumed to transfer a certain fraction of their
income to their parents. The fraction is the same for all children, irrespective of their sector of
employment, but it depends on their number of siblings for  > 0: In principle,  2 [0; 1]; but
in the following I will assume that  2]0; 1[ to ensure that there is a positive, but diminishing
marginal e¤ect of having more children on second period income. When  = 0, children share
all their income with their parents. When  = 1 children share only a fraction 1=N of their
income with their parents, resulting in parents receiving the equivalent of one full income from
their children in total. If there is only one child in the household that child will be the sole
breadwinner of the family in the second period and is forced to share his/her full income with
the parents, irrespective of the size of :
Parents are faced with two choice variables; how much to save or dissave s; and which
proportion of their children to educate formally through schooling . The rst order condition
with respect to s is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2) (3)
4For analytical simplicity,  is written as continuous in the theoretical model, but it will be treated as discrete
in the calibrations and in the empirical model.
5While the literature on child labour and schooling generally set ea as negative and thus as a source of income,
I here follow Bock (2002) in stating that the overall learning potential in the tasks completed by children in
agriculture is higher than the immediate return. If children were only undertaking tasks with no learning, but
high immediate output, such as fetching water or rewoods, there would be no transfer of farm-specic human
capital from parents to children and therefore no future agricultural return from such activities.
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That is, savings s will be chosen such that marginal utility in period one equals the expected
marginal utility of period two. The rst order condition with respect to  is given by equation
(4), where  is the optimal solution for the maximisation problem above
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for 0 <  < 1
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) > E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 0
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) < E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 1
(4)
where
E[N1 (yb2 ya2)U 0(c2)] = E(N1 (yb2 ya2))EU 0(c2)+cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) cov(N1 ya2 ; U 0(c2))
Uncertainty about second period income results in two covariance terms, both negative, between
the second period income variables, ya2 and y
b
2, and marginal utility, U
0(c2). These terms will,
when they are strong enough, pull the optimal portfolio allocation,  away from each of the
two corner solutions. Uncertainty in the agricultural sector will have a positive e¤ect on 
because it will increase the right hand side of the rst order consition for  and pull towards
the  = 1 corner solution. Uncertainty in the urban sector, on the other hand, will have a
negative e¤ect on  because it will decrease the right hand side of the the rst order condition
for  and thus pull towards the  = 0 corner solution.
In the following, I assume that there is no covariant uncertainty between second period
income from children in the urban sector and children in the agricultural sector. This allows
me to simplify the problem by normalising uncertainty about income from the agricultural
sector to zero, and thus solely focus on the e¤ect of uncertainty of urban income on the
optimal proportion of children in formal schooling. Going back to the rst order condition
for ; equation (4), this means concentrating on the covariance term, which can reduce the
right-hand side of the rst order condition and thus reduce the optimal : That is, focusing
on the somewhat more relevant question of what can result in an optimal  below 1, rather
than what can result in an optimal  above 0.
This is not to say that there is no uncertainty in the agricultural sector, but rather that
uncertainty associated with income transfers from distant migrant children in the urban sector
is higher. These migrant children may face higher income levels, but also relatively more
variation, since the urban labour market entails a risk of unemployment, which is not present
among subsistence farmers in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, parents may also perceive
the size and the frequency of income transfers from urban migrant children to be more uncertain
compared to the daily support and in-kind assistance from home children engaged in local
agricultural sector6.
6The uncertainty could thus also, in e¤ect, be an intergenerational agency problem between parents and
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The uncertainty, that parents face about income transfers from migrant children in the
urban sector is modelled as a simple mean-preserving spread. Each migrant child can either
get a good (typically formal sector) job or not, where the probability of a good draw in the
urban labour market is given by p = 0:5. Migrant children in good jobs have an urban income
of yb2 = +", whereas migrant children without good jobs have an urban income of y
b
2 =  ":7
This means that second period urban income is given by
yb2 =
(
+ "
  "
w.p.
w.p.
p = 0:5
(1  p) = 0:5
The mean and the variance for each child in the urban sector is E(yb2) =  and V ar(y
b
2) = "
2:
Given this specication of uncertainty, the rst order condition for  rewrites (4) as
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]  0
where the specication of the covariance term will depend on the degree of risk correlation
in the urban labour market outcome. The expected total income transfers from all the N
children, which have gone to the urban sector, is simply E(N1 yb2) = N1 ; independent
of the degree of risk correlation among migrant siblings. But the variance of their expected
total income, V ar(N1 yb2) and the covariance above, cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) will both depend
on the degree of risk correlation in urban income.
I consider the two extremes where income transfers from siblings in urban employment are
either perfectly correlated or uncorrelated. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between. When
there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban employment, all siblings will either have
a good draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (+"); or they will all have
a bad draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (  "), hence the variance
is V ar(N1 yb2) = 2N2 2"2 . When there is no risk correlation among siblings, they all
face the same urban labour market lottery irrespective of the labour market outcomes of their
siblings. The variance under no risk correlation is thus smaller and depends on the binomial
coe¢ cient
 
N
i

, where i denotes the number of successful siblings in the urban labour market
(i.e. those where yb2 = + ") and N is the total number of siblings in the urban sector in the
second period, V ar(N1 yb2) = N 
NP
i=0
 
N
i

1
2N
(i"  (N   i)")2 = N1 "2:
migrant children. Their degree of success is harder to monitor and lack of family control increases with the
distance. Social sanctions are often mentioned as e¤ective means in overcoming such agency problems and
thereby helping to reduce at least one source of future uncertainty. In chapter 1, Lassen and I analyse the e¤ect
of such sanctions on the demand for formal schooling.
7 I do not explicitly consider a mortality risk of young adults as in Estevan and Baland (2007). However, the
model could easily be extended to include such risk, but if mortality risk is exogenous to choice of education, it
would simply just add a higher level of uncertainty in both the agricultural and urban sector. The qualitative
ndings of the model would not change.
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As long as uncertainty in the agricultural sector and the urban sector do not covary, house-
holds will have an incentive to diversify their human capital investments to reduce future risk
exposure. For a given set of preferences, it can be shown that, once the optimal choice of  and
s have been found by solving the two rst order conditions, the derivative of  with respect
to " is negative. If the need for diversication is strong enough, that is if " is large enough, it
will have a negative impact on the proportion of children sent to school in the optimal human
capital portfolio of the household.
2.2 Calibrations
Although it is possible to show analytically, that the partial derivative of  with respect to
" is negative. This does not indicate whether existing levels of uncertainty in urban income
alone can result in less than full enrolment. Only by calibrating the model, using actual levels
of school expenditures and income in both the agricultural and urban sector, is it possible
to determine whether the actual dispersion in urban income, V ar(yb2) = "
2; could potentially
keep some children out of school purely due to future income or risk diversication, even under
perfect credit markets.
The model is calibrated for the average household using simple data moments based on the
table of summary statistics (table 1 in section 3), and constant relative risk aversion preferences
with a risk aversion parameter of  = 2:8 Rural and urban income are proxied by rural and
urban household expenditure measures of 0.707 and 1.247 USD, respectively. First period
parental income and second period agricultural income are normalised to unity Y1 = ya2 =
1, the spread of second period agricultural income is normalised to zero, and second period
urban income and spread are adjusted accordingly, resulting in yb2 = 1:26=0:708 = 1:780 and
" = (1:218   0:501)=0:708 = 1:013. Schooling expenditures (eb), including annual uniform
expenses, amount to 2.5 per cent of parental income, expenses associated with educating the
children traditionally are simply set at half, i.e. ea = 0:0125.9
Figure 1 shows the pure e¤ect of future urban income uncertainty " on the optimal pro-
portion of siblings educated formally  for N = 1; 3; 5; and 7 children, respectively10. The
discrete jumps in the graph stem from the discrete number of children. For instance, when
" 2 [1:1; 1:6] a household with three children (green line) will only be sending one out of the
three to school under perfect correlation in "s. On average, the sample of households have 5-6
children in rural areas.
8For additional calibration results on the two-period model, please refer to chapter 2.
9The parameter values di¤er from those of chapter 2 because a di¤erent and smaller sample is used. I only
include households which have both children of school age and children beyond school age in order to resemble
the three period model as closely as possible. However, this does not change the qualitative ndings of the
calibrations.
10For a simpler version of gure 1, refer to gure 0 in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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(Figure 1)
It is clear from gure 1 that future uncertainty, the level of which is proxied by actual levels
of income spread, can indeed result in households diversifying their human capital investments.
For the average household with ve children, an " = 1 (which corresponds to the standard
deviation of the average income level in data) results in a predicted interval of  of [0.6;1] and
likewise the actual enrolment rate of  = 0:7 corresponds to an optimal human capital portfolio
when future urban income uncertainty is in the interval of " = [0:9; 1:7]. Both intervals include
the observed values in the data. These are the predictions based on a model of perfect credit
markets, the less than full school enrolment is thus purely a result of risk diversication and not
in any way driven by sibling rivalry over resources. Adding credit constraints (s  0) and child
labour (ea =  0:025) to the calibrations shift the graphs inwards towards the origin, resulting
in even lower optimal levels of , see gure 2. Now the actual enrolment rate of  = 0:7
corresponds to an interval of uncertainty of " = [0:3; 1:2]: Without uncertainty (" = 0), the
model predicts that the optimal schooling rate for households with ve children is 0.8, which is
slightly above the actual enrolment rates. This enrolment rate is a pure e¤ect of sibling rivalry
in the constrained household, but any further reduction due to uncertainty (" > 0) is an e¤ect
of sibling portfolio dependence in the need for risk diversication.
(Figure 2)
From these two gures it is di¢ cult to determine whether sibling dependence is primarily
caused by sibling rivalry over scarce resources or by the need to diversify future income sources
and their associated risk. Both explanations can generate model predictions consistent with
simple data moments and the two e¤ects are likely to co-exist. The point of this exercise is
not to question the importance of liquidity constraints and scarcity of resources in the human
capital investment decisions of the household, but to emphasise that liquidity constraints and
child labour might not be the full explanation for lack of schooling.
2.3 A Three Period Model
The two-period model is appealing for its simplicity, the negative e¤ect of future income un-
certainty on the human capital portfolio decision of the parents is immediate. Unfortunately,
the model does not lend itself very easily to cross sectional data or even standard panel data,
because the time span would be too short to cover the two periods in question. However, one
of the key aspects of the model is the prediction that households will tend to diversify future
income sources if there is enough uncertainty about future income. This need for diversica-
tion can spill over into the schooling choice today and create potential for a negative sibling
dependence in schooling; a negative dependence, which is not generated by constraint e¤ects
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due to sibling rivalry for currently scarce resources, but purely driven by the need for risk
diversication in the human capital portfolio of siblings. The challenge then becomes to test
for negative sibling depence in schooling without implicitly testing for a liquidity constraint.
This can be done by exploring the natural sequentiality in the schooling decision of siblings
and looking at two di¤erent cohorts of siblings within a household. The older cohort, who have
completed schooling will be generating income and is therefore able to contribute resources
to the household rather than demand them. That is, all else equal, households with older
economically active siblings will have less of a binding liquidity constraint than households
without. This in itself should have a positive e¤ect on schooling if households are liquidity
constrained. On the other hand, if the proportion of formally educated older siblings is higher
than the optimal overall proportion of formally educated children in the household , then
this is likely to have a negative e¤ect on the proportion of formally educated younger siblings
for the desired future income source diversication to be achieved.
By extending the model to a three period model, it becomes possible to analyse how exactly
the portfolio allocation of the older siblings should a¤ect the portfolio allocation of the younger
ones. This will have direct empirical implications, which can be tested in the cross sectional
data as long as there are enough households with children both of and beyond school age. The
three period model is set up such that older siblings are educated in the rst period and work
in the second and third period. Younger siblings are educated in the second period and only
work in the third period. Parents generate income in the rst and the second period, but not
in the third period, where they have reached old age and rely fully on the income of their
children. The human capital investment decision now becomes sequential. There will still be
an optimal overall  for the parents, which depends on the degree of uncertainty about future
income, here isolated in the urban sector. The sequentiality will generate predictions of how
the proportion of formally educated siblings from the rst cohort, 1 will a¤ect the proportion
of formally educated siblings from the second cohort, 2 such that the overall optimal  is
achieved. The total number of children N as well as the allocation of children between the two
cohorts, N1 and N2 are all exogenous.
In period 1, parents face uncertainty about period 2 and 3 and maximise the following
expected utility function
max
1;2;s1;s2
EW (c1; c2; c3) = U(C1) + EU(c2) + EU(c3)
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subject to the budget constraints for the three periods
c1 = Y1   (1  1)N1ea   1N1eb   s1
c2 = Y2 +N
 2
1 [(1  1)N1ya12 + 1N1yb12]  (1  2)N2ea   2N2eb + s1   s2
c3 = N
 3 [((1  1)N1 + (1  2)N2)ya3 + 1N1yb13 + 2N2Eyb23] + s2
N1 is the size of the rst and older cohort of siblings, 1 is the proportion of these that are
educated formally. Their second period urban income is yb12; which has a mean preserving
spread of "12; and their third period urban income is yb13 with a mean preserving spread of
"13: N2 is the size of the second and younger cohort of siblings. 2 is the proportion of these
that are educated formally, and their third period urban income is yb23 with a mean preserving
spread of "23: The total number of children is N = N1 + N2: The assumptions from the two
period model are maintained. I do, however, allow for di¤erent degrees of income transfers in
period 2 and period 3, such that 2 < 3: This is to mimic the fact that only in old-age are
parents dependend on their children for subsistence, as well as the fact that older siblings in
period 2 will primarily be of an age where they are about to establish their own households
and therefore may not contribute as much to the parental household as in the future.
The key point of interest, in terms of empirical implications, is the relationship between 2
on 1: This relation is immediate if the system is solved backwards in time, that is solving the
maximisation problem in period 2, taking the outcome of period 1 as given. The maximisation
problem therefore simplies to the following
max
2;s2
EW (c2; c3) = U(c2) + EU(c3)
subject to
c2 = Y2 +N
 2
1 [(1  1)N1ya2 + 1N1yb12]  (1  2)N2ea   2N2eb + s1   s2
c3 = N
 3 [((1  1)N1 + (1  2)N2)ya3 + 1N1yb13 + 2N2yb23] + s2
which, under the assumption of no liquidity constraints, yields two rst order conditions for 2
and s2, respectively.
N2(e
b   ea)U 0(c2) = E
h
N 3N2(yb23   ya3)U 0(c3)
i
U 0(c2) = EU 0(c3)
It is possible to nd the derivative of 2 with respect to 1 without specifying the preference
or uncertainty structure by di¤erentiating the system above and using Cramers rule. Although
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not perfectly unambiguous analytically, it turns out that under no liquidity constraints and
no child labour and with enough uncertainty, the derivate d2=d1 is negative. Whereas if
liquidity constraints are imposed, child labour is introduced and uncertainty is virtually nil,
then the derivative d2=d1 is positive. See appendix A1 for the exact specication.
2.4 Calibrations and Simulations
Before turning to the empirical analysis, the qualitative results in terms of the d2=d1 deriv-
ative are veried numerically. The second period maximisation problem of the three period
model is therefore calibrated under a set of di¤erent uncertainty structures in the three urban
income measures yb12; y
b
13 and y
b
23: Uncertainty is still modelled as a mean preserving spread for
the urban sector and normalised to zero in the agricultural sector. However, now the uncer-
tainty measures, ("12; "13 and "23) can be perfectly correlated or uncorrelated within cohort,
between cohorts and over time. This gives rise to a variety of di¤erent combinations of uncer-
tainty structures. In the following graphs, I have assumed that uncertainty is uncorrelated over
time ("12 6= "13), but perfectly correlated within and between sibling cohorts ("23 = "13). This
is entirely for illustrative purposes. Calibrations are done for all the possible combinations of
uncertainty structures and the overall qualitative results are the same.
Due to the perfect correlation within cohorts, period 2 can either be in a high income
state (y12 =  + "12) or in a low income state (y12 =    "12), depending on the urban
labour market outcomes for the 1N1 children in the urban sector. The model is calibrated
for N1 = 3; N2 = 3; 2 = 1:5; 3 = 0:95 and y2 = 0:5, the remaining values are identical
to the calibration of the two period model above. Parental second period income has been
reduced to ensure that the sum of parental income and the income transfers from the oldest
cohort are in the neighbourhood of 1, the normalised agricultural income. E.g. if all N1
are traditionally educated and earn ya2 = 1; the total income of the household in the second
period is 0:5 + 3=31:5 = 1:0774: Argueably, this is a bit arbitrary, but the qualitive results are
robust to di¤erent specications. What is important is to have some degree of binding liquidity
constraints under no credit markets.
In gure 3 the negative relationship between schooling of the older and younger cohort is
very clear. The left panel shows the relationship when the second period urban outcome for
cohort one is high, the right panel when the second period urban outcome is low. It is clear,
that there is only a negative relationshipbetween 1 and 2 if there is enough uncertainty. For
uncertainty levels below the normalised agricultural income (" < 1) households will always be
educating all children in the younger cohort irrespective of the older cohort. The need for risk
diversication is not strong enough to generate any sibling dependence. Each line represents
a di¤erent degree of uncertainty (") and thus di¤erent optimal overall  from the two period
problem. Heterogeneity across households, in terms of the uncertainty level they are facing, will
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generate a variety of di¤erent optimal s and thus di¤erent optimal (1; 2) combinations.
(Figure 3)
Take the purple line (" = 1) in the right panel above as an example. Here the optimal
overall  = 12 ; or 3 out of 6 children are being sent to school: When 1 = 1 all three older
siblings are sent to school and therefore none of the younger ones are in school, and vice versa.
If uncertainty increases (" 2 [1:25; 1:75]), this depresses the overall optimal  to 1=6th and
only one out of the total of six children are sent to school such that either 1 = 1=3 or 2 = 1=3
(blue dotted line). The negative relationship between 1 and 2 is thus purely mechanical in
the sense that it is fully determined by the overall optimal  and it only exists for  > 0 and
 < 1: When  = 0; 1 = 2 = 0 and when  = 1; 1 = 2 = 1:
The possible heterogeneity in  results in a cross sectional relationship between 1 and
2 which is not strictly negative. This can be shown by simulating a distribution for  and
1 and from these generate 2: Overall it must hold that  = (1N1 + 2N2)=N such that
2 = (
N   1N1)=N2: From this, the mechanical negative relationship between 1 and 2 is
obvious. The simulations are very simple and do not incorporate the model as such. The main
point is simply to show the negative relationship between 1 and 2 as a consequence of  < 1
due to a need for risk diversication. To ensure a discrete nature in the overall optimal ;
it is generated as nb=N , where nb is the optimal number of children with schooling out of the
total number of N children. N is drawn from a Poisson distribution with E(N) = 5:6 as in the
data. nb is drawn from a binomial distribution given N and with probability E() = 0:715 as
in the data, see table 1 in section 3. From the simulation results in gure 4, it can be seen that
if the distribution of  covers the full range between 0 and 1, then a least squares estimation
of the cross sectional relationship between 1 and 2 results in an inverse U relationship.
(Figure 4)
The correpsonding graph based on the actual data for 1 and 2 without any restrictions
on  is given below in gure 5. Eyeballing the two gures, they seem very close. A joint test
of equality of regression coe¢ cients for the two 1 terms in the least squares regression cannot
be rejected.
(Figure 5)
Comparing gure 4 and gure 5, it shows that the simulated conditional mean function
from a very simple version of the model (where the only role of uncertainty is to make  < 1)
gives exactly the relationship seen in the data.
The obvious question is then, what else (other than uncertainty and the need for risk diver-
sication) could result in an optimal overall  < 1; which would generate the same relationship
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between 1 and 2: Liquidity constraints and child labour cannot, I will return to this shortly.
Another possibilty is that heterogenity in  is driven by heterogeneity in ability (in terms of
schooling) across or within households. If there is heterogenity in ability across households but
not within households, such that each household sample from an ability distribution and all
children within households are identical, then the overall  for each household will always be
at a corner. There will thus be a bangbang solution in the sense that for the low ability house-
hold  = 0 (for these returns to traditional eduaction will be higher than the returns to formal
education); and for high ability households  = 1 (for these schooling is the most protable
educational choice): This is a consequence of no uncertainty and no liquidity constraints.
On the other hand, if the optimal overall  < 1 due to heterogeneity within households,
such that schooling is only a protable investment for some children, then this will yield the
same predictions in gure 4 as uncertainty. Thus, I cannot distinguish the e¤ect on  of within
household ability di¤erences from uncertainty and the need for risk diversication. However,
it must be said that for within household ability di¤erences to be generating the same results,
the dispersion in ability within households must be large enough to locate some siblings below
the cut o¤ point where schooling is no longer the most protable educational choice, and other
siblings above.
Although liquidity constraints can result in less than full enrolment among siblings within
a household, they can never actually general an optimal  < 1: For liquidity constained
households, the optimal  always equals unity as long as schooling is the most protable
educational choice, but the household is forced into a second best solution because it is not
able to optimize intertemporarily. For such households, the choice of 1 will a¤ect the choice
of 2: Even if the household was not able to achieve 1 = 1 due to liquidity constraints,
higher 1 will result in higher second period income and, all else equal, this will ameliorate the
liquidity constraint when it comes to educating the younger cohort. That is, there will be a
positive relationship between 1 and 2: The simulations in gure 4 are based on an underlying
relationship between 1 and 2 as illustrated in gure 3, however when introducing liquidity
constraints and child labour the relationship between 1 and 2 is completely di¤erent, see
gure 6.
(Figure 6)
In gure 6 it is clear that when there is no uncertainty (" = 0); but child labour and liquidity
constraints (ea =  0:025; s = 0), the relationship between 1 and 2 is positive under high
second period outcome for 1N1 urban migrants and zero under low second period outcome.
The positive e¤ect under high second period outcome shows exactly the proposed e¤ect of the
second period income of the older cohort ameliorating the liquidity constraint in the human
capital investment decision for the younger cohort.
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Any negative relationship between 1 and 2 in the data will thus be due human capital
diversication, either as a consequence of uncertainty and the need for risk diversication
or simply due to within household ability di¤erences. It can not be generated by liquidity
constraints and child labour. There are two other, equally important, implications of the
human capital portfolio model. If  < 1 due to risk diversication of future income sources,
then the negative sibling dependence should in principle only hold for rural households, because
urban households do not have the agricultural income diversication possibility. Second, the
portfolio e¤ect should also only hold for sons and not for daughters, because Tanzania is
largely a patrilineal society where the obligations of daughters vis-a-vis their family shift to
their husbands family upon marriage. Daughters can therefore not be relied upon for old-
age security and, thus, there is no need for ensuring risk diversication of their future income
sources. Within household ability di¤erences can not generate such predictions. There are no
reasons to believe that within household ability heterogenity is gender specic, nor that only
rural households should face within household ability di¤erences, but urban households should
not. Testing for di¤erences across gender and across sector is therefore an implicit test of the
uncertainty explanation versus the within household ability explanation.
3 Data
In order to test the empirical implications of the portfolio model above, I use a large-scale
nationwide cross-sectional household survey from Tanzania undertaken in 1994, the Human
Resource and Development Survey (HRDS).11 It is a nationally representative survey of 5,000
households out of which more than half of the households have school-aged children. The
HRDS data contains detailed information on individual household members, including their
educational status. At household level, there is information about sources of income, detailed
assets and expenditure information and, not least, schooling expenditures, school distance
as well as the heads assesment of the quality of the local primary school. Out of the 5000
households, only households where the household head has children (or step-children) of school
age as well as children beyond school age are included. Combined with a need for non-missing
observations of the included variables, this reduces the sample to 1328 households, out of
which slightly more than half are urban. Although the portfolio model is only applicable to
rural households with access to both formal and traditional education, urban households are
included for that exact comparison. Table 1 lists summary statistics for all relevant variables
from the data set.
11The survey was a joint e¤ort undertaken by the Department of Economics of the University of Dar es Salaam,
the Government of Tanzania, and the World Bank, and was funded by the World Bank, the Government
of Japan, and the British Overseas Development Agency. For more information or access to the data see
www.worldbank.org/lsms
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[Table 1]
There are three groups of variables, which are included in the emprirical analysis. First of
all, the sibling composition and allocation between formal education and traditional education.
N1 children are all children beyond school age, N2 children are of school age that is between
7-17 years old. 1 and 2 refer to the proportion of children which are through or in formal
schooling, respectively. The variables are also split by gender, allowing to test the hypothesised
sibling dependence separately for sons and daughters. There is an average of 5-6 children in
total, the number is slightly higher in rural than in urban areas. There is an overall schooling
rate of children of slightly more than 70% for this sample of households.
The second group of variables characterise the household. These variable include proxies for
model variables. Parental income is proxied by household expenditure. There are no income
measures in the data set, and commonly expenditure measures are thought to be better proxies
for life time income and less prone to measurement error than income measures, especially when
looking at rural households with a family-based agricultural production system, Deaton (1998).
More than 90 per cent of rural households have agriculture as their main source of income,
whereas this number is almost 35 per cent for urban households, indicating that the rural urban
divide in terms of agriculture and non-agriculture is not perfect, but still useful. Schooling is
almost three times more expensive in urban areas, compared to rural areas, where the annual
school costs amount to roughly 6 USD and rural school children have an average of 1.5 km
to cover to go to school. 40 per cent of rural households have at least 2 heads of livestock
or 5 pigs or sheep. Each rural household has an average of almost 15 hectars of land, but
there is a lot of dispersion in this number. The median rural household has 10 hectars and
only the top quartile of the distribution have land holdings above 18 hectars. There is a fairly
even distribution of muslims, catholic and protestants in rural areas, whereas muslims are a
dominating group in urban areas. There are more than 100 di¤erent tribes in Tanzania, in the
empirical analysis below I control for tribal a¢ liation of the largest ten tribes at village level.
Although income sources are clearly predominantly agricultural in rural areas, there are still
roughly 20 per cent of households with wage or self-employment business income. This number
is naturally considerably higher in urban area.
The last group of variables are indicator variables for whether the household head considers
the local primary school to have an adequate or good quality of the variable in question. In
general, school quality does not seem to be rated too poorly, except for school supplies.
4 Empirical Specication and Results
The proportion of children enrolled in school is the choice variable in the second period of
the three period model above and thus also the dependent variable in the empirical analysis
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below. It can be expressed either as the number of children attending school, nb2, out of the
total number of school-aged children, N2, or as the proportion, 2 = nb2=N2: This gives rise
to two alternative empirical model specications, either a double censored Tobit model or a
binomial count model. The doubled-censored Tobit model can estimate the proportion of N2
children in school, 2 taking into account that 2 is censored at 0 and at 1. However, 2 will
be of a discrete character since there is a natural upper bound to the total number of young
o¤spring in a household. The underlying assumption of continuity in the dependent variable
of the Tobit model might therefore be inappropriate.
The alternative is to model the choice of nb2 directly as a count variable. It is then important
to use a count model, which takes the upper censoring into account, such that predicted values of
nb2 never exceeds N2. This is the key feature of the standard binomial count model, Winkelman
(1997). This model estimates the number of children attending primary school nb2, conditional
on the total number of school-aged children in the household N2.12 When conditioning on N2;
it is clearly treated as exogenous to the schooling decision and all results should be interpreted
given the number of school aged children. Although the main empirical analysis is based on
the binomial count model, results are also reported for the Tobit model as well as the linear
probability model in section 4.2 to check whether results are robust to model specication.
4.1 Econometric Model
The number of children in school nb2 is assumed to be binomially distributed and can therefore
be thought of as a sum of independent and homogenous Bernoulli-trials up until N2. That
is, the current household demand for schooling is modelled as a sum of N2 binary individual
choices concerning school attendance, which are assumed to be independent and with the same
school attendance probabilities (2)13.
Pr(schooli = 1) = 2; where i = 1; 2; :::; N2 and 2 2 [0; 1]
and nb is binomially distributed
N2X
i=1
schooli = n
b
2  Bin(N2; 2)
The expected value of nb2 is E(n
b
2) = N22 and the variance is V ar(n
b
2) = N22(1   2).
The e¤ect of di¤erent explanatory variables contained in x will enter through the link function
12This model is not commonly used in the economics litearture, but a related example is by Thomas, Strauss,
and Henriques (1990). They use the binomial model to study child mortality within families, conditional on the
total number of children ever born.
13The assumptions of homogeneity and independence among children within the household will be relaxed
shortly.
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G(x0) of the (conditional) probability of school attendance, 2(x0) = G(x0) =
exp(x0)
1+exp(x0) =
(x0); which here is the logistic distribution. Assume that the conditional mean is correctly
specied as E(nb2jx; N2) = N22(x0) and the conditional probability of the number of children
attending primary school being equal to nb2 is Pr(y = n
b
2jx) =
 nb2
N2

2(x
0)n
b
2(1 2(x0))N2 nb2 .
The log-likelihood function for each household is then given by
lnL() = ln

nb2
N2

+ nb2 ln(x
0) + (N2   nb2) ln(1  (x0))
and the rst order conditions with respect to  is given by
@ lnL
@
= nb2x N2

exp(x0)
1 + exp(x0)

x =

nb2   E(nb2jx; N2

)x = 0
the solution to which is the maximum likelihood estimator ^ML.
However, maximum likelihood estimation requires the underlying binomial distribution to
be correctly specied, that is assuming homogeneity and independence concerning school at-
tendance among the children of a household. If these assumptions do not hold, the model
generates over- or under-dispersion relative to the specied distribution variance of nb2. By
using the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, that is nding the  that satises the rst or-
der condition rather than the  that maximises the likelihood function above, it is possible to
relax the distributional assumptions concerning the conditional variance and instead allow for
the robust sandwich estimator initially introduced by Huber (1967). The conditional variance
of nb2, which is part of the robust sandwich estimator of var(), is then simply estimated by
\V ar(nb2jx; N2) = (nb2   \E(nb2jx; N2))2, where \E(nb2jx; N2) = N22(x0^): The sandwich estima-
tor is robust to over- and under-dispersion, heteroskedasticity, distributional misspecication
and clustering, as long as the conditional mean is correctly specied, (Cameron and Trivedi
(1998), Newson (1999) and Wooldridge (2002)). Thus, this variance estimator is robust to
violation of the assumptions of homogeneity and independence among the school-aged children
in the household.
4.2 Empirical Results
There are three testable empirical implications of the three period portfolio model. First of
all, an implication of the need for future risk diversication is that, given enough uncertainty
about future income transfers, there will be negative sibling dependence among the younger
and older cohorts of siblings. Second, this should primarily hold for siblings in rural households,
because urban households do not have the same diversication possibilities between formal and
traditional education. Third, it should also only hold for sons and not for daughters due to
the patrilineal structure of the Tanzanian society. The model is therefore in principle only
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applicable to rural sons.
(Table 2)
Column 1 in table 2 is a binomial regression of the number of primary school attending sons
from cohort 2 out of the total number of sons in cohort 2, N2. It is regressed on 1; N1 of older
brothers and N2 as well as on proxies for the remaining model variables. Household income is
proxied by the expenditure measure and a control for whether agriculture is the main source
of income as well as an interaction term taking the parental agricultural earning abilities into
account. Costs of schooling eb are proxied by the average school cost in the village as well as
the average distance to the local primary school in the village. Finally, an indicator variable for
whether the household has a herd or not is included, this is thought as a proxy for ea. The key
variable of interest is the e¤ect of 1 on 2 (which in e¤ect is the dependent variable) among
rural sons.
When 1 enter as a linear term in the 2 regression, it has no signicant e¤ect on 2.
However, if the e¤ect of 1 is allowed to be non-linear and a quadratic term is included, it
is soon clear that the insignicance of the linear term is due to the underlying non-linearity.
There is both a strong positive e¤ect of 1 on 2 for lower levels of 1 and a strong negative
e¤ect for higher levels of 1: The turning point is constant across the three specictions for
rural sons in column 2-4, which allow for di¤erent sets of control vairables. In column 2 only
the model proxies are included, column 3 also includes school quality controls and column 4 in
addtion includes a number of household characteristics as well as tribal controls and religious
a¢ liation. Somewhat surprisingly, apart from the quadratic 1 terms, only the latter group is
(jointly) signicant. A series of other control variables have all been tested insignicant and
without any inuence of the 1 estimated coe¢ cients.
The turning point of the inverse U equals 0.57 for all three specications in column 2-4.
Below this point, the positive relationship between 1 and 2 is either due to the ameliorating
e¤ect of N2 children on the liquidity constraints or simply a consequence of cross-sectional
heterogenity in , as illustrated in gure 4 and 5. It is impossible to separate which of these
two positive e¤ects are dominating. However, this is not true when it comes to the negative
e¤ect of 1 on 2 for higher levels of 1. The model predicts that when there is no uncertainty
about future income transfers, there will always be a positive e¤ect of 1 on 2 due to the
positive income e¤ect. Only a considerable degree of uncertainty and thus a strong enough
need to diversify risk by diversifying income sources can generate a negative e¤ect of high levels
of 1 on 2. That such a negative e¤ect exists for rural sons cannot be rejected. It even exists
for a substantial part of the N1 distribution, only 30.46% of the rural households with sons
have 1  0:57 among sons. Thus, for a majority of younger sons, the parental need for future
risk diversication seems to be a main determinant for their schooling decision.
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The picture is di¤erent for rural daughters. The schooling rate of younger daughters (2)
is estimated in column 5. There is no signicant e¤ect of schooling of their older sisters,
irrespective of the functional form. Column 4 reports the quadratic e¤ect, but a pure linear
e¤ect is also insignicant, although in some specications a positive e¤ect of the linear term
is signicant at 10%. The 1 terms for rural daughters cannot be tested jointly signicantly
di¤erent from zero, they can also not be tested jointly signicantly di¤erent from the two 1
coe¢ cients of the rural sons. There is too much imprecision to say anything conclusive about
whether there is positive or negative sibling dependence among sisters. The schooling decision
of girls do, however, seem to respond to income e¤ects. There is a positive signicant (at 10%)
e¤ect of log of household expenditure on schooling of the younger cohort of sisters with a high
marginal e¤ect of 32% for the average rural household with daughters. The distance to the local
primary school also matters signicantly. Calculating the marginal e¤ect, an extra kilometer
in terms of distance can reduce the proportion of younger sisters in school by 8 percentage
points. Overall, it seems safe to conclude that for daughters it is unlikely to be portfolio e¤ects
among sisters, which dominate the schooling decisions made by parents, but there could be
some degree of sister rivalry. This gender di¤erence between sons and daughters is consistent
with the risk diversifcation hypothesis, but not with the possible alternative of  < 1 due to
within household ability di¤erences.
There is a lot of imprecision in the estimates for both sons and daughters when the sample
is split by gender. This is not surprising. First of all, only households, which have children
of the same gender in both the younger and older cohort, are included. Second, there is less
variation in the dependent variable because there are fewer N2 sons or N2 daughters, this will
generate more corner solutions. Furthermore, there might be size e¤ects from splitting the
sample. More corner solutions can in itself generate stronger negative e¤ects of 1: However, if
results were purely driven by size e¤ects, they should be stronger for daughters than for sons
because the sample for daughters is smaller than that for sons. This is not the case.
Households are aggregated to include all siblings of rural households in column 6 and,
for comparison, of urban households in column 7. Finally, the model is also estimated on
the full sample in column 8, which naturally increases the level of precision in the coe¢ cient
estimates. Now household expenditure has a strong signicantly positive e¤ect, and there is a
negative e¤ect of high levels of agricultural income, consistent with traditional education being
a relatively more attractive educational alternative. But what is more important, is that the
non-linear quadratic e¤ects of 1 on 2 are also strongly signicant on the full sample. In fact,
they seem stronger for the full sample than for the rural sample, indicating that the size e¤ects
are likely to be negligible. The turning point of the inverse U of 2 is now higher and very
close to the actual rate of schooling in the data,  = 0:7: When looking at colum 6 and 7,
however, it is clear that the quadratic e¤ect stems from the rural households. Among urban
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households there is a positive linear e¤ect of 1 on 2; but the quadratic terms is insignicant.
A joint test for whether the two 1 terms for urban households in column 7 equals those of
the rural households in column 6 is rejected at a 5% level, indicating that there is very limited
scope for human capital diversication among siblings in urban households. Thus, the model
implications of risk and income source diversication generating negative sibling dependence
among older and younger siblings in rural households and, within these, primarily among sons,
cannot be rejected by the data.
(Table 3)
The results are robust over a range of empirical specications with the inclusion or exclusion
of a number of di¤erent control variables, such as whether households have electricity, bank
accounts, access to transport, and ownership of own house. From table 3 it also shows that,
in addition, results are robust to choice of econometric model. The qualitative ndings are
the same both for the full sample of households, as well as when the sample is split by rural
or urban households. The turning point for the inverse U of 1 is also reasonable stable over
the di¤erent specications. It is 0.75 and 0.77 for the full sample in the Tobit model and the
linear probability model, respectively, and 0.63 and 0.65 for the rural households in the same
two models. This has to be compared with 0.7 and 0.63 for the full sample and the rural
households, respectively, in the binomial model.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The main contribution of this paper is to extend a simple two-period human capital portfolio
model, which allows for two types of education with di¤erent returns and di¤erent risk, such
that it can generate empirical predictions directly testable in standard household data from
developing countries. By extending the model to a three-period model and allowing for se-
quentiality in the human capital investment decision of siblings, it is possible to derive testable
model predictions of sibling dependence due to risk diversication, which di¤er from predictions
based on sibling rivalry over scarce resources.
The key implication of the two-period model is that uncertainty about future income trans-
fers from children generates a need for future risk and thus income source diversication, which
spills over into a need for current human capital diversication in the educational choice of chil-
dren. This human capital diversication is only possible in rural areas, where there exists a
clear dichotomy between formal and traditional education and the associated future urban and
agricultural employment. Traditional education in terms of on-farm learning by doing endows
children with specic skills or human capital directing them towards future agricultural work
or farming. Formal education, on the other hand, endows children with general human capital
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suitable for future modern or urban employment. As long as returns and risks of the agricul-
tural and the urban sector are uncorrelated, an obvious ex-ante risk management strategy of
income smoothing is simply to ensure an optimal balancing of risk and returns from these two
sectors by diversifying the human capital portfolio of children already when they are of school
age.
Model implications makes it possible to disentangle sibling dependency due to risk diversi-
cation from the standard argument of sibling rivalry over scarce resources in the child labour
literature. The testable empirical prediction is that there should be a negative relationship
between schooling of the younger and older sibling cohorts. The empirical analysis shows that
such a negative sibling dependence does indeed exist when the proportion of formally educated
older siblings is high, consistent with a need ofr risk diversication due to uncertainty about
future returns to education. The result holds for the full sample of households, and when look-
ing into the specic subsamples, it holds for rural households and not for urban, and it is only
strong and signicant for the specic subsample of rural sons, exactly as expected considering
the human capital portfolio model.
The question is then whether such a negative e¤ect for the specic subsample of rural
sons could be caused by something else. First, it cannot be explained by liquidity constraints,
because these older siblings beyond school age typically contribute to household income. Sec-
ond, birth order e¤ets, which are often used as a prime indicator for whether or not a child
is attending school in empirical analyses based on individual children, would also predict the
opposite e¤ect. It is generally thought that the older siblings work to help pay for schooling
of the younger ones, the e¤ect should therefore be positive. Third, the negative e¤ect of a
high proportion of schooling of older siblings on the proportion of schooling of the younger
ones is also not likely to be caused by transitory income shocks. Transitory income shocks in
rural areas are generally caused by failing agricultural income (e.g. due to adverse weather
conditions), households with older formally educated siblings and thus access to urban income
sources should be able to shield the schooling of the younger siblings better than households
without, which would generate a positive rather than a negative relationship. Finally, within
household ability di¤erences could be generating the same overall results. Within household
ability di¤erences would also result in an over  < 1 with a mechanical negative relationship
between 1 and 2 as found in the simulations. However, within household ability di¤erences
cannot explain the empirical ndings in terms of gender di¤erences and rural-urban di¤erences.
The nal conclusion is therefore that future income uncertainty and the need for risk di-
versication does a¤ect the joint schooling decision to such an extent that there is negative
sibling dependence between cohorts. The return side of the human capital investment decision
can thus be a dominating factor in the human capital investment decision made by parents on
behalf of their children. I do not wish to question the importance of liquidity constraints on the
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schooling decision of children, in fact I also nd some evidence of income e¤ects, however what
I do question is whether the liquidity constraint explanation, which only relates to the cost
side of the human capital investment decision is indeed the full explanation. Taking the return
side into consideration when analysing the human capital investment decisions of parents has
important implications for educational policies. If the objective of policy makers is to ensure
full enrolment into primary schools, lowering the costs of schooling will have a positive, but
insu¢ cient e¤ect for the objective to be reached in rural areas where traditional agricultural
production systems require specic skills, passed on by generations. Only in modern more
complex agricultural production systems, where there are learning opportunitiesfrom general
human capital skills, as Rosenzweig (1995) puts it, will formal schooling generate a return.
When the production technology is simple, there are generally very limited or no returns to
formal schooling, e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) and
Jolli¤e (2004). Parents, I am sure, perceive this.
So, is it possible to generate returns to formal schooling in simple agriculture? What if
primary schooling did not only endow children with general human capital in terms of math-
ematics and reading and writing Kiswahili and English (as it is the case in Tanzania, where
a third, tribal, language is the mother tongue of most children), but also endowed children
in rural areas with some of the specic skills needed for a future life in farming? That is,
adapting the curricula of primary education to the future needs and necessary life skills of the
children supposed to attend school. As a matter of fact, the parents of the HRDS data give the
answer themselves. In the survey, they have been asked a number of questions about education
and school curricula, including a question on what they think are the important subjects that
should be taught in primary schools14. They were asked to rank ve subjects according to
importance: (i) teaching good written and spoken Kiswahili, (ii) teaching good written and
spoken English, (iii) religious or moral education that teaches children to be polite, respectful
and good citizens, (iv) teaching technical skills for agriulture and business(which is the only
course out of the ve that is not actually being taught), and (v) teaching mathematics and
science. There is no doubt about their answer, teaching technical skills for agriculture and
business rank highest. Parents want, not only general, but also specic skills for their children.
They want skills diversication.
14Section 2, part B, question 80-85 in the HRDS questionnaire.
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6 Figures
Figure 1. E¤ect of uncertainty " on optimal overall proportion of siblings in school 
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour (ea = 0:0125)
Figure 2. E¤ect of uncertainty " on optimal overall proportion of siblings in school 
- under liquidity constraints and child labour (ea =  0:025)
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Figure 3. E¤ect of older cohorts 1 on younger cohorts 2
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour (s 7 0; ea = 0:0125)
- under no correlation over time and perfect correlation within cohorts and between cohorts
Figure 4. Estimation of 1 and 2 relationship on simulated data for full distribution of 
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Figure 5. Estimation of 1 and 2 relationship on actual data for full distribution of 
Figure 6. E¤ect of older cohorts 1 on younger cohorts 2
- under liquidity constraints and child labour (s  0; ea =  0:025)
- under no correlation over time and perfect correlation within and between cohorts
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7 Tables
Table 1. Summary statistics
Rural HHs Urban HHs
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Sibling composition
pi 0.715 0.260 0.000 1.000 0.787 0.274 0.000 1.000
pi1 0.721 0.329 0.000 1.000 0.780 0.347 0.000 1.000
pi1 (sons) 0.710 0.393 0.000 1.000 0.755 0.397 0.000 1.000
pi1 (daughters) 0.721 0.393 0.000 1.000 0.812 0.358 0.000 1.000
pi2 0.741 0.386 0.000 1.000 0.799 0.354 0.000 1.000
pi2 (sons) 0.739 0.398 0.000 1.000 0.808 0.368 0.000 1.000
pi2 (daughters) 0.746 0.411 0.000 1.000 0.808 0.370 0.000 1.000
N2 children in school 1.633 1.067 0.000 6.000 1.635 1.067 0.000 6.000
N2 sons in school 0.833 0.801 0.000 4.000 0.820 0.822 0.000 4.000
N2 daughters in school 0.800 0.856 0.000 4.000 0.815 0.821 0.000 4.000
N1 2.306 1.248 1.000 10.000 2.108 1.059 1.000 6.000
N1 sons 1.187 0.942 0.000 5.000 1.092 0.881 0.000 4.000
N1 daughters 1.119 1.000 0.000 6.000 1.016 0.893 0.000 4.000
N2 2.063 1.297 1.000 9.000 2.288 1.386 1.000 9.000
N2 sons 1.179 1.060 0.000 8.000 1.181 1.029 0.000 6.000
N2 daughters 0.884 0.919 0.000 5.000 1.107 1.033 0.000 6.000
Proportion of daughters 0.461 0.236 0.000 1.000 0.484 0.232 0.000 1.000
N 5.606 2.342 2.000 19.000 5.289 1.921 2.000 15.000
Household characteristics
HH expenditure per AE per day 0.708 0.501 0.125 5.213 1.260 1.218 0.130 14.008
Agriculture is main income 0.904 0.295 0.000 1.000 0.344 0.475 0.000 1.000
Av. school costs in village 6.369 3.567 1.718 19.281 19.129 13.190 1.622 82.135
Av school distance (km) 1.542 1.033 0.185 5.417 1.317 0.627 0.111 3.625
HH has livestock 0.413 0.493 0.000 1.000 0.082 0.274 0.000 1.000
Land(ha) 14.682 14.696 0.000 125.000 6.058 14.759 0.000 250.000
HH size 8.508 3.219 3.000 32.000 8.093 2.780 3.000 25.000
HH head female 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 0.145 0.353 0.000 1.000
Muslim HH 0.277 0.448 0.000 1.000 0.567 0.496 0.000 1.000
Catholic HH 0.346 0.476 0.000 1.000 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000
Protestant HH 0.265 0.441 0.000 1.000 0.148 0.356 0.000 1.000
Village prop. of HHs w wage income 0.164 0.118 0.000 0.565 0.571 0.218 0.053 1.222
Village prop. of HHs w business income 0.046 0.056 0.000 0.273 0.122 0.081 0.000 0.500
School quality assesment
Teachers good/adequate 0.746 0.436 0.000 1.000 0.881 0.324 0.000 1.000
Headmaster good/adequate 0.823 0.382 0.000 1.000 0.917 0.276 0.000 1.000
School supplies good/adequate 0.411 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.454 0.498 0.000 1.000
Environment good/adequate 0.552 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.656 0.475 0.000 1.000
Self-reliance good/adequate 0.798 0.402 0.000 1.000 0.828 0.378 0.000 1.000
Swahili lessons good/adequate 0.869 0.338 0.000 1.000 0.932 0.252 0.000 1.000
English lessons good/adequate 0.593 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.731 0.444 0.000 1.000
Math lessons good/adequate 0.777 0.417 0.000 1.000 0.855 0.353 0.000 1.000
Moral lessons good/adequate 0.728 0.445 0.000 1.000 0.818 0.387 0.000 1.000
Max number of observations 654 674
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8 Appendix A1
Under no liquidity constraints and no child labour, the derivative of 2 with respect to 1is
found by using Cramers rule on the system of rst order conditions. It is given by
d2
d1
=
ED  BF
AD  BC
where
A = D =
h
 (eb   ea)N2U 00(c2)  E

N2N
 3(yb23   ya3)U 00(c3)
i
> 0
B =
 U 00(c2)  EU 00(c3) > 0
C =

 

(eb   ea)N2
2
U 00(c2)  E

N2N
 3(yb23   ya3)
2
U 00(c3)

> 0
E =
h
E

N1N
 3(yb13   ya3)U 00(c3)

 N1 21 (yb12   ya2)U 00(c2)
i
< 0
F =
h
E

N 23N2(yb23   ya3)N1(yb13   ya3)U 00(c3)

  (eb   ea)N1 21 N2(yb12   ya2)U 00(c2)
i
< 0
Although not immediate from above, it turns out that the derivative is generally negative
and in particularly so the larger the uncertainty.
Under liquidity constraints (s = 0) and child labour (ea < 0), the derivative is simply given
by
d2
d1
=
F
C
which is by all means easier to interpret. The sign depends on F; which now is ambiguous
because consumption smoothing over time is di¢ cult. If there is virtually no uncertainty (as
it is typically the case in the standard child labour literature), there are high indirect costs of
schooling such that (eb   ea) is large, and the household is severely liquidity constrained such
that jU 00(c2)j >> jU 00(c3)j because second period consumption is smaller than third period
consumption, then the second term in F will dominate and the derivative becomes positive.
This positive e¤ect is strengthened the larger the immediate gains from child labour in period
2 that is the higher the indirect costs of schooling (eb   ea).
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Abstract
Lack of primary schooling among rural children in developing countries is often at-
tributed to credit constraints and demand for child labour. However, it can be shown
that the choice of not educating all children formally through schooling, but rather edu-
cating some children traditionally through on-farm learning-by-doing can be an optimal
strategy for improved risk diversication within the household. In this paper, I test an
intra-household human capital portfolio model on extraordinary panel data from a rural
region in Northwestern Tanzania with a 13 year time horizon. The portfolio model allows
for diversication of human capital investments as an ex-ante risk management mechanism.
The need for risk management is driven by uncertainty about future income. Model as-
sumptions and implications are strongly supported by the empirical ndings. The results
indicate that the need for future income source diversication can indeed a¤ect current
school decisions. This paper thus presents an alternative explanation for low rural school
enrolment rates in developing countries. An alternative which is not in any way driven by
resource constraints. This can potentially have far reaching policy implications.
Keywords: Schooling, child labour, human capital investment, future income uncertainty, risk
diversication, liquidity constraints, Kagera, Tanzania, Africa
Chapter 4 of Ph.D. thesis.
1
1 Introduction
Schooling rates are continuously low among rural children in many developing countries. Clas-
sic human capital investment theory dictates that an individual should invest in education as
long as the discounted future returns exceed the current direct and indirect costs of such an in-
vestment, e.g. Ben-Porath (1967). Such a cost benet argument is simple and straightforward.
However, the investment decision is more complex when it comes to primary school education
of children in developing countries. The human capital investment decision is not an individual
decision for each child, but rather a joint decision made by parents for all children. The com-
plexity arises from the fact that parents bear the costs of primary education of their children,
whereas the individual child receives the future benets. Parents therefore face uncertainty
about both the level and the possible share of future returns to education.
There is a vast amount of literature on the choice of child labour and schooling among
households in developing countries. This literature has a strong emphasis on the cost side of
the human capital investment decision and the inability of parents to borrow against the future
returns of their childrens education, see Edmonds (2007). The literature so far has illustrated
that costs and credit constraints are important in the schooling decisions of households. I
investigate whether the need for risk diversication due to uncertainty about future returns is
equally important for the schooling decision. Two recent papers have introduced uncertainty
in Baland and Robinson (2000)s, by now, standard human capital investment model for the
individual child and show, analytically, that this can result in less schooling, Pouliot (2005)
and Estevan and Baland (2007). However, these papers do not make any rigorous attempt at
estimating the importance of uncertainty in the household schooling decision empirically.
In this paper, I ask the following question: Can the need for ex-ante risk diversication be
so strong that it alone results in some children not being sent to school in order to diversify
the human capital portfolio of the household? This contributes to the existing schooling and
child labour literature by focusing explicitly on the expected future returns to parents from
investing in the human capital of their children, and by modelling the human capital investment
decision jointly for all children in the household, rather than for each individual child, using
a simple human capital portfolio model. I allow for two types of human capital, general
human capital acquired through formal schooling directing children towards the urban sector,
and specic human capital acquired through traditional on-farm learning-by-doing directing
children towards the agricultural sector. The model is set up and calibrated both with and
without liquidity constraints and child labour in order to separate implications of uncertain
returns, portfolio e¤ects, from implications of costs and liquidity constraints, constraint e¤ects
on the joint schooling decision. Portfolio e¤ects result in a positive relationship between fertility
and schooling within a household, whereas constraint e¤ects result in a negative relationship.
The calibration results are essential for generating precise model predictions, which can be
2
tested empirically, and thereby provide guidance in how to take the model to the data.
Both calibrations and the empirical analysis are based on a data set from a household
survey in the region of Kagera in Northwestern Tanzania with an extraordinary long time
horizon of 13 years1. The data set has detailed information on schooling, fertility and migrant
children. The long time horizon allows me to focus on households with completed fertility and
completed human capital investment decisions of all their children. In addition, issues which
are left unanswered by the model or the data, are resolved by the use of qualitative data, which
are crucial for getting a better understanding of the inuence of social norms, in particular in
terms of gender di¤erences in the schooling decision.
The analytical and empirical results show clear evidence of human capital diversication
among children within households. I nd strong empirical evidence of portfolio e¤ects consistent
with human capital diversication happening due to uncertainty, and for which I nd no other
observationally equivalent alternative. Furthermore, the positive portfolio e¤ects dominate
only among sons and not among daughters, which is exactly what the social norms would
predict. All model assumptions and other implications are also consistent with the data.
These ndings have important for policy implications. If policy makers solely act on the
cost side of the educational decisions of the household, while the return side is neglected, the
objective of full primary school enrolment might not be achieved. The schooling system should
be able to accomodate the need for future income source diversication and provide the life
skills necessary for children to be sucessful both in the agricultural and in the urban sector.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I describe the ethnographic evidence forming
the background for the model assumptions. In section 3, the simple portfolio model is set up
and calibrated under the di¤erent scenarios allowing for uncertainty, liquidity constraints and
child labour. Section 4 is a description of the KHDS data, while section 5 includes a detailed
empirical investigation of each of the testable model assumptions and implications. Possible
alternative explanations for the key result are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes and
policy implications are discussed.
2 Ethnographic Evidence
Rural Kagera is, in many ways, a very di¤erent setting from modern industrialised societies,
also in terms of social norms and expectations about the role of parents, as well as the role
of children. The inuence of norms is di¢ cult to detect in quantitative empirical analyses.
Qualitative data can therefore be useful complements, especially when the set of norms dicussed
is di¤erent from ones own reference set. Lassen and I therefore decided to collect qualitative
data from 12 out of the 49 KHDS sample villages in Kagera to gain local insight, Lassen and
1The Kagera Health and Development Survey, KHDS I+II.
3
Lilleør (2005).
During semi-structured focus group discussions on schooling, family, networks, migration
and old-age security, a certain picture emerged about norms and expectations in the relationship
between parents and children. First, it quickly became clear that old-aged people rst and
foremost rely on their children for subsistence and care. If they have no children or these fail
to provide the assistance needed, old-age support can also be provided by clan members or by
fellow villagers who then, in return, would inherit any assets. The property one has may help
him when he is sick as he may sell some so as to get some money or may give a will to someone
he trusts to take care of him and take his property when he dies..."Take care of me and you will
take me property when I die."(Cluster 12). Old people without assets or faithfull or loving
children can expect little assistance.
Second, the expected assistance from children di¤ers depending on their gender, education
and residence. Norms clearly dictate that sons should provide for their old-aged parents,
whereas daughters cannot be expected to do so. Once married the obligations of daughters lie
with their family in-law. A boy is the heir of the family because a girl will later on be married
and go away (...) a girl is likely to benet the clan of her husband, (Cluster 8) and educating
a girl is taking the whole wealth to her in-laws, (Cluster 21). There is even a local saying in
Haya "Omswisiki taba wawe", meaning the daughter is always not yours, (Cluster 21), and
a ritual linked to the gender di¤erence already when infants: When a female child is born, at
the age of three months she is brought into the living room and directed to front door facing
out as a ritual that she will have to leave the family when she is old enough, (Cluster 50).
Even so, it seems that many daughters still try to help their old age parents as much as they
can, and they are therefore often considered more faithfulland show more lovethan their
brothers, (Cluster 17). This expectation of daughters being more loving, is repeatedly given as
a reason for sending girls to school in the hope of future returns even though she will marry
and belong to the familiy of a di¤erent clan. Girls have a reputation of caring more for their
parents than boys when they succeed in life, (Cluster 23). Boys tend to forget their past and
their families. (Cluster 8). The focus group in cluster 50 very clearly stated the dilemma of
parents, when asked who would be given priority in terms of schooling if they had to choose
between a daughter and a son. The participants said that they would send a boy in case they
had to choose. This is because the boy is expected to become the successor when parents die.
If the boy was not the successor the girl would be sent to school because she is more likely
to help the parents. In addition, schooling may be important for the marriage market. It is
easier for [girls with primary school] to be married to a highly educated person, (Cluster 50).
On the other hand, there also seems to be fear of pregnancy if girls attend school in teenage
years girls are more likely to get pregnant which will result in drop out, (Cluster 19) .
Third, the expected migration pattern, and with it, the type of old-age assistance, also seems
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to di¤er for sons and daughters. Whereas marriage seems to be the primary factor determining
the migration of a daughter, education is the key for whether or not a son migrates. Sons
without primary school are not expected to migrate and mainly fail if they do so because their
familiarity lies in the local agricultural environment. They will engage in farming and be of
general assistance to their parents in terms of supplying farm produce, manual work, and
nursing the sick. Their education limits them from gaining more than their working strength.
Since they live closer to their families they assist on daily events, (Cluster 13). Likewise, on
the general description of an uneducated son they note that His most important asset is his
own strength which can be used any where that he is familiar with, He will attend all the
cultural practices for the family, and help the father with manual works, His help is important
as he is used to the environment [of the village] , (Cluster 50). In return for his assistance, a
son without formal education expects all life support, e.g. shamba, from parents so he has to
work hard for them, (Cluster 21).
Sons with education, on the other hand, are seen as likely to migrate out of the rural village,
and their assistance will be in terms of remittances, upon request, if they succeed in life and are
good or loving sons that do not forget their past and their family. The educated migrant son
sends more remittances as much as he can to keep his family relative to his income, (Cluster10),
sends cash money when requested, more than once, and has good income but only responds
to the call of the father., When married he turns weak to his wife. He concentrates on his
household and lives an expensive life while he is forgetting his [parental] family, (Cluster 50).
In addition, migrant children living far away are generally thought of as harder to reach and
less reliable when it come to ald-age assistance. The focus group in cluster 12 pointed this out
by using a Swahili saying "Fimbo ya mbali haiui nyoka - the far stick cannot kill a snake" This
gives excuse for the child staying in distant places. Parents will not have more expectations to
those children staying far.Parents thus loose control over migrant children.
Fourth, schooling in itself also carries an element of uncertainty. It is seen as risky if
the educated child is not able to nd employment and does not become self-dependent, but
rather continues as a burden to the parents. It is seen as not risky if the educated child
nds employment, becomes self-dependentand as a good investmentif he, in addition, is a
lovingchild and starts remitting. Schooling is a good investment when a child does not turn
back to the parents to depend on them, (Cluster 12). Every parent expects to benet from
the good result with investment on their children (...) a farmer planting good seeds, he always
expects to get good yields, the value of education is seen especially when a child gets success,
(Cluster 19). Primary education is the good investment only if: a child after school does not
depend on parents, but works for himself; if he/she is employed by the government, a child will
be sure of monthly salary and out of this will be helping the parents at home; if he/she remits
home, (Cluster 17).
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Finally, it was mentioned repeatedly, by the use of a Haya proverb, that if other migrant
children in the village were doing well and remitting home, this would have a positive inuence
on the parents decision to send their own children to school: "Rutachuba talima ntanu -
without jealousy you cannot open a new banana farm" meaning one cannot be successful,
(e.g. Cluster 12, 13, and 23). That is, only if you also wish do do well when you see others
doing well, will you succeed. The concept of jealousyis used in a positive manner, incentives
to invest in schooling are improved, when others are able to generate good returns from the
same type of investment.
3 Model
As outlined above, parents have di¤erent expectations and face di¤erent uncertainties about
future assistance from their chidlren, depending on the gender, schooling and residence. This
section provides a simple portfolio model of the human capital investment decisions faced by
parents with more than one child. The model is set up as a two period model, where children are
educated in the rst period and, as adults, provide for their parents in the second period. The
model di¤ers from most models in the existing child labour literature, because it incorporates
old-age dependency on children; parental uncertainty about the future income from children;
sibling dependency in the human capital investment decision; and a clear distinction between
the urban and the agricultural sector. The model is set up to analyse the e¤ects of uncertainty
about future income transfers from children to parents on the present human capital investment
decisions parents have to make on behalf of their young children. The model and its underlying
assumptions generate a set of empirical implications, which can be directly tested in the data.
Some of these implications di¤er markedly from the ones generated by conventional theories
of child labour. I do not distinguish between gender in the model, but given the qualitative
ndings, the model is expected only to hold for sons.
3.1 A Basic Portfolio Model
The model is a unitary household model, where parents function as a unied sole decision
maker. It consists of two periods, t = 1; 2, and there is no discounting of the future and no
interest rate on savings or credit. The model will be calibrated under two di¤erent scenarios
in section 3.2 to facilitate comparison of the empirical implications of the model with those of
more conventional theories of child labour and human capital investment. Below, the model is
outlined under a no liquidity constraint, no child labourscenario. Later, I will impose both
liquidity constraints and child labour.
In the rst period, parents earn agricultural income Y1; which they allocate between rst
period household consumption c1, savings s; and the education expenses for their N children.
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N is assumed to be exogenously given, since the emphasis here is not on the e¤ect of uncertainty
on fertility decisions, but on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the joint human capital investment
decision of children, given the fertility of the household.2 There are two types of education in
the model, general formal education achieved through primary schooling and specic traditional
education achieved through on-farm learning-by-doing. Traditional education directs children
towards future employment in the agricultural sector (a), whereas formal education directs
children towards future employment in the non-agricultural urban sector (b) in the second
period. Parents face a discrete choice for each of the N children of whether he or she should
be educated traditionally or formally. A child can only receive one type of education3.
In the second period, traditionally educated children earn agricultural income, ya2 , whereas
formally educated children earn urban income, yb2: Parents do not generate any income in the
second period, but rely fully on their savings and the joint agricultural and urban income
transfers from their N children for second period household consumption, c2. Second period
income is uncertain. Parents therefore maximise a joint von Neuman-Morgenstern expected
utility function dened over and separable in household consumption, ct, where t = 1; 2: The
utility function is assumed to be concave, such that U 0(c) > 0 and U 00(c) < 0: The household
solves the following maximisation problem
max
;s
EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2) (1)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb   s (2)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2) + s
where  is the proportion of children, which parents chose to educate formally through school-
ing. That is,  is the portfolio allocation of children between traditional and formal human
capital investments. The number of children who receive schooling in the rst period is thus
given by N and the number who are educated within the traditional agricultural based sys-
tem is (1 )N .4 The total amount of educational expenses is (1 )Nea+Neb; where ea is
the educational expenditure for each child in traditional education, e.g. supervisional costs of
parents, and eb is the educational expenditure for each child in formal education, e.g. tuition
2 It is conceivable that the fertility decision and the human capital investment decision of the born and unborn
children are both inuenced by the parentspreference for old-age security, which suggests modelling the two
decisions jointly. However, to keep things simple, I focus on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the human
capital investmnet decision of children conditional on the household having completed their fertility.
3This is a simplifying assumption. The choice here is not on how many hours a child spends in school or
working, but rather whether he or she graduates with full primary school education or not.
4For analytical simplicity,  is written as continuous in the theoretical model, but it will be treated as discrete
in the calibrations.
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fees and uniform costs. Educational expenditures are allowed to di¤er over the two sectors,
and they are, for now, both non-negative and therefore considered as a cost.5
Second period consumption will equal any capital transfers from period one in terms of
savings or dissavings, s, plus a fraction, 1=N of total income from all children. Total second
period of the children amounts to the agricultural sector income (1   )Nya2 ; and the urban
sector income Nyb2. Children are assumed to transfer a certain fraction of their income to their
parents. The fraction is the same for all children, irrespective of their sector of employment,
but it depends on their number of siblings for  > 0: When assuming 0 <  < 1; there will
be a positive, but diminishing marginal e¤ect of having more children on total second period
income received from children.
While second period urban income will come from migrant children, second period agricul-
tural income will come from home children educated by their parents. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that, to the extend that parents have actually concentrated on passing on their spe-
cic human capital skills to their children, the second period agricultural income of these, ya2
will be positively correlated with the current agricultural income of the parents, Y1; such that
ya2 = f(Y1); where f
0 > 0: Furthermore, not only specic human capital will matter for the
agricultural productivity of children, but also the inputs available at local level, which are likely
to be highly correlated over generations.
Savings can be negative, and both the discount rate and the interest rate are normalised to
unity and are thus explicitly left out of the model for simplicity. By assuming perfect credit
markets, I can ignore any e¤ect of liquidity constraints on the schooling decision and thus focus
on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital portfolio decision of all N
children in the household. The quation is: can this alone result in less than full school enrolment
among siblings, i.e. a model prediction of at least one child being educated traditionally and
thus resulting in  < 1 solely due to uncertainty about future income transfers.
When there are no liquidity constraints, parents are faced with two choice variables; how
much to save or dissave s; and which proportion of their children to educate formally through
schooling ; the human capital portfolio allocation. The rst order condition with respect to s
is6
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2) (3)
5While the literature on child labour and schooling generally set ea as negative and thus as a source of income,
I here follow Bock (2002) in stating that the overall learning potential in the tasks completed by children in
agriculture is higher than the immediate return. If children were only undertaking tasks with no learning, but
high immediate output, such as fetching water or rewoods, there would be no transfer of farm-specic human
capital from parents to children and therefore no future agricultural return from such activities. thus for ea to
be an educational expense, children have to be allocated tasks of with a certain degree of complexity and, thus,
a learning potential. See section 2.5 in chapter 2 for more detail.
6When liquidity constraints are imposed s = 0 and parents only have one choice variable, : The maximisation
problem therefore reduces to one rst order condition, eq. (4) below.
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That is, savings s will be chosen such that marginal utility in period one equals the expected
marginal utility of period two. The rst order condition with respect to  is given by equation
(4), where  is the optimal solution for the maximisation problem above
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for 0 <  < 1
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) > E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 0
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) < E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 1
(4)
Parents face two sources of uncertainty with respect to future income transfers from their
children. There is uncertainty about the future employment of a child, but there can also be
uncertainty about whether the successful child will send the expected level of remittances to
his parents, that is an uncertainty about whether the child is a lovingchild or not, as noted
by some of the focus group participants. Lucas and Stark (1985) emphasise how parents may
be more likely to loose control or family command over migrant children as compared to home
children.7
In the following, I assume, that there is no covariant uncertainty between second period
transfers from children in the urban sector and children in the agricultural sector. This allows
me to simplify the problem by normalising uncertainty about agricultural remittances to zero,
and thus solely focus on the e¤ect of uncertainty about urban remittances or income transfers
on the optimal proportion of children in formal schooling, . This is not to say that there is
no uncertainty associated with agricultural income transfers or in-kind assistance, but rather
that uncertainty associated with transfers from distant migrant children in the urban sector is
higher. Urban migrants face higher income levels, but also relatively more variation, since the
urban labour market entails a fundamental risk of unemployment, which is not present among
subsistence farmers in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, parents may also perceive the size
and the frequency of remittances from urban migrant children to be more uncertain compared
to the daily support and in-kind assistance from home children engaged in local agricultural
sector8. Finally, because ya2 is likely to be strongly correlated with Y1, parents will be able to
make more precise predictions about the future value of ya2 given their priors, than about the
future value of yb2:
In short, the uncertainty faced by parents about second period income is modelled for the
urban sector, where each migrant child can either get a good (typically formal sector) job or
not; and where migrant children in good jobs can remit more than migrant children without a
7For a detailed literature review on this subject, please refer to chapter 2.
8This is, in e¤ect, an agency problem between parents and migrant children. The degree of success of migrant
children is harder to monitor for parents and family control is likely to decrease with the distance. Social sanctions
are often mentioned as e¤ective means in overcoming such agency problems and thereby helping to reduce at
least one source of future uncertainty. In chapter 1, Lassen and I analyse the e¤ect of such sanctions on the
demand for formal schooling.
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good job, but they may not do so. This is modelled as a simple mean preserving spread, where
lovingchildren with good jobs remit a share of their high urban income, yb2 = + "; whereas
less lovingchildren with good jobs mimic children without good jobs and thus only remit a
share of a low urban income, yb2 =   ": Second period urban income is given by
yb2 =
(
+ "
  "
w.p.
w.p.
p = 0:5
(1  p) = 0:5
The mean and the variance for each child in the urban sector is E(yb2) =  and V ar(y
b
2) = "
2;
respectively: The expected total income transfers in period 2 from all the N formally educated
children in the urban sector, is simply E(N1 yb2) = N1 ; independent of the degree of
correlation among children in the uncertainty structure. However, the variance of the expected
total income transfers, V ar(N1 yb2) and the covariance in the rst order condition for ,
cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) will both depend on the degree of correlation. I consider the two extremes
of either perfect correlation or perfect uncorrelation in the uncertainty structure of urban
remittances. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between. When there is perfect correlation
in " among migrant siblings, they will all either have a good draw and be good remitters,
and then their income transfers will amount to N1 ( + "); or they will all have a bad
draw or all be bad remitters, and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (   "),
hence the variance is V ar(N1 yb2) = 2N2 2"2. When the individual "s are perfectly
uncorrelated, migrant children all face the same urban labour market lottery irrespective of
the labour market outcomes of their siblings and they decide independently on their level of
remittances to parents. The variance under no risk correlation is thus smaller and depends on
the binomial coe¢ cient
 
N
i

, where i denotes the number of successful siblings in the urban
labour market (i.e. those where yb2 = +") and N is the total number of siblings in the urban
sector in the second period, V ar(N1 yb2) = N 
NP
i=0
 
N
i

1
2N
(i"  (N   i)")2 = N1 "2:
As long as there is no covariance between the uncertainty associated with the agricultural
sector income transfers and the uncertainty associated with urban sector income transfers,
households will have an incentive to diversify their human capital investments between these
two sectors to reduce future risk exposure. If the need for diversication away from the urban
sector is strong enough, that is the second period covariance term, cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) is
su¢ ciently negative, this will have a negative impact on the number of children sent to school
in the optimal human capital portfolio of the household, . It will then be optimal for the risk
averse parents to direct one or more children towards future employment in the agricultural
sector by educating them traditionally on the farm.
10
3.2 Model Calibrations
In the following, I rst calibrate the portfolio model using standard CRRA preferences under
both the no liquidity constraint, no child labourscenario, and later introduce both liquidity
constraints and child labour. By doing so, I am able to separate out which empirical im-
plications originate from uncertainty and the portfolio model as such, and which empirical
implications originate from a household being liquidity constrained.
The model is calibrated using simple summary statistics from the KHDS data (see table
4.1 for detail). It is calibrated for the average rural household, using the average values for
household expenditure as a proxy for agricultural income, Y1 and ya2 and for number of children
N , while the village average is used for schooling expenditure. Second period urban income,
yb2 is proxied by the average level of household expenditure in urban areas. All expenditure
variables are measured as daily adult equivalent terms in USD. Calibrating the model based
on real data is helpful in determining the relative levels of exogenous variables. The variable
values and their normalisation in the calibrations are listed below in table 3.1
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of KHDS variables and their model equivalents.
KHDS I variable KHDS data Normalisation Model
AE daily HH expenditure, urban HHs mean 0.75 2.02 yb2
s.d. 0.86 1.78 "
Rural Households
AE daily HH expenditure, agricultural HHs mean 0.37 1 Y1= ya2
s.d. 0.20 0
Annual school expenditure, cluster mean mean 4.65 0.03 eb
Total number of children in HH mean 8.21 N
Proportion of children in/through school mean 0.67 
# Rural Households in sample 365
Note: All expenditure amounts are in USD, where 1 USD =455 Tsh. AE: adult equivalent
In the calibrations, I assume that the correlation between rst period parental agricultural
income and second period agricultural income of children is perfect and that the mapping is 1:1.
That is, parents transfer all of their specic human capital skills through traditional education
to the children destined for agriculture. Agricultural income levels in the two periods are
normalised to unity, Y1 = ya2 = 1 with zero standard deviation. This results in an adjustment
of the urban sector second period income, such that E(yb2) =  = 0:75=0:37 = 2:02 and
the uncertainty measure, here proxied by the standard deviation, " = s:d:(yb2) = (0:86  
0:20)=0:37 = 1:78: The annual expenditures of schooling in rural areas, including school fees
and school uniform costs, are 3% of household expenditures per child, thus eb = 0:03: Since
I have no plausible measure of the supervision costs of traditional education, I simply set it
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at half of the schooling costs, such that ea = 0:015 under the no liquidity, no child labour
scenario. Thus, for the average KHDS household formal education is always more protable
than traditional education. The question is then how much uncertainty about future returns
to formal education is needed for the household to diversify future income sources and thus
educate at least one child traditionally.
In the following, graphs are calibrated using  = 2 as the relative risk aversion parameter
in the CRRA utility function. To avoid heavy consumption smoothing incentives,  = 0:95
and thereby ensuring that rst and second period consumption are of the same magnitude. In
the graphs, yb2; ; ; e
a and eb are held constant, whereas N;Y1 = ya2 and " are allowed to vary.
The urban income transfer uncertainty, " runs in the [0; 2] interval, thereby including in the
upper end the actual expenditure spread present in the data of " = 1:78. For the maximum
level of uncertainty (" = 2), the migrant child is in a situation of virtually no income or an
income four times that of the agricultural sector. The number of children, N can vary from
2-16. Although the total number of children on average is 8, the average number of sons is 4.
Given the qualitative ndings on gender di¤erences, the model is likely to be less applicable to
girls. I will return to this in the empirical analysis below. Finally, note that since the model is
calibrated for discrete numbers of children,  is also of a discrete character.
3.2.1 No liquidity constraints and no child labour
The main contribution of the simple portfolio model above is captured in gure 3.1. It shows
the e¤ect of uncertainty on the human capital investment decision under perfect correlation
and uncorrelation in the uncertainty measure "; respectively.
[Figure 3.1]
For " = 0, there is no future uncertainty and thus no need for future income source diver-
sication. The household will always choose the optimal corner solution for , which for the
average KHDS household is  = 1: For low levels of ", the household does not alter its opti-
mal human capital allocation between the traditional agricultural sector and formal schooling.
However, as the uncertainty about future income transfers from migrant children increases, the
need for future income source diversication shifts the optimal portfolio allocation away from
100% enrolment in schooling. There is nothing new about this. For any risk averse agent,
there is an optimal trade-o¤ between risk and returns of investments. What is new is that this
is applied to the human capital investment decision of rural households in developing coun-
tries. The key point here is that even in a world of no liquidity constraints and no immediate
returns to child labour, households would still not send all of their children to school if there
is a certain level of uncertainty or risk associated with returns to schooling. For the average
KHDS household with 8 children, this implies that for an income spread in the urban sector
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of " = 1:8, roughly as we see in the data, the optimal proportion of children in school under
the two extremes of either perfect correlation or perfect uncorrelation in the " risk measure,
 is 0:875 and 0:125, respectively. This should be compared to the actual intra-household
proportion of children with formal education of  = 0:67; which is right in between.
Allowing for sibling dependency is one of the main contributions of the portfolio model
compared to the existing literature on child labour. The e¤ect of changes in N on  can be
characterised as the portfolio e¤ect. Analysing the human capital investment decision of the
full set of children jointly, rather than for each child independently and then adding up, yields
very di¤erent results because the total number of children inuences the covariance term in
the rst order condition for . Standard model on child labour and schooling typically set the
number of children to one for simplicity, e.g. Baland and Robinson (2000), Ranjan (1999),
and Basu and Van (1998). These model more or less explicitly argue, that the decision is
identical for all n children. They therefore implicitly assume away any sibling dependency
in the schooling or child labour decisions. Such models will, by construction, always predict
a corner solution for  since the household schooling rate is given by n times the optimal
solution for the individual child. Interior solutions for  can, in such models, only be the result
of changes in the household resources over time, such that some children may have been subject
to binding liquidity constraints, others not. In the portfolio model, the disregard for sibling
dependence corresponds to looking at the case of N = 1 and then subsequently applying that
specic solution for  to all children. For N = 1, the model predicts that when " > 1:4; the
optimal choice of  shifts from schooling to agriculture under a relative risk aversion parameter
of  = 2: And, when "  1:4 the household will always send all children to school ( = 1), and
for " > 1:4 the household sends none ( = 0). Looking at gure 3.1, this is clearly not the
case for N > 1. There is an obvious portfolio e¤ect on  of changes in N: There is even some
indication of convergence as N increases.
[Figure 3.2]
Figure 3.2 is an alternative illustration of the same results. It show the e¤ect of changes
in N on  for di¤erent levels of uncertainty. For the uncorrelated " = 1:78, there is a clear
positive e¤ect on  of increases in N until  reaches the neighbourhood of 0.8, where it seems
to stabilise. For the perfectly correlated "; the convergence happens much earlier and the clear
cut positive e¤ects of N on  are only present for low levels of N . This is not surprising. By
introducing perfect correlation in "; I am assuming the same outcome for all migrant children.
Thus, the risk diversication can only take place between the rural and urban sector, whereas
for uncorrelated " it can take place both between the rural and urban sector as well as among
the migrant children within the urban sector.
The e¤ects of changes in parental agricultural income Y1, in , and in the probability of
parent receiving remittances in the second period from the migrant children, p are all trivial.
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Although it should be noted that the sectoral divide in returns to education generates a negative
e¤ect of high agricultural income on  once the traditional agricultural sector becomes a
protable risk-free alternative to formal education. There is a positive e¤ect on  when  = 1
compared to  = 0: Finally, there is a clear positive e¤ect on  of increases in p, i.e. the higher
the probability of receiving second period remittance, the more protable is the investment in
formal human capital and parents will choose to send a larger proportion of their children to
school9.
The most interesting point to take from this exercise is that uncertainty matters for the
human capital investment decision. Potentially it matters a lot. Even in a world conducive
in any aspect, but risk, to full school enrolment, a simple model of utility maximisation with
standard risk averse agents predicts optimal intra-household school enrolment rates well below
unity for actual levels of urban income spread.
3.2.2 Liquidity constraints and child labour
When the model is calibrated under liquidity constraints, there is no transfer of capital between
periods and s = 010: Parents are thus maximising eq. (1) with respect to  subject to
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb (5)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2)
For the model to resemble the standard child labour and schooling literature as much as
possible, there should also be high opportunity costs of schooling in terms of child labour.
This is achieved by ensuring that the immediate return to traditional education outweighs
the learning costs associated with the task complexity, such that ea < 0: This means that
 ea resembles a wage for each child in the agricultural sector. However, child labour is still
regarded as a means of acquiring traditional education and thereby future agricultural returns,
such that ya2 is tied to the parental level of Y1: If the type of child labour in question is indeed
detrimental to human capital accumulation of the child and thus to his future agricultural
earning capabilities, a stronger version of child labour should be imposed where ya2 < Y1
because only an incomplete transfer of specic human capital from parents to the child has
taken place. In the following, I assume full transfer of specic human capital skills from parents
to the traditionally educated children, thus setting ya2 = Y1:
The introduction of a liquidity constraint, where households no longer can borrow against
future income (s  0), has the expected negative e¤ect on the proportion of children sent to
9 It should be noted that as soon as p 6= 0:5, the uncertainty is no longer modelled as a mean preserving
spread and thus increasing p has two implications. It increases both the mean and the variance of second period
urban income transfers.
10 In the calibrations, I allow s  0.
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school, but only in households with many children, see gure 3.3. For households with up
to eight children, there is no e¤ect on  when the uncertainty measure is uncorrelated and
only a slight negative e¤ect of the liquidity constraint under perfectly correlated "s. Under no
uncertainty, the liquidity constraint only really binds for N  10, which is equivalent of the
schooling expenditure amounting to 30% of total household expenditure.
[Figure 3.3]
While the inability to borrow against future income is most likely reality for most households
in developing countries, the true cost of schooling, it is often argued, has to be measured in terms
of the opportunity costs of childrens time. The model is therefore also calibrated allowing for
not only future but also immediate returns to traditional education and thereby introducing the
concept of child labour. This is simply done by setting ea =  0:03: One child in the agricultural
sector can then nance one child in school. These immediate returns to children engaged in the
agricultural sector in the rst period o¤ers a possibility of improved consumption smoothing
between period one and two, compared to the situation of no immediate returns to traditional
agricultural education. Under no uncertainty, the liquidity constraint now binds for N  4,
see gure 3.4:
[Figure 3.4]
It is also clear from gure 3.3. and 3.4 that for the special case of N = 1, which is the
standard case in the schooling and child labour literature, there is no e¤ect on the optimal
decision of introducing liquidity constraints and only a very marginal e¤ect of also introducing
child labour. The optimal education choice shifts from formal to traditional education in
agriculture at " = 1:5 when there is no child labour, and at " = 1:4 when there is child
labour. The, by the child labour literature, predicted strong e¤ects of households being liquidity
constrained are thus hard to conrm analytically for one-child households given the numerical
values for school costs and household income.
The pure portfolio e¤ect of changes in N on  is contaminated once the household is
liquidity constrained. However, since the constraint only really binds for households with more
than four (ten) children with (without) the introduction of child labour, the portfolio e¤ect is
less a¤ected by the liquidity constraint for lower levels N: This is also clear from gures 3.5
and 3.6 below, which corresponds to gure 3.2 only now the household is liquidity constrained
(gure 3.5) and is also able to benet from immediate returns to childrens engagement in
agriculture, i.e. child labour (gure 3.6).
[Figure 3.5] & [Figure 3.6]
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In order to analyse the e¤ect of variations in agricultural income on the optimal portfolio
allocation, I let rst and second period agricultural income vary in the interval Y1 = ya2 =
[0:2; 3]. Thereby it is possible to analyse the e¤ects of income when the liquidity constraint is
strong for low levels of Y1 as well as when the agricultural returns make traditional education
an attractive alternative to formal education for high levels of ya2 . For households with N = 4,
the simple liquidity constraint is binding for agricultural income levels below Y1 < 0:5 in the
sense that it is optimal for the household not to send all four children to school. Allowing for
child labour, the household will allocate at least one child to the agricultural sector for income
levels below Y1 < 1:1; despite future returns to agriculture being very low.
[Figure 3.7] & [Figure 3.8]
From gure 3.7 and 3.8 it is clear, that this yields interesting empirical implications. The
e¤ect of increases in agricultural income is positive when the liquidity constraint is binding, but
negative for higher levels of agricultural income, when the agricultural (here risk free) sector
o¤ers returns to traditional education which can match the returns to formal education. This
generates an inverse U shaped relationship between the proportion of children in school and
income. The strength of this inverse U shape is, not surprisingly, a¤ected by the degree of risk
aversion given to the utility function, but is nevertheless present both for  = 1 and  = 3:
Finally, it should be noted, that the interval of negative e¤ect of high agricultural income
on  increases as " increase. That is, the turning point for the inverse U shape shifts inwards
as uncertainty increases. This is obvious from gure 3.7 and 3.8 above. For " = 0, the shift
from formal to traditional education happens when agricultural income reaches the mean level
of urban income, but as " increases the shift happens for lower levels of agricultural income.
3.3 Empirical Implications
The di¤erences between the model implications under the di¤erent scenarios guides the em-
pirical analysis below. It is not possible to identify the true e¤ect of uncertainty about future
remittance on schooling, but by using the set of model implications as guidelines, it is possi-
ble to test whether the empirical ndings are indicative of the existence of uncertainty in the
human capital investment decision.
The main implication of the portfolio model is that uncertainty about future income trans-
fers from children, " has a negative e¤ect on the optimal proportion of children educated
formally, . Empirically, it is virtually impossible to nd an appropriate measure of the un-
certainty perceived by parents, it relates both to the uncertainty about the future urban labour
market for each of the migrant children, and to the uncertainty about the intergenerational
contract, that is whether children, if successful in the labour market, will in fact send the
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expected remittances.11 There are, however, a set of testable empirical implications of the
model and its assumptions. Each of these are indirectly a test of the model. If just one of
them is rejected in the data, the relevance of the model is clearly questionable when it comes
to analysing the human capital investment decisions within the household.
I will distinguish between the empirical implications relating to the model assumptions and
those relating to the existence of uncertainty. Although the assumptions of the model are
based on previous ndings and conclusions in the literature (see the detailed literature review
in chapter 2 of this thesis), they should also be consistent with the data at hand in order for
the model implications to be of any empirical contribution.
There are three central assumptions, which have to be consistent with the data: (i) urban
income levels and urban income spreads are assumed to be higher than agricultural income
levels and spreads, respectively, but without stochastically dominating the agricultural income
distribution; (ii) parents are assumed to rely on their children for old-age support; and (iii) it
assumed that there is a sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education. That is,
there are only returns to formal education in the urban sector and only returns to traditional
education in the agricultural sector. In addition, these three assumptions generate two empirical
implications, which also have to be consistent with the data: (i) there should be an inverse
U relationship between the proportion of children in school and agricultural income; (ii) the
probability of receiving remittances from migrant children should have a positive e¤ect on the
proportion of children in formal education. I return to the empirical tests of each of these
assumptions and their model implications in section 5 below.
The uncertainty aspect of the human capital portfolio model also yields testable empirical
implications: (i) the overall low enrolment rate in primary schools should to a large extend
be caused by within household variation rather than between household corner solutions of
zero or full enrolment; (ii) the empirical e¤ect of the total number of children on the optimal
human capital portfolio of the household can give indications of the relative strength of a
portfolio e¤ect and thus of the inuence of uncertainty and risk management considerations in
the human capital investment decision relative to the constraint e¤ects; and (iii) the portfolio
e¤ect should only be found among sons, not daughters, if the qualitative ndings on gender
di¤erences with respect to norms for old age support can be generalised. Testing all of these
implications empirically is a test of whether the model is consistent with the ndings in the
data.
While the rst empirical implication of the model, that the majority of intra-household
schooling rates should not be at a corner, is necessary for the model to have any relevance
11 In chapter 1, Lassen and I analyse the e¤ect of reduced uncertainty about remittances on schooling by using
variation in civil society structures and social norms across villages, captured by a tribal fractionalisation index.
Even so, the analysis captures the e¤ect of di¤erences in expected income transfers rather than the e¤ect of
di¤erences in their spread and, thus, the risk.
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at all, it is also a very general implication supported by many alternative hypotheses about
schooling and child labour.
The most central empirical implication of the model is therefore the positive portfolio e¤ect
of N on : This implication requires the portfolio e¤ect to dominate any negative e¤ect of
liquidity constraints. It is thus not only a (somewhat restrictive) test of the portfolio model as
such, but also a test of the relevance of the portfolio model compared to the general liquidity
constraint explanation in the literature. This implication is central because it only holds
for positive levels of "; which, in the calibrations above, as a minimum needs to be in the
neighbourhood of " = 1 (which means an income spread of the same size as the average level
of agricultural income), making it an indirect test of whether future income uncertainty a¤ects
the human capital investment portfolio of the household today. If it is possible to identify
a positive portfolio e¤ect of N on  empirically, then the model provides an unambiguous
indication of sibling dependence in the need for risk diversication, and thus an indication of
income uncertainty a¤ecting the choice of human capital investment.12 However, if the e¤ect of
N on  is zero or negative, the model cannot provide any unambiguous conclusions of whether
the human capital investments in the household are inuenced by future income uncertainty.
Thus, testing the e¤ect of N on  negative is not necessarily a rejection of the model, it could
be due to a dominance of the liquidity constraint e¤ects compared to the portfolio e¤ect, or it
could simply be that there is no portfolio e¤ect.
Most of the empirical implications are straightforward and fairly constant over the di¤erent
scenarios. However, two of the implications are less so. Their calibration results are therefore
summarised in table 3.2. The table gives a brief overview of the model predictions with respect
to the e¤ects of fertility, N; and income, Y1 on the optimal proportion of children in school, 
under the three di¤erent scenarios of liquidity constraints (LC) and child labour (CL) and for
di¤erent values of and correlations structures in the uncertainty measure, ". It is clear from
the table that a positive e¤ect of N on  is only possible for high levels of uncertainty and it is
only unambiguous when " is uncorrelated across migrant children and there is no child labour,
ea > 0. In the remaining cases, the positive e¤ect of N is only dominant for low levels of N:
The relationship between  and N is therefore likely to be non-monotonic. In the following
empirical analysis, I will therefore test for di¤erent functional forms, including a fully exible
non-parametric specication.
12This, of course, hinges upon the positive e¤ect of N not being driven purely by observationally equivalent
alternatives, I will return to this in section 6 below.
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Table 3.2. Empirical implications
no LC, no CL LC,no CL LC, CL
s 7 0; ea= 0:015 s  0; ea= 0:015 s  0; ea=  0:03
" = 0 " < 1 "  1 " = 0 " < 1 "  1 " = 0 " < 1 "  1
d
dN corr " = 0  0 7 0 = 0 < 0 7 0 < 0 < 0 7 0
uncorr " = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 7 0 < 0 < 0 7 0
d
dY1
corr " = 0  0  0 inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U
uncorr " = 0  0  0 inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U
Note: For d

dY1
, the total number of children is held constant at N = 4; corresponding to the average
number of sons in a household. The negative e¤ect of Y1 on 
exists for lower levels of Y1 as " increases.
The non-monotonic relationship between agricultural income and the proportion of children
in school is an interesting point relative to the existing literature on child labour, where non-
monotonicity is often used to explain weak empirical e¤ects of household economic status on
schooling enrolment or child labour. The reasons given for non-monotonicity are generally
based on local non-linearities for certain intervals in the data. This can stem from imperfection
in the land and/or labour markets (Bhalotra and Heady (2003)), from discrepancies between
own judgement and childrens judgement of the economic status of parents in old age and thus
expectations of low future intergenerational transfers if parents are not poor enoughseen with
the eyes of the children (Rogers and Swinnerton (2004)), from dramatic non-linearities in the
neighbourhood of the poverty line because as soon as parents can a¤ord not to let their children
work, they will do so, as suggested by the luxury axiomof Basu and Van (1998) and tested
empirically on Vietnamese data by Edmonds (2005).
Non-monotonicity in the relation between economic status and child labour or schooling
could also arise as a global phenomenon. Edmonds touch upon this in handbook chapter on
child labour, where he notes that a positive relationship between child labour and economic
status can be explained by employment opportunities, Edmonds (2007). This is exactly what
the assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education is about.
Learning-by-doing in agriculture generates future returns in the agricultural sector, schooling
generates future returns in the formal urban sector. If the urban employment opportunities are
limited, and the expected returns to formal schooling therefore low or if agricultural incomes
are high, the traditional educational alternative of the agricultural sector is therefore relatively
more attractive. The assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to education therefore generates
an empirical implication of global non-monotonicity. For low levels of agricultural income, the
liquidity constraint is binding and the agricultural sector as such is unattractive, increasing
income will therefore have a positive e¤ect on the optimal allocation of children in formal
schooling. However, if the agricultural income levels are high enough to be able to compete with
urban income levels, the traditional educational alternative becomes relatively more attractive
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and the optimal human capital portfolio shifts more towards future agricultural employment,
that is as Y1 = ya2 get high enough,  starts falling again. This generates a negative or an
inverse U relationship between agricultural income and the optimal : This generates a very
simple alternative explanation for a possible non-monotonic relationship between income and
schooling or child labour among rural household. Such a hypothesis is easy to test in the data.
Finally, it should be noted that the interval in which there is a negative e¤ect of Y1 on 
increases as uncertainty " increases, that is the turning point for the inverse U relation between
Y1 and  moves inwards. This is natural consequence of risk aversion, once the variance of
future urban income increases, the risk-free alternative becomes more attractive even though
the expected mean is lower. This implication of the model is harder to test directly, although
gender di¤erences indicate that uncertainty should matter more for sons than for daughters
and thus a direct implication would be that the turning point of the inverse U is lower for sons
than for daughters.
4 Data and Setting
Both the qualitative and quantitative data used in this chapter were collected in the Kagera
Region. A predominantly rural area in the Northwestern part of Tanzania bordering Lake
Victoria to the East, Uganda to the North and Rwanda and Burundi to the West, see map in
Appendix A1. The population (about 2 million in 2002) is primarily engaged in agriculture
and, to some extend, trading. The agriculture is a mixture of food and cash crop production,
dominated by bananas and co¤ee in the North and by maize, sorghum and tobacco in the
South. For more detail, see De Weerdt (2007).
The data set used for estimation in this chapter is unique. The Kagera Health and Devel-
opment Survey data is a long term panel based on household surveys with a time span of 13
years, the rst round of surveys were originally conducted in 1991-1994, (KHDS I) and then
again in 2004, (KHDS II). This time horizon is a particular advantage for studying the human
capital investment decision outlined in the portfolio model, which relies on the assumption
that households have completed their fertility decisions in order to get a good estimate of the
completed human capital investment decision, . It is when children are of school age that
the schooling decisions are likely to be made, but given the sequential nature of having chil-
dren, it is only possible to observe the nal  years later. The long time horizon is therefore
crucial, because it allows me to use 2004 information about the proportion of children with
a primary school degree, but 1991-1994 information about household characteristics relevant
when the human capital portfolio decision is actually made. In addition, the KHDS has an
explicit module with detailed information on migrant children. This is unusual for household
surveys, which normally only survey household members, then children living elsewhere are
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not included and generally not accounted for.
In 2005, Lassen and I supplemented the quantitative KHDS data with qualitative data
based on focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews from 12 of the 49 KHDS
villages, working with the team that collected the new round of KHDS data in 2004. The
main purpose of the qualitative data collection was to get a closer to an understanding of what
a¤ects the schooling decisions made by parents and whether they are inuenced by the future
prospects for their children, urban migration and expected level of remittances as well as old-age
dependency, inheritance rules and social norms. Issues, which to some extend can be tested for
quantitatively, but where qualitative conrmation is reassuring. A typical focus group session
had a duration of three and a half hours including a break and included approximately ten
villagers with some knowledge of schooling, comprising all adult age groups and both men
and women, selected in cooperation with the village leader (an elected local) and the village
executive o¢ cer (appointed by the central government, not local). All sessions were conducted
with the same facilitator and the same note taker, and reporting procedures were set up so as to
ensure a uniform reporting across villages. Survey instruments and outcomes are documented
in Lassen and Lilleør (2005).
4.1 Data and Sample Selection
The data from the Kagera Health and Development Survey consists of ve waves. The rst four
waves were conducted with 6 months interval from 1991 to 1994 covering 915 households in to-
tal. All individual household members from the rst four waves were attempted re-interviewed
in a fth wave in 2004, (Beegle, DeWeerdt, and Dercon (2006))13. This implied tracking each
individual, even if they moved out of the village, region or country. The tracking in KHDS
2004 is exceptional with a re-interview rate of 91% of the surviving baseline households from
KHDS 1991-94, and an overall re-interview rate of 82% of the surviving household members14,
(Beegle, DeWeerdt, and Dercon (2006)). For the selected sample of households used below, the
re-interview rate among the surviving children is almost 93%. Slightly more than 8% of the
children in these households die between KHDS I and KHDS II.
The sample selection is based on the following critera. Only rural households with children
of the head or his/her spouse are included, and at least one of these children must be of school
age in wave 1. I dene primary school age to be between 7-17 years old, allowing for the
widespread delayed enrolment. Households must be interviewed both in the rst wave and in
the fth wave, but there are no requirements of survey participation in the three intermediate
13KHDS I was undertaken by the World Bank and e Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences, whereas
KHDS II was funded by DANIDA and World Bank and implemented by E.D.I. (Economic Development Initia-
tives) in Kagera.
14A household is characterised as re-interviewed when at least one member of the baseline household is re-
interviewed in 2004.
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waves. This means that all households will have at least one child aged between 20-30 years
old in 2004, who typically has a group of siblings. None of these siblings are allowed to be
younger than 7 years old in 2004, this is to avoid including households which may not yet have
completed their fertility and schooling decisions. The nal sample is 370 households15.
Since it is the long time horizon, rather than the dynamics of the panel as such, that are
of importance for taking the model to the data, it is worth making a note on the exact use of
the data. Basically, I create a pseudo cross-section, where variables relating to children and
their education (i.e. measures of N and ) are based on 2004 information, whereas variables
relating to the schooling decision, such as educational expenditures and household income (i.e.
measures of ea; eb and Y1) are based on averages from the pooled 1991-94 data. The ve waves
are thus collapsed to one, where the variable values are either an average over time of the
rst four waves, or 2004 values. To get the most exact measure of completed fertility and the
completed human capital investment decisions, N and , I include educational information
on the dead and the untraced children using the latest information available in KHDS I. This
way, attrition is virtually nil among children of participating households.
Finally, it should be noted that KHDS was collected as a two-stage stratied random sample,
based on geography and on mortality risk within the household. Since one of the main purposes
of the KHDS was to analyse the e¤ect of fatal adult illness on remaining household members,
there was a strong oversampling of sickhouseholds. A sickhousehold is dened as a household
where at least one adult is ill and unable to work or where there has been recent adult mortality
of anyone between 15-50 years of age in the 12 months preceding the enumeration interview. A
total of 16 households were sampled in each cluster, 14 of these where sickhouseholds. Such
a heavy stratication calls for careful consideration in any estimation analysis. However, if
the stratication is based on variables exogenous to the question of interest, it can be ignored
in the sense that any M-estimator will still produce consistent estimates and inference is still
valid, (Deaton (1998), Wooldridge (2002)). I return to this below in section 5.4.
4.2 The Local Setting of Final Sample
By 2004, the households included in the nal sample have an average of 8.2 children and 67.4 %
of these have completed or are attending primary school. There are roughly the same number
of sons and daughters and, on average, they are being equally educated in terms of schooling.
The intra-household proportions of children with formal education is given by the total number
of children who have completed primary school or are still attending primary school divided by
the total number of children of the household. I include children that have died, if they were
15The household attrition rate is 4.7%, or 18 of the households which full the sample selection criteria are
not re-interviewed in 2004. These households are in general smaller, with fewer children, less land, but slightly
higher expenditure levels. Household heads are younger and with less schooling than the average in the sample.
22
at least 7 years of age at time of death. They are included both in the fertility measure and
the portfolio measure using the latest schooling information available.
Households in Kagera have many children. 5% of the sample have more than 16 children,
and typically their fathers have more than one wife. I drop any household with more than
25 children to avoid that these households are driving the empirical results. This reduces the
sample by 1.5% to 365 households.
In the early 1990s, the sample households had average daily expenditure levels per adult
equivalent of 0.37 USD, well below the global poverty line of 1 USD/day. An alternative
measure of how tightly the liquidity constraint may be binding, is the food share out of total
household expenditure, which on average was 66%. The households owned slightly more than
2 hectares of land, and almost a quarter of them had a small herd of cattle, sheep, goats or
pigs. Income source diversication is not just a matter for future risk management, but also
happened to a large extent at present in early 1990s. The questionaire allows for six di¤erent
sources of income: agricultural income, wage income, self-employment business income, rental
income, transfers and other non-labour income. More than 90% of the households had at least
three sources of income. All households had agricultural income and most households also have
rental income and income from transfers, typically remittances. 20% of the households have
income from non-agricultural self-employment and 40% from wage employment.
Household heads were on average 50 years old and slightly more than a third of them had
a primary school degree. During a period of 12 months, 30% of the migrant children of the
village had sent remittances, and around 20% of migrant children have succeeded in nding
wage employment. The Kagera region is predominantly inhabited by Haya people. The tribal
fractionalisation index is therefore also relatively low with a value of 0.2. Households lived in
villages with almost 4000 inhabitants on average, and where the average distance to the local
primary school was less than 2 km. The annual school fee was 40 cents, but school uniforms
were considerably more expensive and averaged more than 4 USD. Class sizes were 50 students
and generally there were 3-4 students per text book. Almost 70% of the teachers had either a
grade A or grade B degree. These latter variables will be used as school quality controls in
the regression analyses below.
[Table 4.1]
5 Empirical Estimates
Before continuing to the empirical analysis and tests of model implications, the validity of model
assumptions are reviewed in section 5.1. The choice of the econometric model is discussed in
section 5.2 and the empirical analysis of model implications is in section 5.3. In section 5.4,
robustness checks of the model are carried out.
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5.1 Testing model assumptions
The rst assumption, that urban income levels are higher than agricultural income levels in
expectation, and likewise for the spreads, is easily conrmed by looking at the means and
standard deviations for household expenditure levels in rural and urban areas. As it is most
commonly done, I use expenditure measures as proxies for lifetime income levels, as they
are subject to less uctuations and probably also smaller measurement errors.16 The KHDS
expenditure measure includes an estimate of the consumption of home-produced goods, which
is an important component of any agricultural household food consumption. A simple one-sided
t-test, where the alternative is that urban expenditure levels are higher than the corresponding
rural levels, easily rejects the null of equality at 1% level. Likewise for the di¤erence in standard
deviations. The rst assumption of yb2 < y
a
2 and "
b > "a thus cannot be rejected in the data.
Again, this is not to say that the uncertainty associated with agricultural income is negligible.
There is lots of uncertainty associated with agricultural production. However, income shocks
may be more temporary than in the urban sector, reducing the overall spread in agricultural
income compared to urban income. The important, but untested, assumption is that the
uncertainties associated with each of the two sectors are uncorrelated.
The second assumption that parents rely on their children for old-age support, is an as-
sumption based on the ndings of the fertility literature17. This is supported by the qualitative
ndings described above. Children are always mentioned as the rst and most important source
of old-age support, followed by fellow clan-members and villagers if the elderly owns assets to
leave as inheritance in return for the assistance. A quick look at the KHDS I data, conrms the
heavy dependence on children in old-age. Out of the roughly 200 individuals in KHDS I, who
are 70 years of age or older, at least 60% live with their children and at least 92% either live
with their children or have at some point during the 18 months interval of the survey received
remittances directly from their children or from the households of their children. Combined
with the ndings of the qualitative data, this is a good indicator that also children in Kagera,
as it has been found elsewhere, are important sources of old-age security for their parents.
The model assumption is thus consistent with both qualitative and quantitative ndings in the
data.
The third assumption of a sectoral divide in the returns to formal and traditional educa-
tion may at rst glance seem controversial. However, here it is important to keep the local
setting in mind. With an agricultural production system based on traditional methods and
indigenous knowledge about the local agricultural cycle, the transfer of farm specic human
16Deaton (1998) notes that survey-based estimates of income are often substantially less than the survey-
based estimates of consumption(p.30), suggesting a strong underestimation of savings. Furthermore, for the
large number of households that are involved in agriculture or in family business, personal and business incoming
and outgoings are likely to be confused. This complicates the measure of income even further.
17See section 2.6 of chapter 2 for a review of the fertility literature and the role of intergenerational transfers.
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capital from parents to children is important. In particularly so, as long as more complex
modern agricultural technologies are unavailable or beyond the nancial reach of a subsistence
farmer. The literature on agricultural production and returns to specic versus general hu-
man capital shows this distinction very clearly. A key contribution in this area is Rosenzweig
(1995). He argues that when the agricultural production technology is simple, schooling does
not increase productivity. Returns to formal education are only positive, when new advanced
technologies are introduced, creating an environment for productive learning opportunities,
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) and Rosenzweig (1996))18. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999)
and Jolli¤e (2004) conrm the ndings by Rosenzweig of low or no returns when agricultural
technologies are simple. They use data from rural Pakistan and rural Ghana, respectively, and
show, that on-farm returns to education are low, while o¤-farm returns to schooling can be
quite high. It should be noted that although the notion of no return to formal schooling in
traditional agriculture and no returns to traditional agricultural education through learning-
by-doing in the formal urban sector is not common in the child labour literature, it is also not
new. Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) operate with a similar set-up and nd strong indications of
returns to learning-by-doing of, what they term, subsistence workin the agricultural sector.
Taking a very crude look at the KHDS I data, there are some indications that also in Kagera
there exists a sectoral divide in the returns to traditional and formal education. Figure 5.1
shows a non-parametric polynomial t between average years of formal education among adult
male household members and agricultural and non-agricultural income19, respectively. Income
measures are in logarithmic terms and per adult equivalent per day. There is a strong positive
correlation between years of formal education and non-agricultural income levels, and virtually
no correlation between years of formal education and agricultural income levels.
[Figure 5.1: adult males schooling and income]
When slicing the data slightly di¤erent and comparing the level of formal education among
adult males in the bottom and top deciles of the agricultural and non-agricultural income
distributions, respectively, the same nding emerges. There is no signicant di¤erence in the
level of education among the bestand the worst farming households measure in terms of
agricultural income, both have an average of 5 years of formal education among adult males.
There is, however, a signicant di¤erence of 2.3 years of formal education among the top and
the bottom decile of the non-agricultural income distribution, where the bottom decile hosts
males with an average of 4.5 years of formal education, compared to an average of 6.8 years of
18An example of this is the introduction of high-yielding variety seeds under the Green Revolution in India,
where Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) nd increasing returns to primary education during periods of technical
progress, but low or no returns otherwise.
19Non-agricultural income is here the sum of wage income and business income from non-agricultural self-
employment.
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education in the top decile of the non-agricultural income distribution. Looking at the crude
and partial correlation coe¢ cients in data and testing for their signicance level similar ndings
emerge, see table 5.1
Table 5.1. Correlation coe¢ cient between years of formal education and income levels.
av. years of formal education Agri.income Non-agri. income
...among adult males in HH no controls 0.01 0.25***
w/ controls 0.00 0.10***
...among adult females in HH no controls 0.04** 0.30***
w/ controls 0.02* 0.10***
Note: *10%, **5%, ***1% signicance levels. Income measure are in logarithmic term, per adult equivalent per day.
Partial correlation coe¢ cients are from pooled OLS regression of income on years of adult female and male schooling, as
well as a number of controls, such as HH size, number of adult males and females, land, cattle, BMI, age, weight, and
tribal a¢ liation.
Although the above ndings are based on simple correlations in the data without any
controls for selection issues or labour supply, they are consistent with the assumption of a
sectoral divide in returns to schooling. There is an overall indication of positive correlation
between more years of schooling and higher non-agricultural income levels, but much less so for
agricultural income. These quantitative ndings are conrmed by the qualitative ones, where,
in particular, elderly respondents emphasised the lack of agricultural skills among primary and
secondary school graduates. At a question of whether someone with an education is always
better o¤ than someone without, it was reported that "one old man opposed saying the one
with primary education wastes their time at school instead of learning real life at home When
they return to learning how to farm their fellows who did not go to school are far ahead",
(Cluster 2). In another cluster, when asked whether primary school is a risky investment,
it was noted that "In case a child returns to weeding a farm it is a loss, then it is a risk
investment", (Cluster 13), implying that students of primary schools only know enough about
farming to be able to weed. Although the latter comment would imply negative returns to
schooling in agriculture, the model only assumes no returns to formal education in agriculture,
which seems to be consistent with the data.
5.2 Choice of econometric model
The optimal portfolio allocation of children between formal and traditional education,  is
by construction a variable censored at 0 and at 1. I have therefore chosen to estimate the
reduced form for  of the portfolio model using a two-sided censored Tobit regression. For each
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individual household i the optimal portfolio choice can then be described as
i = 
0xi+ui
where i is the latent variable. Although it might be optimal, in terms of the model, for the
parents sometimes to choose values outside this range, it is not feasible. xi contains each of
the observable model variables, N;Y1; eb; p as well as a set of controls for household and village
characteristics, and ui is a normally distributed homoskedastic error term, ui  N(0; 2): .
Given the censoring of i ; I observe the following in the data
i = 0; if i  0
i = 

i ; if 0 < 

i < 1
i = 1; if i  1
The double-sided Tobit log-likelihood function for each household is given then
lnLi =
X
i=0
ln

0  0xi


+
X
0<i<1
1



i   0xi


+
X
i=1
ln

1  

1  0xi


The model is estimated using robust standard errors allowing for correlation within villages.
However, consistent estimates of the -coe¢ cients in the Tobit model are subject to a set of
assumptions.  should have characteristics of a random normal variable, which means that
(i) the uncensored  must be a continuous variable, and (ii) the error term ui must be both
normally distributed and homoskedastic. Unfortunately, if these assumptions are not fullled,
the coe¢ cient estimates may be inconsistent.
Given the somewhat discrete nature of ; an obvious alternative to the Tobit model is a
binomial count model. The dependent variable is then no longer the proportion of formally
educated children, but rather the number of formally educated children, N b = N out of the
total number of children in the household, N: N b is assumed to be binomially distributed and
should be thought of as a sum of independent and homogenous Bernoulli-trials up until N .
It is possible to relax the, in this setting, very restrictive assumptions of homogeneity and
independence among siblings, by estimating the model using quasi-maximum likelihood. In
section 5.4 , I will return to these robustness checks of the preferred reduced form specication.
5.3 Testing model implications
There are two groups of model implications, those relating to model assumptions and the stan-
dard human capital investment aspect without uncertainty, and those relating to uncertainty
about returns and thus the human capital portfolio aspect. All implications are important
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for the model conclusions, but only by testing the implications relating to the latter group
will it be possible to say anything about the importance of the portfolio e¤ect relative to the
constraint e¤ect.
5.3.1 Model implications irrespective of uncertainty
There are three implictaions relating to the model and its assumptions, but which are not in any
way a consequence of uncertainty about future returns. First, if formal education is indeed more
protable than traditional education, the model predicts a positive e¤ect of parental income
on  for households where the liquidity constraint is binding in the human capital investment
decision. Second, if parents base their expectations about second period remittances from
migrant children (p) on the current proportion of remitting migrant children in the village, this
proportion should have a positive inuence on the optimal choice of : This is suggested by
the qualitative ndings, where jealousywas a motivational factor for educating children in
the sense that if parents perceive that other educated children from the village are doing well
and remitting home, this will increase the current demand for schooling in the village. Parents
want their own children to do as well as other children. This implication, however, also hinges
upon the assumption of a sectoral divide in the returns to formal and traditional education. If
remitting children were mostly traditionally educated, the e¤ect should be negative. Third, a
more direct implication of the sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education is
the global non-monotonicity between agricultural income and the optimal portfolio allocation
of children to formal education. That is, there should be a negative e¤ect of high agricultural
income levels on , due to the relative shift in protability between traditional and formal
education. These three implications are tested in the reduced form of the Tobit -regresssions
in table 5.2.
[Table 5.2]
Model (1) in table 5.2 is the most basic reduced form regression for : It includes measures
of or proxies for the available key model variables, N;Y1; eb; and p; as well as a controls for
household characteristica (age and education of household head, proportion of daughters, and
household size excluding the number of children), and controls for school quality (number of
students per math book and per Kiswahili book, proportion of teachers with grade A and grade
B diploma, and class size).
Looking at the rst column for all children, there is a positive and highly signicant portfolio
e¤ect of the number of children, N on  and a positive e¤ect of household expenditure (which
is a proxy for Y1), indicating the existence of a liquidity constraint. However, when splitting
the sample by sons and daughters, the liquidity constraint only seems to bind for daughters,
whereas the portfolio e¤ect is clearly only dominant among the sons, as the qualitative ndings
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suggest it should be if the portfolio model is valid. This seems to be a strong result in favour
of the portfolio model above, which I will analyse in more detail in section 5.3 below.
The comparison of model (1) and model (2) is included for one reason. In model (1),
there is a positive and signicant e¤ect of the village proportion of migrant children remitting
to their parents, which is clearly driven by the sons as it should be according to the model
predictions. However, this e¤ect disappears completely when controls for the tribal composition
and the fractionalisation index within the village are included. This should come as no surprise.
These tribal controls are strongly signicant and, as Lassen and I discuss in chapter 1, highly
correlated with the probability of children remitting home. We nd indications that the reason
for this is a positive correlation between tribal homogeneity and the strength of social norms,
and thus family control, within the village. Schooling expenditure is measured both in terms
of average school distance within the village, school fees and uniform costs. There is a negative
e¤ect of the school distance, which is strong for sons in model (2). Despite the school quality
controls not being jointly signicant, they are still included because they are closely correlated
with the school fee. Even so, the school fee still has a positive e¤ect on the proportion of
daughters in school.20
The positive e¤ects of the proxies for both Y1 and p; together with the ndings of gure
5.1 and table 5.1 above, give some indications of the possible existence of a sectoral divide
in the returns to schooling. The most direct implication is, however, the predicted inverse U
relationship between  and Y1, see model (3). When including the quadratic term of household
expenditure, both the linear and the quadratic terms are strongly signicant with the expected
opposite signs. The negative e¤ect of high agricultural income on  starts at the turning
point of the inverse U, which for sons is at Y1 = 0:99 USD in model (3) and in model (4),
the latter includes wealth controls. This is in the neighbourhood of the 98th percentile of the
expenditure distribution for rural households, and thus within sample range. For daughters
the turning point is at Y1 = 1:13 in model (3) and at Y1 = 1:17 in model (4). The latter
turning point is almost outside the range of the expenditure distribution, only two households
have expenditure levels higher than 1.17 USD per adult equivalent per day. This can be an
indication of girls being more subject to liquidity constraints than boys, and/or of uncertainty
being more important in the optimal schooling decision for boys than for girls, as suggested by
the portfolio model.
As a robustness check, model (3) is re-estimated without the top 5% of the expenditure
distribution to ensure that the inverse U shape is not purely driven by one or two outliers,
and the results are even stronger and more signicant. The turning points move inward to the
70th and 88th percentile of the expenditure distribution for sons and daughters, respectively.
In a similar spirit, I have used the quadratic of log expenditure. The qualitative results are the
20A similar positive e¤ect for all children and for sons disappears after inclusion of school quality controls.
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same, although the signicance levels are somewhat lower. Overall, it seems safe to conclude
that the inverse U shape between Y1 and  predicted by the assumption of a sectoral divide in
formal and traditional education is consistent with the data.
Finally, it should be mentioned, that the results are robust to several di¤erent model spec-
ications. Controls for land, livestock, the use of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and
irrigation, the existence of road for motorised vehicles in the village, population size of village
and whether or not the village has a daily market have all been included without a¤ecting the
remaining model coe¢ cients signicantly, see model (4).
5.3.2 Model implications of uncertainty
There are three empirical implications of the model which all are direct implications of the
existence of uncertainty about future return to human capital. The key empirical implication
is the possible dominance of a positive portfolio e¤ect over a negative constraint e¤ect of higher
N on . The null hypothesis is that the portfolio e¤ect exists and is strong enough to gener-
ate a positive e¤ect of the total number of children on the optimal proportion of children in
school. Despite only being an indirect test of uncertainty, it is a clear unambiguous empirical
implication of the model. A positive e¤ect of N on  can only be due to the existence of uncer-
tainty and thus a need to ensure future income diversication in the human capital portfolio
allocation. It was already clear from table 5.2 that the positive portfolio e¤ect does indeed
dominate the negative resource constraint e¤ect for sons, but not for daughters, as suggested
by the qualitative results. Since this is the most central result of the model implications and
the empirical analysis, let me go into its details.
The calibration results show that in case of liquidity constraints or perfectly correlated
uncertainty measures, the positive e¤ect will only dominate for low numbers of N because
either the liquidity constraint starts to bind for higher numbers of N and/or the N" spread
becomes too large when migrant children are perfectly correlated. This suggests allowing for
a quadratic term in N and thereby being able to capture a possible negative e¤ect for high N
on : Table 5.3 shows the linear and quadratic N models for sons, model (4) and model (5)
respectively, as well as the quadratic N model for daughters, model (6).
[Table 5.3]
The quadratic N terms in model (5) are both highly signicant and with the expected signs.
The negative constraint or correlation e¤ect only starts to dominate the positive portfolio e¤ect
of the total number of sons on their optimal proportion in school,  when there are more than
ten sons in the household. Almost 97% of households have ten sons or less. To ensure that this
is not solely driven by the choice of functional form, I have tested the quadratic specication
in N against a fully exible non-parameteric specication using indicator variables for N = 2
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up to N = 12: A likelihood ratio test cannot reject that the quadratic specication is nested
within the exible non-parametric specication. This strong positive e¤ect of the total number
of sons is surprisingly close to the scenario of no liquidity constraint and no correlation in the
uncertainty measure for migrant children illustrated in the calibration gure 3.2 above. Figure
5.2 below shows the raw mean of  for each N (the unconnected dots), a non-parametric t of
 on N using a Kernel weighted local mean smoothing function and its 95% condence interval
(dark blue line and shaded area), and the predicted value of  from model (5) are all shown
in gure 5.2. below. The inverse U shape in the relation between total number of sons and the
proportion of them being formally educated is clear, and the predicted value for  from the
quadratic N model (5) ts comfortably within the condence interval of the nonparametric t
of  on N .
[Figure 5.2]
However, the estimation of a quadratic relationship between N and  for the sons in model
(5) comes at a cost. The inverse U e¤ects from the quadratic expenditure specication disappear
when the level of agricultural income is proxied by household expenditure. This is despite the
fact that these two inverse U relationships are caused by opposite e¤ects. The negative e¤ect of
a high number of sons is due to liquidity constraints, whereas the negative e¤ect of high levels
of expenditure is the opposite, the agricultural sector is now more attractive. If instead I use
the non-food share of household expenditure as a proxy for disposable income in the household
both quadratic terms survive, although they are now weaker for daughters. The negative e¤ect
of high disposable income among starts dominating around the 80th percentile for sons, see
model (9).
While the positive portfolio e¤ect of number sons should exist, but not necessarily dom-
inate, for everyone, the negative e¤ect of the quadratic term for number of sons should only
exist for households which are liquidity constrained or where the urban income uncertainty
is highly correlated among migrant children. Ignoring the latter, and thus assuming that the
negative part is only driven by liquidity constraints, this would imply that among households,
which are unlikely to be liquidity constrained, the positive e¤ect should dominate the negative
e¤ect over the full range of N: That is, there should be no negative quadratic e¤ect for this
subset of households. This can be tested by comparing those households who are less likely to
be liquidity constrained with the rest. Assuming that the liquidity constraint does not bind
for the top quartile of the expenditure distribution, I dene this group to be a HiEXP group.
Model (7) corresponds to model (5), but now allowing for interaction terms between the func-
tional form for number of sons (N +N2) and an indicator variable for whether the household
belonged to the HiEXP group in KHDS I. Now both the quadratic terms for number of sons
and the household expenditure are strengthened and signicant with the expected signs. But,
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the HiEXP interaction terms are all insignicant, including the quadratic interaction. Unfor-
tunately this does not tell us much, the insignicance can easily be due to sample size problems
or it can be because there simply is no signicant di¤erence between the two groups. There
are 85 households in the top quartile of the expenditure distribution. Taking a graphical look
at the data, there is some indication, that sample size might cause the insignicance. Figure
5.3 corresponds to gure 5.2, but now the the predicted values for  are predicted for each of
the two subgroups, HiEXp = 0 and HiEXP=1.
[Figure 5.3]
The negative liquidity constraint e¤ect clearly dominates the positive portfolio e¤ect for
lowerN among the lower 75% of the expenditure distribution compared to the top quartile. The
inverse U relationship is virtually absent from the HiEXP group, as the portfolio model would
predict. Estimating model (5) without the top quartile of the expenditure distribution predicts
a turning point of the quadratic N relationship at eight sons, the liquidity constraint starts
binding earlier than in the full model (5), where the turning point was ten sons. Similarly, the
turning point for the quadratic Y1 relationship is also lower (now 0.31 USD), corresponding to
the median household. This could be an indication of households in the bottom three quartiles
facing higher levels of uncertainty about future income transfers than the richer households of
the top quartile, see model (8).
Second, for the model to be of any relevance it is necessary that the overall school enrolment
rate is primarily driven by less than full enrolment within households, rather than being a result
of averaging over corner solution between households. This is clearly the case. More than 70
per cent of the households have uncensored enrolment rates between 0 and 1, almost 20 per
cent of the households are censored at  = 1 and the remaining are censored at  = 0: For sons
and daughters, separately, the numbers are slightly higher with approximately 50 per cent of
the households being uncensored. This is no surprise as the number of forced corner solutions
is higher due to more observations with only one son or one daughter in the household. There
is no signicant di¤erence between the censored and uncensored household enrolment rates, all
are close to 0.65.
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Table 5.4 Household primary school enrolment rates
Mean  # HHs % HHs
Uncensored HHs 0.64 278 72.58
Censored HHs 0.67 105 27.42
All HHs 0.65 383 100.00
The nal testable empirical implication of the portfolio model is the gender di¤erence. The
model should only apply to sons. If the relations above were all spurious, one should expect
no di¤erence between sons and daughters. The data tells a di¤erent story. Throughout results
have been di¤erent by gender in the expected direction. Model (6), which is the quadratic N
model for daughters only, conrms this once again. The model is estimated to ensure that the
insignicance of the linear term of N was not due to misspecication of the functional form.
Including a quadratic term does not alter the conclusion, there is no e¤ect of the total number
of daughters on the proportion of daughters which have received formal education. Not only
are the coe¢ cients insignicatnt, they are also jointly signicantly di¤erent from those of sons
at a 1% signicance level. There has been a signicantly negative e¤ect of the proportion
of daughter in the household throughout. This could be capturing some of the e¤ect of the
number daughters. Leaving out the variable controlling for the proportion of daughters in
the household, the e¤ect the number of daughters is negative and only signicant at a 20%
level. The combination of the lack of a positive portfolio e¤ect of number of daughters on
their optimal proportion in school and the strong dominance of the positive e¤ect of household
expenditure indicates that the human capital investment decision of the girls is largely inu-
enced by resource constraints within the household, but not by the need for risk diversication.
Although daughters are perceived as more loving as suggested by the ethnographic evidence,
this perception is probably inuenced by the fact that they are not expected to remit. This
goes hand in hand with the quantitative nding in the data, that daughters are found to be
more likely to remit, but their level of remittances is substantially below that their brothers.
In the ethnographic evidence, it was often mentioned that daughetrs would remit in terms of
gifts to their mothers (bars of soap, a dress), whereas sons remit cash to fathers.
Overall, it seems safe to conclude that the model implications and assumptions are consis-
tent with the data. There are strong indications of positive portfolio e¤ects for lower numbers
of sons, although negative constraint e¤ects seem to dominate for larger numbers of sons.
There are also some, although not as strong, indications of the sectoral divide in returns to
formal versus traditional education actually keeping children out of school if parents are doing
relatively well in the agricultural sector. The negative e¤ect of higher levels of expenditure
tend to come into e¤ect sooner for sons than for daughters, which is in line with the portfolio
model suggesting that the more the optimal portfolio allocation  is a¤ected by uncertainty,
the sooner the negative e¤ect of higher agricultural incomes will start dominating. Since the
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optimal portfolio allocation of sons is sensitive to uncertainty, whereas that of daughters is not,
such a result is exacly what should be expected. The gender di¤erences thus come into play at
di¤erent levels.
5.4 Robustness Checks
The empirical specication, which most closely resembles the portfolio model, is the quadratic
N and Y1 model (5) in table 5.3 for sons. To have a rough idea of how well the econometric
model does in terms of tting the data, please refer to gure 5.4 below. It shows the actual 
for sons and the associated predicted probabilities.
[Figure 5.4]
As mentioned above in section 5.1, the Tobit estimates are only consistent when the as-
sumptions of normality and homoskedasticity of the error term u are fullled. In the following,
I will look into these assumptions as well as check the robustness of the key results of model (5)
by using alternative estimation methods. Table 5.5 below includes model (5) for comparison
and a number of alternative econometric models.
The rst alternative is a Tobit model estimation allowing for a specic functional form of
heteroskedasticity, V ar(ujx) = 2 exp(z), where z is a subset of the explanatory x variables,
model (10). In this specication z includes the total number of sons and log expenditure. More
general formulations have also been tested, where household size, total number of children, pro-
portion of daughters, school distance and the tribal fractionalisation index have been included,
but these variables are all insignicant in the heteroskedaticity estimation. A Hausman test for
equality of coe¢ cients of the two Tobit models, where the model (5) is e¢ cient and consistent
under the null, and model (10) is consistent under both the null and the alternative hypothesis,
is rejected. So is a likelihood ratio test of model (5) being nested in model (10). Even though
there is indication of heteroskedasticity and a considerable drop in signicance levels in model
(10) compared to model (5), the main nding of a positive portfolio e¤ect among the sons
seems to be hold. However, as Deaton (1998) point out, it is somewhat arbitrary what to use
as explanatory variables in the heteroskedasticity function and what to use in the regression
function. This can result in situations where the coe¢ cients in the heteroskedasticity function
are estimated consistently, but those of the regression function are not. This method should
therefore be used with caution. A comparison of model (10a) and model (10b) also show that
including a di¤erent set of regressors in the heteroskedasticity function change the coe¢ cient
estimates.
The second assumption of the Tobit model is normality of the error terms. A possible way of
testing the appropriateness of the Tobit model is thus to compare its estimates with estimates
from models, which do not assume normality. In the censored setting, Powells censored Least
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Absolute Deviation estimator, which is based on an assumption of the conditional median
Med(ujx) = 0, rather than the conditional mean E(ujx) = 0, is a typical choice. This estimator
is consistent both for non-normal and heteroskedastic error terms. However, it only allows for
one-sided censoring. The model is not very well estimated for two reasons, only being able to
allow one-sided censoring I choose to enforce the upper censoring which has most data points.
Second, in order to achieve convergence, the tribal controls have to be left out. Regression
results are shown in the column of model (11), purely as a robustness check of the Tobit model.
The coe¢ cient estimates and their bootstrapped standard errors are generally all of the same
magnitude.
Both the Tobit model and the Powells median estimator requires a continuous dependent
variable. Although households in Kagera have many children, the continuity of  can be
debated. An alternative robustness check is therefore to estimate the same model, but now as
a binomial count model as mentioned above in section 5.1. The results of such an estimation
are shown as model (12), standard errors are robust and cluster corrected. The signs and
signicance levels indicate that results are clearly in line with the above ndings. Finally, a
standard linear probability model has been estimated using ordinary least squared, again with
robust and cluster corrected standard errors, see model (13). The OLS estimates should be
scaled with the proportion of uncensored variables in the sample for better comparison with the
Tobit estimates of model (5), as suggested by Greene (1981)21. For the sons, 50% of households
have uncensored values of  which implies multiplying the OLS coe¢ cients with 2. Again, both
magnitudes and signicance levels are comparable to those of the Tobit model. Thus, despite
possible problems of non-normality and heteroskedasticity, it seems safe to conclude that the
results are robust to the choice of econometric model.
[Table 5.5]
Another robustness check has to be done with respect to the heavy stratication in the
data sampling between sickand wellhouseholds. In the empirical analysis above, the sam-
ple stratication is assumed exogenous to the human capital investment decision. There are
di¤erent reasons to think that this is not the case. The data collection was done with a focus
on oversampling of possible HIV infected household. Investment decisions for better old-age
security are likely to be altered if life expectancy either of the parents or of the children changes
dramatically. This would then also inuence the optimal human capital portfolio allocation
within the household. Estevan and Baland (2007) argue that high mortality rates among adult
children can generate enough uncertainty for parents to alter their human capital investment
21Wooldridge (2002) has a similar suggestion for checking the appropriateness of a Tobit by comparing the
scaled Tobit coe¢ cient estimates with those of a probit. The Tobit estimates should be scaled with estimated ,
(Wooldridge (2002):p.534). Such an eyeball comparison yields similar results; magnitudes, signs and signicance
levels are reasonably close.
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decision, but they do not test this hypothesis in the data. There is in general only sparse
empirical evidence on this issue. Using KHDS I data, Burke and Beegle (2004) nd no e¤ect
of the death of parent on the total number of hours in school for boys or girls. Although, using
KHDS I & II, Beegle, DeWeerdt, and Dercon (2005) nd some indication of a negative impact
on the long run level of educational attainment of orphans, but primarily so for children not
already enrolled at the time of death of the parent. In my nal sample of 365 households, only
40 households are classied as well. Only very crude test of di¤erence between the two groups
have therefore been done. Simple t-test of di¤erences in , N , or Y1 for all children, sons only
and daughters only cannot show any signicant di¤erence between the two groups. Including
a wellindicator variable and interaction terms with N and Y1 in -regressions for model (4)
and (6) show no signicant di¤erence between the two groups. Due to the heavy oversampling
of sickhouseholds, the empirical results of this paper may therefore represent a lower bound
in terms of schooling.
Finally, it should be mentioned that results are robust to sample selection. Inclusion of
households with more than 25 children or with children under the age of 7 in 2004 only
strengthens the results further, so does truncating the total number of sons and daughters,
respectively, at 12.
6 Alternative Explanations
The positive quadratic portfolio e¤ect for sons is the key result of the empirical ndings pro-
viding support for the hypothesis that future income uncertainty generates a need for human
capital diversication. Hence, an obvious question is what else could result in a positive e¤ect
of the number of sons on their intra-household schooling rate?
There are three possible explanations, which can all yield a positive e¤ect of N on . First,
rural households could choose, for which ever reason, always to keep one son at home, who
is destined for taking over the family farm once adult. Such a hypothesis has very accurate
predictions for the value of  for each N , see gure 5.5 below. It is clear from this gure,
that the hypothesis has some value compared to the non-parametric t and its condence
interval. However, the one-son-behind hypothesis seems to underpredict for small N and, more
importantly, overpredict when there are many sons in the household. The one-son-behind
hypothesis is not able to capture the negative quadratic e¤ect of large N on : A raw F-test
from a simple Tobit model of  regressed only on indicator variables for the number of sons in
the household rejects that the estimated coe¢ cients equal (N   1)=N: Likewise, if the positive
e¤ect of N on  in model (4) is purely driven by the one-son-hypothesis, there should be
no statistically signicant di¤erence between the connected gray dots and the yellow ones in
gure 5.5 over N: This can be tested by deducting e = (N   1)=N from the actual  and
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then testing for any remaining explanatory power of N in a    e tobit regression, where the
censoring limits now are (-1 + 1=N) and (1=N), for the lower and upper limit respectively:
Likelihood ratio tests against both the quadratic and the non-parametric functional form of N
both reject the one-son-behind hypothesis, indicating that it is indeed not able to capture the
non-monotonicity in the data.
[Figure 5.5]
The second alternative explanation is closely related. If there are diminishing returns in
agriculture it might not be feasible to have more than one son taking over the family farm, it
would therefore require additional land for any other son also being educated traditionally. The
one-son-behind hypothesis is thus comparable to an explanation of strong diminishing returns
to labour in agriculture, in the sense that the family farm cannot feed more than the family
of one son. However, an explanation based on strong diminishing returns have to be coupled
with local land scarcity, making it di¢ cult or very expensive to acquire new land for the second
or third son destined for agriculture. The KHDS data contain a community level variable of
whether people in the village buy or sell land, however the measure changes dramatically over
the rst four waves, despite the very short time span. In the rst wave, it is stated that only
in 53% of the villages land is bought and sold, in wave 4 the number is almost 80%. Using the
variable as an indirect measure of land scarcity22 has no signicant direct e¤ect on  in model
(4), nor does it a¤ect the positive e¤ect of N when introduced as an interaction term. However,
the instrument might be weak given the large variation over time. A more appropriate measure
of land scarcity is needed, in order to test the e¤ect of land scarcity on  and on the    N
relation properly. Furthermore, with strong diminishing returns  will never start dropping
again for high levels of N: This explanation can therefore not capture the quadratic relationship
between  and N found in the data. The qualitative data also give some hints on this matter.
The issue of schooling versus the right to a plot of land was clearly an issue much debated
during the focus group discussions. It was noted repeatedly that children have rights to one of
the two, sometimes both. It was thus not uncommon for parents to acquire land, sometimes
with the assistance of the local village council, for future inheritance to their sons, or for parents
to split family plots between sons, if the size would make such a split feasible. Village councils
would indeed allocate new land plots upon reasonable requests. However, in the more ancient
villages23 land tends to be more scarce and the local village councils have no or less free land
to allocate. Although diminishing returns most likely are present and inuence the schooling
decision of the parents, it does not seem to be enough to explain what we are seeing.
22 If villagers never buy or sell land, it can imply that all land is inherited and therefore di¢ cult to come by
through other channels.
23That is villages, which existed prior to the Ujamaa villagization programme of President Nyerere in the late
1960s. The programme forced all rural households into (often new) villages with access to water and schools.
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Despite the fact that none of the above alternative explanations can be veried by the data,
they might still have some credit. However, for the one-son-behind hypothesis to be a useful
alternative explanation, the question still remains what the economic rationale behind it is. One
can easily imagine the rationale being precisely what this paper is about, risk diversication.
It should be emphasised though, that while both of the two alternative explanations can give
plausible reasons for the positive e¤ect of N on , they are not able also to explain the negative
quadratic e¤ect of N on , which is embedded in the portfolio model.
Finally, one might wonder whether child heterogeneity or non-constant returns to scale
with respect to number of children and their education could generate a positive relationship
between N and : The model assumes both child homogeneity and constant returns to the
number of children being educated. I am thus disregarding the classic Becker argument of
a trade-o¤ between quantity and quality of children. If such a trade-o¤ exists, say because
parents have to spread their e¤orts over more children, it should result in decreasing returns to
the number of children being educated, and therefore predict a negative relationship between
N and : The question is then whether increasing returns to the number of children being
educated is a plausible explanation. This should result in the youngest of many brothers on
average doing better in the urban sector compared to the youngest of few brothers, everything
else equal. There are no indications of this in the data, a simple test of whether the youngest
out of maximum 4 sons compared to the youngest out of minimum 6 sons is less likely to be in
wage employment is rejected. There is no signicant di¤erence what so ever.
The question then is whether unobserved heterogeneity with respect to ability can generate
the inverse U relations between  and N . If all households sample from the same schooling
ability distribution, then child heterogenity cannot generate a positive relationship between
 and N . Only if households with more children sample from schooling ability distributions
with considerably higher means than households with fewer children, could child heterogeneity
generate such a positive relationship between  and N: This would require modelling N as
endogenous such that households drawing high ability children among the rst borns realise
that they are drawing from a good ability distribution and therefore decide to have more
children, whereas households drawing from bad ability distributions stop their fertility earlier.
First born migrant sons should therefore be more successful in the urban labour market due
to higher ability if they are from a large family rather than a small family. Again, there are
no indications of this being the case in the data. Furthermore, this cannot explain the gender
di¤erence. It is hard to imagine that draws from the ability distribution should depend on
gender.
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7 Conclusions & Policy Implications
In this paper, the emphasis has been on modelling the household human capital investment
decision jointly for all children and thereby allowing for sibling dependence, which goes beyond
the much debated sibling rivalry for scarce resources. A simple human capital portfolio model
is set up to analyse the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the optimal allocation of children
between formal and traditional education, that is between future urban and agricultural in-
come. Not surprisingly, it is easy to show analytically that as uncertainty about future income
increases, risk averse parents will tend to diversify their human capital investments in children
in order to diversify future income sources. This is a standard example of an ex-ante risk
management strategy, only in this paper applied to a di¤erent setting, the educational choice
of the children. It is not possible to get a credible measure of future uncertainty in data, and
therefore not possible to identify such an e¤ect directly. However, by calibrating the model
under di¤erent scenarios using data driven numerical values, I am able to derive very specic
model predictions for how sibling dependence due to portfolio e¤ects can be separated from
resource constraint e¤ects in the empirical analysis.
Empirically, there are two ndings, which provide strong support to the portfolio model.
First of all, I nd that positive portfolio e¤ects are remarkably strong for sons and clearly
dominate possible negative constraint e¤ects as long as the number of sons is not too high. In
households with many sons, the negative constraint e¤ects seem to dominate. This generates
a quadratic relationship between the number of sons in the household and the proportion of
them being educated formally. Second, there is no such nding for daughters. The anecdotal
evidence from the qualitative data on norms and expectations with respect to childrens role as
old-age security providers for their parents clearly supports the nding of a gender di¤erence
in the portfolio model. Norms dictate that parents can only ask for support from their sons
(and, if any, their unmarried daughters) in old age. The obligations of married daughters lie
solely with their families in law. There are, to the best of my knowledge, no other hypotheses
or models, which are able to explain such relationships.
In addition, all model assumptions and their implications are consistent with data. This
includes the key assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to education, the implication of
which is an inverse U relationship between agricultural income levels and the proportion of
children being educated formally. In standard models of child labour, which rely on poverty and
liquidity constraints to explain child labour and lack of schooling, the relation between income
and schooling is generally thought of as (at least globally) monotonic. The simple introduction
of a sectoral divide in returns to education can imply global non-monotonicity. This is not an
implication of modelling human capital investment decisions under uncertainty, but the interval
for which one should expect a negative e¤ect of agricultural income and schooling of sons can
be widened by the presence of uncertainty.
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These analytical and empirical ndings can have potential far-reaching policy implications.
If the objective of an educational policy is full enrolment into primary schools, policy makers
should acknowledge both the role of sons as old-age security providers of their parents and
the strength of the rural/urban sectoral divide, which clearly has implications for the human
capital investment decisions within the household. One obvious, but also very expensive,
policy implication is to copy the state intervention in developed countries, where the state has
diminished the role of an intergenerational contract between parents and children, because they
supply both schooling and old-age security via the tax system. Another more straightforward,
and certainly cheaper, policy implication of the model is that full enrolment can be achieved if
formal education is able to encompass the most important features of traditional education, the
agricultural life-skills enabling children to become locally rooted future farmers. This could be
achieved by introducing practical agricultural subjects focusing on some of the more complex
tasks with high learning potential into the primary school curriculum in rural areas. Subjects,
which at the moment are purely undertaken by parents through traditional education and
learning-by-doing.
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8 Figures
Figure 3.1. E¤ect of future urban income uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio
Figure 3.2. E¤ect of fertility on the optimal human capital portfolio, for di¤erent levels of
risk "
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Figure 3.3. E¤ect of future urban income uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio
under liquidity constraints, s  0
Figure 3.4. E¤ect of future urban income uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio
under liquidity constraints and child labour, s  0 & ea =  0:03
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Figure 3.5. E¤ect of fertility on the optimal human capital portfolio under liquidity con-
straints, s  0
Figure 3.6. E¤ect of fertility on the optimal human capital portfolio under liquidity con-
straints and child labour, s  0 & ea =  0:03
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Figure 3.7. E¤ect of agricultural income on the optimal human capital portfolio under
liquidity constraints, s  0
Figure 3.8. E¤ect of agricultural income on the optimal human capital portfolio under
liquidity constraints and child labour, s  0 & ea =  0:03
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Figure 5.1. Income levels over average years of formal education among adult males in HH
Figure 5.2. Proportion of formally educated sons over total number of sons in HH
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Figure 5.3. Proportion of formally educated sons over total number of sons in HH, split by
HiEXP
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Figure 5.4. Actual  and predicted probabilitis of model (5)
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Figure 5.5. One-son-behind prediction compared to quadratic N model
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9 Tables
Table 4.1. Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
KHDS II data
Pi (sons) 0.681 0.342 0.000 1.000
Pi (daughters) 0.679 0.346 0.000 1.000
Total number of children 8.208 4.461 1.000 25.000
Total number of sons 4.090 2.555 0.000 16.000
Total number of daughters 4.118 2.778 0.000 16.000
KHDS I data
Daily HH expenditure per AE in USD 0.366 0.200 0.072 2.129
Food share out of total HH expenditure 0.659 0.152 0.211 0.971
Land (ha) 2.244 1.867 0.121 12.222
Herd dummy 0.238 0.427 0.000 1.000
Number of income sources 3.597 0.940 1.000 6.000
Proportion of daughters 0.503 0.227 0.000 1.000
Household size, excl. children -1.127 3.709 -18.000 6.000
Household head has primary education 0.340 0.474 0.000 1.000
Age of household head 50.414 14.215 17.000 95.000
Proportion of Mhaya in village 0.555 0.426 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mnyambo in village 0.127 0.291 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mhangaza in village 0.159 0.348 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Msubi in village 0.019 0.075 0.000 0.500
Proportion of Mzinza in village 0.011 0.031 0.000 0.150
Proportion of Kishubi in village 0.013 0.035 0.000 0.222
Proportion of other tribes in village 0.117 0.216 0.000 1.000
Tribal fractionalisation index 0.197 0.200 0.000 0.660
Population in village 3919 3501 1254 18526
Av. school distance in village 1.902 1.432 0.027 9.465
Av. school fee in village 0.398 0.149 0.231 1.389
Av. school uniform costs in village 4.253 1.095 2.418 7.579
Pr(migrant children remitting) in village 0.317 0.112 0.067 0.600
No. stud per math book 2.777 1.139 0.970 7.418
No. stud per kiswahili book 4.054 4.591 0.591 34.928
Proportion of A grade teachers in school 0.344 0.121 0.111 0.691
Proportion of B grade teachers in school 0.353 0.217 0.000 0.875
No. stud per classroom 48.890 8.476 29.757 70.103
Observations 365
Note: There are only 353 (352) households with sons (daughters), respectively.
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10 Appendix A1: Map of Kagera and location of KHDS I clus-
ters
Note. This map is copied from Development Research Group (2004).
52
References
Baland, J.-M., and J. A. Robinson (2000): Is Child Labor Ine¢ cient?, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 108(4), 663679.
Basu, K., and P. Van (1998): The Economics of Child Labor,The American Economic
Review, 88(3), 412427.
Beegle, K., J. DeWeerdt, and S. Dercon (2005): Orphanhood and the Long-Run
Impact on Children,mimeo, World Bank.
(2006): Kagera Health and Development Survey 2004 Basic Information Document,
mimeo, World Bank.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967): The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings,
The Journal of Political Economy, 75(4), 352365.
Bhalotra, S., and C. Heady (2003): Child Farm Labor: The Wealth Paradox,World
Bank Economic Review.
Bock, J. (2002): Learning, Life History, and Productivity. Childrens Lives in the Okavango
Delta, Botswana,Human Nature, 13(2), 161197.
Burke, K., and K. Beegle (2004): Why Children Arent Attending School: The Case of
Northwestern Tanzania,Journal of African Economies, 13(2), 333.
De Weerdt, J. (2007): Moving Out of Poverty in Tanzanias Kagera Region, in Moving
Out of Poverty, ed. by D. Narayan. World Bank.
Deaton, A. (1998): The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach to
Development Policy. Johns Hopkins Univ Pr.
Development Research Group, W. B. (2004): Users Guide to the Kagera Health and
Development Survey Datasets,World Bank.
Edmonds, E. (2005): Does Child Labor Decline with Improving Economic Status?,Journal
of Human Resources, 40(1), 77.
Edmonds, E. V. (2007): Child Labor, in Handbook of Development Economics, ed. by
T. Schultz, and J. Strauss, vol. 4. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
Estevan, F., and J. Baland (2007): Mortality Risks, Education and Child Labor Star,
Open,Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), 118137.
53
Fafchamps, M., and A. Quisumbing (1999): Human Capital, Productivity, and Labor
Allocation in Rural Pakistan,The Journal of Human Resources, 34(2), 369406.
Fafchamps, M., and J. Wahba (2006): Child Labor, Urban Proximity, and Household
Composition,Journal of Development Economics, 79(2), 374397.
Foster, A., and M. Rosenzweig (1996): Technical Change and Human-Capital Returns
and Investments: Evidence from the Green Revolution,The American Economic Review,
86(4), 931953.
Greene, W. (1981): On the Asymptotic Bias of the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator of
the Tobit Model,Econometrica, 49(2), 505513.
Jolliffe, D. (2004): The Impact of Education in Rural Ghana: Examining Household
Labour Allocation and Returns on and of the Farm, Journal of Development Economics,
73, 287314.
Lassen, D. D., and H. B. Lilleør (2005): Qualitative Survey on Ethnic Capital and
Schooling, Kagera Tanzania, April 2005,Mimeo. Department of Economics, University of
Copenhagen, Data documentation, University of Copenhagen.
Lucas, R. E., and O. Stark (1985): Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana,
Journal of Political Economy, 93(5), 901918.
Pouliot, W. (2005): Introducing Uncertainty Into Baland and Robinsons Model of Child
Labour,Journal of Development Economics.
Ranjan, P. (1999): An Economic Analysis of Child Labor,Economics Letters, 64, 99105.
Rogers, C., and K. Swinnerton (2004): Does Child Labor Decrease When Parental In-
comes Rise?,Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 939946.
Rosenzweig, M. (1995): Why Are There Returns to Schooling?,The American Economic
Review, 85(2), 153158.
(1996): When Investing in Education Matters and When It Does Not.,Challenge,
39(2).
Rosenzweig, M., and K. Wolpin (1985): Specic Experience, Household Structure, and
Intergenerational Transfers: Farm Family Land and Labor Arrangements in Developing
Countries,The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 961987.
Wooldridge, J. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press.
54
LICENTIATAFHANDLINGER/PH.D.-AFHANDLINGER I ØKONOMI 
Københavns Universitet 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hans Keiding: Some Topics in the Theory of Large Economies with Production. 1974. (Upubl.). 
 
2. Rolf Norstrand: Statens økonomiske styring af kommunerne. 1974. 
Publ.: Gult memo nr. 28, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut 1974. 
 
3. Uffe Bundgaard-Jørgensen & Iben Spliid: Skitse til en procedure for kommunalplanlægning. 
1975. Publ.: PhD theses no. 21/22, IMSOR, Lyngby 1974. 
 
4. Chr. Hjorth-Andersen: Forureningsøkonomi. 1975. 
Publ. af Akademisk Forlag, København 1975. 
 
5. Niels Kærgård: Efterspørgsel og varighed for varige goder. 1975. (Upubl.). 
 
6. Peter Toft-Nielsen: MUCO ANALYSE om multicollinearitet i lineære økonomiske modeller. 1976. 
(Upubl.). 
 
7. Palle Geleff: Makromodeller for integreret fysisk økonomisk planlægning på regional niveau. 
1978. (Upubl.). 
 
8. Flemming Dalby: 1978 
a) Statsfinansernes indenlandske likviditetsvirkning I. 
Publ.: Blåt memo nr. 46, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut 1976. 
b) Statsfinansernes indenlandske likviditetsvirkning II. 
Publ.: Blåt memo nr. 51, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut 1976. 
c) Statsgældsspolitik. (Upubl.). 
 
9. Peter Erling Nielsen: Reale og monetære renteteorier siden Wicksell. 1978. (Upubl.). 
 
10. Niels Lihn Jørgensen: 1978. 
a) En perspektivplanlægningsmodel. 
Publ.: Gult memo nr. 44. Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut 1977. 
b) Dynamisk input-output teori. 
Publ.: Gult memo nr. 47, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut 1977. 
c) En dynamisk input-output model for Danmark. 
Publ.: Gult memo nr. 56, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut 1978. 
 
11. Thorbjørn Waagstein: Monopol, teknologisk udvikling og investering i barrierer. 
Publ.: Blåt memo nr. 94, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1980. 
12. Michael Fuchs: Aspects of Monetary Policy as an Element of Stabilization Policy in open 
Economies. 1980. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 1, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1981. 
 
13. Lars Thorlund-Petersen: Independence and Convexity of Preference Relations. 1981. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 2, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1981. 
 
14. Niels Holger Skou: Substitution mellem arbejdskraft og kapital i udviklingslandene. 1982. 
Publ. som følgende Gule memoer fra Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut: 
Nr. 54: Teknologioverførsel til udviklingslandene. 1978. 
Nr. 61: En model til undersøgelse af faktorsubstitutionsmulighederne i 
udviklingslande: Chenery-Raduchel modellen. 1978. 
Nr. 62: Substitution mellem arbejdskraft og kapital i udviklingslande. En empirisk 
undersøgelse for Indien og Mexico. 1978. 
 
15. Christian Groth: Konjunkturteorier set i lyset af moderne uligevægtsteori. 1982. 
Publ. som Blåt memo nr. 101a og nr. 101b (Matematisk apendiks): Cyklisk kapitalakkumulation. En 
diskussion og nogle udvidelser af Marx-Goodwin-modellen. Københavns Universitets Økonomiske 
Institut, 1981. 
 
16. Niels Westergård-Nielsen: The Labor Market for a Group of Young Professionals. 1982. 
Licentiatafhandlingen består af følgende 8 dele: 
1. A Study of a Professional Labor Market - Introduction and Data. Working Paper 
1981-2, Studies in Labor Market Dynamics, Århus Universitets Økonomiske Institut. 
2. Job Search in a Professional Labor Market, 1980. Discussion Paper 606-80,  
Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
3. Determinants for Search Prior to Unemployment, 1981. Cykelafdelingen, 
Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut. 
3a. Appendix: A Note on Estimation of Probability Functions, 1981. Cykelafdelingen, 
Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut. 
4. Do the Jobs Differ for Groups with Various Durations of Search? 1981. (Upubl.) 
5. The Composition of Salary and Other Types of Compensation, 1981. Gult memo nr. 
84, Cykelafdelingen, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut. 
6. Three Salary Models, 1981. Working Paper 1981-3. Studies in Labor Market 
Dynamics, Århus Universitets Økonomiske Institut 
7. Estimation of the Reservation Wage, 1981. Working Paper 1981-4, Studies in Labor 
Market Dynamics, Århus Universitets Økonomiske Institut. 
8. The Grades of Law Graduates, 1981. Gult memo nr. 85, Cykelafdelingen, 
Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut. 
 
17. Troels Østergaard Sørensen: Koordinations- og allokeringsproblemer i en decentral 
markedsøkonomi med særligt henblik på arbejdsmarkedet. 1983. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 3, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1983. 
 
18. Esben Dalgaard: Moderne teorier om indkomstdannelsen . 1984. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 4, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1984. 
 
19. Flemming Møller : Social cost-benefit analyse - teori og praksis. 1984. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 5, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1984. 
 
20. Gert Aage Nielsen: En empirisk analyse af dansk eksport. 1984. Del 1+2. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 6, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1984. 
 
21. Michael Møller: Det danske boligmarked. 1984. Udgivet af Institut for Finansiering, 
Handelshøjskolen i København. 
 
22. Søren Bo Nielsen: Bidrag til analysen af kortsigtede makroøkonomiske effekter af energipris 
chok i åbne økonomier. 1984 . Del 1+2. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 7, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1984. 
 
23. Tom Hefting: Energiprischok og disses kortsigtede makroøkonomiske effekter i en lille åben 
økonomi. 1984. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 8, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1985. 
 
24. Bodil Olai Hansen: Efficiensproblemer under ubegrænset tidshorisont. Del 1+2. 1985. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 9, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1985. 
 
25. Peter Birch Sørensen: Stabilization Policy in an Inflationary Economy. Essays in Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy. Del 1+2. 1985 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 10, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1985. 
 
26. Lars Otto: En analyse af produktionsmulighederne i fremstillingserhverv. 1986. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 11, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1986. 
 
27. Fredrik Pitzner-Jørgensen: COMECON-samarbejdet - modeller for praktisk planlægning for et 
system af økonomier. 1986. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 12, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1986. 
 
28. Leif Hasager: National Economic Planning. 1987. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 13, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1987. 
 
 
29. Paul Bruniche-Olsen: Mobilitet og tilpasninger på arbejdsmarkedet. 1987. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 14, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1987. 
 
30. Jesper Munksgaard Pedersen: LINRAT - en energirationeringsmodel for Danmark. 1987. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 15, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1987. 
 
31. Tage Vosbein: Udvalgte områder af økonomisk reform i Kina 1978 til 1985. 1987. (Upubl.). 
 
32. Hans Aage: Eksempler på anvendt makroteori. December 1987. 
Publ.: Blå memoer nr. 50 (1976), 59 (1977), 123 (1984), 142 (1986 ) Københavns Universitets 
Økonomiske Institut. Desuden indgår et antal upublicerede manuskripter og 
konferenceindlæg i afhandlingen. 
 
33. Karsten Albæk: En økonomisk analyse af lære- og praktik-pladsproblemet. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 16, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1988. 
 
34. Klavs Lindeneg: Planlægning og decentralisering af økonomisk aktivitet, 1988. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 17, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1988. 
 
35. Agnete Raaschou-Nielsen: Institutionel ændring og økonomisk teori, 1988. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 18, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1988. 
 
36. Michael Teit Nielsen: Expectations and Learning in an Overlapping Generations Economy, 1989. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 19, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1989. 
 
37. Hans Jørgen Jacobsen og Christian Schultz: Arbejdsløshed i markedsøkonomier. 
Licentiatafhandlingen består af: 
1. Indledning. (Upubl). 
2. "Inefficiency of Unemployment Allocations", en revideret udgave heraf "Decreasing 
Unemployment Increases Welfare", publ. i Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 
94(3), 1992. 
3. "A General Equilibrium View of Unemployment". I R. Lund and P. Pedersen eds.: 
"Unemployment: Theory, Policy and Structure", Walter de Gruyter and Co., Berlin, 
New York, 1987. 
4. "A Macro Model of Conjectural Equilibrium". Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
vol. 88(3), 1986. 
5. "On the Existence of Conjectural Equilibria with a priori Chosen Rationing 
Patterns". European Economic Review 31, 1987. 
6. Jacobsen, H.J. and C. Schultz: "A General Equilibrium Macro Model with Wage 
Bargaining". Discussion Paper 87-05, Institute of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen, en revideret udgave er kommet med samme titel i Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics, vol. 92(3), 1990. 
7. Jacobsen , H.J. and C. Schultz: "Unemployment and Economic Policy in a General 
Equilibrium Model with Decentralized Wage Bargaining". Upub., en revideret  udg. 
heraf er: "Wage Bargaining and Unemployment in a General Equilibrium Model", 
Discussion Paper 89-01, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 
 
38. Bent E. Sørensen: 4 Essays on Econometric Estimation of Economic and Financial Models. 1990. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 20, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1990. 
 
39. Lars Haagen Pedersen: Intertemporal Optimization & Investment. June 1991. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 21, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1991. 
 
40. Flemming Christensen: Topics in Cooperative Game Theory. December 1991. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 22, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1991. 
 
41. Sven Wunder: Dutch Disease theory and the case of Colombia. Februar 1992. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 23, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1992. 
 
42. Niels Buus Kristensen: Lønstrukturens udvikling på funktionærområdet i Danmark. Februar 
1992. Publ.: Rød serie nr. 24, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1992. 
 
43. Jørgen Ravn Elkjær: Entreprenører, markeder og hierarkier. Februar 1992. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 25, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1992. 
 
44. Eskil Heinesen: Makroøkonomiske rationeringsmodeller baseret på aggregering af mikro-
markeder: Teori og estimation. Juni 1992. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 26, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1992. 
 
45. Birgitte Sloth: Topics in Non-cooperative Game Theory: Fictitious Play and Majority Voting. 
November 1992. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 27, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1992. 
 
46. Finn Tarp: Stabilization and Structural Adjustment: Macroeconomic Frameworks for 
Analysing the Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Udkommet på forlaget Routledge, 1993). 
 
47. Henrik Dan Lando: Six Essays on Unemployment Theory, Flexibility Preference and Financial 
Contracts. Januar 1993. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 28, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1993. 
 
48. Lisbeth Funding la Cour: Divisia Monetary Aggregates for Denmark: Theory, Construction and 
Empirical Performance. Februar 1993. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 29, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1993. 
49. Sverrir Sverrisson: The Economic Interdependence between the Industrial and the Developing 
Countries - the Channels of Transmission. Juni 1993. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 30, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1993. 
 
50. Christian Hansen: Uddannelse som produktionsfaktor - formelle uddannelsers betydning 
for økonomien i 1980'erne. (Udkommet på Institut for Grænseregionsforskning). Oktober 1993. 
51. Lasse Møller: Rent Seeking. Juni 1994. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 31, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1994. 
 
52. Ulrika Enemark: An Economic Analysis of Increased Patient Autonomy in Primary Health 
Care. August 1994. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 32, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1994. 
 
53. Jens Leth Hougaard: Six Essays on Performance Evaluation. August 1994. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 33, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1994. 
 
54. Lisbeth Pedersen: Løndannelse og løntransmission - en analyse af arbejderlønninger i 
Danmark. (Udkommet på Socialforskningsinstituttet, København). December 1994. 
 
55. Karsten Nimb Pedersen: Empiriske makromodeller for det mellemlange sigt. September 1994. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 34, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1994. 
 
56. Martin Rasmussen: Labor unions and international trade. December 1994. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 35, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1994. 
 
57. Jens Bonke: Faktotum - husholdningernes produktion. 1994. 
Publ.: Udkommet på Socialforskningsinstituttet, København, 1995. 
 
58. Ebbe Hendon: Fictitious Play in Games and Lower Probabilities in Decision Theory. 1994. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 37, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, december 1995. 
 
59. Torben Tranæs: Essays on Games and Decisions. 1994. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 40, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, januar 1996. 
 
60. Peter Fristrup: Social Choice - Implementering og Manipulering. Maj 1995. 
 
61. Anders Holm: Unemployment and Education. Micro and Macro Empirical Evidence. August 
1995. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 38, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1996. 
 
62. Peter Stephensen: General Equilibrium and Growth. September 1995. 
63. Henrik Hansen: Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive models: Theory, Applications and 
Software. November 1995. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 36, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1995. 
 
64. Hans Christian Kongsted: Dynamic Models of Foreign Trade under Fluctuating Exchange Rates: 
Theoretical and Empirical Applications. December 1995. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 39, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1996. 
 
65. Henning Bjerregård Bach: Lønmodtageres mobilitet og mobilitet på arbejdsmarkedet.  
Januar 1996. 
 
66. Trine Bille Hansen: Kulturøkonomiske studier - Økonomiske metoder vedrørende 
ressourceallokering til kultur- og fritidsaktiviteter. Juli 996. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 41, Københavns Universitets Økonomiske Institut, 1996. 
 
67. Lars Gårn Hansen : Aspects of Designing Institutions for Environmental Regulation. April 1997. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 42, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1997. 
 
68. Peter Hjertholm: An Inquiry Into the Fiscal Dimension of External Debt: The Case of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Juni 1997. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 43, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1997. 
 
69. Karsten Stæhr: Six Essays on Wages, Price Inflation, and Stabilization Policies. Juni 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 44, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1998. 
 
70. Jonathan Rubin: Econometric Studies of a European Economic and Monetary Union. September 
1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 45, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1998. 
 
71. Morten Binder: Aktiv arbejdsmarkedspolitik og økonomisk marginalisering - en teoretisk 
analyse af den aktive arbejdsmarkedspolitiks langsigtede virkninger på ledighedens størrelse og 
fordeling. Oktober 1997. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 55, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1999. 
 
72. Mette Wier: Vækst, struktur og miljø - 6 bidrag til makroøkonomisk miljømodeludvikling. 
December 1997. 
Udgivet af Danmarks Miljøundersøgelser 1998. 
 
73. Kim Martin Lind: Sectoral Models For Producers’ Long and Short Run Behaviour Applied 
to Danish Pig Production: Construction, Estimation and Testing. August 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 46, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1998. 
 
74. Torsten Sløk: Essays in Policy-oriented Macroeconomics. September 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 47, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1998. 
 
75. Claus Thustrup Hansen: Imperfections in Commodity and Labour Markets – a Macroeconomic 
Approach. Oktober 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 48, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut. 1998. 
 
76. Peter Lyk-Jensen: Essays in Collusive and Co-operative Auction Procedures. Oktober 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 49, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut. 1998. 
 
77. Niels Vestergaard: Property Rights Based Regulation of Fishery: Applications and Theory. 
Oktober 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 50, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1998. 
 
78. Lill Thanning Hansen: Endogenous Growth Theory: Essays on Optimal Policy, Market 
Imperfections and Fertility. November 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 51, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1998. 
 
79. Tove Christensen: Topics in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics with Emphasis on 
Uncertainty and Irreversibility. December 1998. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 52, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1998. 
 
80. Trine Filges: Labour Unions and Unemployment. Januar 1999. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 53, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1999. 
 
81. Thomas Bue Bjørner: Transport Demand and Environmental Regulation in the Transport 
Sector. Januar 1999. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 54, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1999. 
 
82. Birthe Larsen: Unemployment in Search Equilibrium. Maj 1999. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 60, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1999. 
 
83. Lise Nielsen: Forhandlinger i åbne og lukkede økonomier. Juni 1999. (Upubl.). 
 
84. Poul Schou: Endogenous Growth, Nonrenewable Resources and Environmental Problems. 
August 1999. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 56, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1999. 
 
85. Anne Kaag Andersen: Location and Commuting. November 1999. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 57, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 1999. 
 
 
86. Jacob Vastrup: Essays on Policy Related Issues in Macroeconomics. December 1999. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 61, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
87. Jens Hauch: Environmental Regulation and Nordic Energy Markets: An Economic 
Simulation Approach. Februar 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 58, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
88. Rasmus Heltberg: Institutions in Rural Development: Property Rights and Natural 
Resources. Februar 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 59, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
89. Clara M.D. Jørgensen: On the I(2) Cointegration Model. Oktober 1999. 
Publ. Rød serie nr. 66, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
90. Jacob Gyntelberg: Essays in Corporate Finance and Contract Theory. Marts 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 62, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
91. Lars Jebjerg: Regulation. Agency Problems in Regulation. Marts 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 63, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
92. Lars Even Rasmussen: Local Housing Markets with Partial Rent Control. Marts 2000. (Upubl.). 
 
93. Henrik Klinge Jacobsen: Structural Change of the Economy, Technological Progress and 
Long-Term Energy Demand. April 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 64, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
94. Jens Anders Kovsted: Topics in Development Economics. Financial Sector, Child Health, 
and Reconstruction from War. April 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 65, København. Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
95. Frank M. Rasmussen: Essays in International Trade and Labor Market Flexibility. Juni 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 67, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
96. Mogens Jensen: Essays in Non-cooperative Game Theory, Evolutionary Learning and 
Signalling Games. Maj 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 69, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
97. Mette Ejrnæs: Topics in Microeconometrics: Panel Data and Repeated Cross Sections. 
Juni 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 68, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
 
98. Jesper Jensen: Economic Analyses of Carbon Abatement Policies. September 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 70, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
99. Søren Kyhl: Five Essays on Imperfections in Economics. September 2000. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 71, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2000. 
 
100. Anders S. Hoffmann: Imperfect Competition, Multinational Firms and Economic Policy. Maj 
2001. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 72, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2001. 
 
101. Klaus Skytte: Topics on Electricity Trade. Juni 2001. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 73, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2001. 
 
102. Martin Kjeldsen-Kragh: Vintage Capital and Replacement Echoes. Februar  2001. (Upubl.) 
 
103. Morten Igel Lau: Choice over Time: Individual Discount Rates and Dynamic Life Cycle Models. 
September 2001. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 74, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2001. 
 
104. Claes Bengtsson: Voters, Politicians, and Game Theory: Some Theoretical and Empirical 
Results. November 2001. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 75, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2001. 
 
105. Jacob Lester: Essays in Capital Structure Theory and Financial Markets. November 2001. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 76, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2001. 
 
106. Anders Tauber Lassen : Essays in Finance: An International Term Structure Model and 
Optimal Choice and Asset Prices in a Monetary Economy. December 2001. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 77, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
107. Claus Chr. Pörtner: Children and Household Behaviour in Developing Countries. December 
2001. Publ.: Rød serie nr. 78, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
108. Toke Ward Petersen: Uncertainty, Indivisibility and Hyperbolic Preferences in Computable 
General Equilibrium Models. Januar 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 79, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
109. Uffe Nielsen: Essays in Environment and Development Economics. April 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 80, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
110. David Dreyer Lassen: Essays in the Political Economy of Public Finance. Juni 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 81, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
111. Jacob Nielsen Arendt: Essays in Applied Micro-Econometrics: Socio-Economic Differences in 
Health. Juni 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 82, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
112. Signe Krarup: Voluntary Agreements in Energy Regulation. September 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 83, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
113. Torben Mark Pedersen: Business Cycles and Economic Growth. Februar 2002. (Upubl.) 
 
114. Martin Junker Nielsen: Five Essays on Commodity Pricing, Irreversible Investments, 
Convertible Bonds, and the Liquidation of Bad Loans. Oktober 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 84, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
115. Søren Arnberg: Empirical Studies of Agricultural Land Allocation. Oktober 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 85, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2002. 
 
116. Chantal Pohl Nielsen: Supply-Side Issues in Developing Country Agriculture: Constraints and 
Opportunities. December 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 86, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
117. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven: Taxation, Time Allocation, and Economic Efficiency. Januar 2003. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 87, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
 
118. Carl-Johan Dalgaard: Growth and Inequality of Nations. September 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 88, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
119. Søren Leth-Petersen: Empirical Studies of Micro Data on Residential Energy Demand. 
Februar 2003. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 89, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
120. Tim V. Bedsted: A Dynamic Analysis of the Costs of Dementia in Denmark. Februar 2003. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 90, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
121. Ole Kveiborg: Regulating Road Transport Using Mechanism Design. April 2003. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 91, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
122. Martin Kaae Jensen: Balanced Growth, Dynamic Stability, and the Turnpike. September 2002. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 92, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
123. Lina Wøhlk Olsen: Essays on Georg Rasch and his contributions to statistics. Maj 2003. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 93, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
124. Ninette Pilegaard: Essays in Transport and the Economy. Juni 2003. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 94, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
125. Kasper Pasternak Jørgensen: Aspects of Innovation and Innovative Industries. September 
2003. Publ.: Rød serie nr. 95, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
126. Anne Møller Danø: Empirical Studies of Individual Labour Market Behaviour and 
Health. November 2003. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 96, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2003. 
 
127. Lars Pico Geerdsen: Marginalisation Processes in the Danish Labour Market. Januar 2003. 
Publ.: Rapport nr. 03:24, Socialforskningsinstituttet, 2003. 
 
128. Edith Madsen: Unit Roots and Cointegration in Panel Data Models. Februar 2004. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 97, Københavns Universitet Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
129. Heino Bohn Nielsen: I(1) and I(2) Cointegration Analysis: Theory and Applications. 
Februar 2004. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 98, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
130. Henning Tarp Jensen: CGE Modeling, Income Distribution and Agricultural Development with 
a Focus on Mozambique and Vietnam. Marts 2004. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 99, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
131. Lars Peter Østerdal: Topics in Game Theory and Health Economics. April 2004. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 100, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
132. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen: Essays on Financial Factors in Economic Development. Marts 
2004. Publ.: Rød serie nr. 101, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
133. Stine Grenaa Jensen: Promoting Renewable Energy Technologies. Juni 2004. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 102, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
134. Thomas Harr: Essays in Banking Regulation and Financial Crises. April 2004. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 103, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
135. Jacob L. Weisdorf: On the Road to Riches: Aspects of Economic and Demographic 
Growth from the Stone Age and Beyond. Juli 2004. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 104, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
 
136. Andreas Koch: Five Essays on Economic Theory: Complexity and Coordination. 
November 2004. Publ.: Rød serie nr. 105, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2004. 
137. Paul Lassenius Kramp: Topics in Asymmetric Information and Cascades. Januar 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 106, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
138. Kristian Schultz Hansen: Using Disability-Adjusted Life Years and Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis to Define Priorities for the Public Health Care Sector in Zimbabwe. Februar 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 107, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
139. Morten Marott Larsen: Essays in Regional and Transport Economics. April 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 108, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
140. Jesper J. Kühl: Microeconomic Studies on Risk, Poverty and Climate Change. Maj 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 109, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
141. John Rand: Studies in Economic Development: Business Cycles, Economic Structure and 
Enterprise Dynamics. Juni 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 110, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
142. Mette Lunde Christensen: Essays in Empirical Demand Analysis: Evidence from Panel Data.  
Juni 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 111, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
143. Jesper Gregers Linaa: Business Cycles and Monetary Policy. September 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 112, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
144. Søren Gaard: Labor Market Dynamics in Macroeconomics. Juni 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 113, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
145. Anne Dyrberg Rommer: Accounting-based Credit-scoring Models: Econometric Investigations. 
November 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 114, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
146. Steen Winther Blindum: Strict Exogeneity and Nonlinear Panel Data Models with Unobserved 
Heterogeneity. November 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 115, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2005. 
 
147. Kasper Meisner Nielsen: Corporate Governance and Performance in Firms with Concentrated 
Ownership. December 2005. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 116, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2006. 
 
148. Mette Knudsen: Essays on the Distribution of Incomes: Effects of Monetary, Financial and 
International Trade Policies. Januar 2006. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 117, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2006. 
149. Mette Gørtz: Leisure, Household Production, Consumption and Economic Well-being. Maj 
2006. Publ.: Rød serie nr. 118, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2006. 
 
150. Jens Erik Nielsen: Essays in the Economics of Transport. Marts 2007. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 119, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2007. 
 
151. Elisabeth Hermann Frederiksen: Inquiries into Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and 
Labor Allocation. Maj 2007. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 120, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2007. 
 
152. Mikkel Barslund: Microeconometric Applications in Development Economics. June 2007. 
Publ.: PhD Series no. 121, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2008. 
 
153. Martin Junge: Three Essays in Applied Economics: Social Insurance. September 2007. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 122, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2007. 
 
154.  Birgitte Gersfelt: Developing Country Agriculture and International Trade: Impact and Future 
Challenges.  April 2007. 
Publ.: Rød serie nr. 123, Københavns Universitet. Økonomisk Institut, 2007. 
 
155. Thomas Jensen: Topics in Political Economy: Voting, Elections, and Terrorism. 
November 2007. 
Publ.: PhD Series no. 124, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008. 
 
156. Niels Arne Dam: Essays on Price Formation, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy. April 2008. 
Publ.: PhD Series no. 125, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008. 
 
157. Steffen Andersen: Individual Preferences and Choice Behavior:  From the Laboratory to the 
Field. August 2007. (Upubl.). 
 
158. Cecilie Dohlmann Weatherall: Education at Workplaces: Long-Term Unemployment, Wages 
and Enrolment. September 2007. 
Publ.: PhD Series no. 126, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008. 
 
159. Bertel Schjerning: Dynamic Aspects of Entrepreneurial Behavior. April 2008. 
Publ.: PhD Series no. 127, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008. 
 
160. Sinne Smed: Empirical studies on "Health, Information and Consumer Behaviour". September 
2008. Publ.: PhD Series no. 128, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008. 
 
 
 
160. Helene Bie Lilleør: Uncertain Returns and Children's Schooling in Tanzania. Oktober 2008. 
Publ.: PhD Series no. 129, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008. 
 
PhD Series (formerly Rød serie) 
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen 
 
A list of previously published issues is found in earlier volumes, or at: 
http://www.econ.ku.dk/Research/Publications/red/red.default.asp 
 
 
124. Thomas Jensen: Topics in Political Economy: Voting, Elections, and Terrorism. 
(November 2007). 2008. 
 
125. Niels Arne Dam: Essays on Price Formation, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy. 
(April 2008). 2008. 
 
126. Cecilie Dohlmann Weatherall: Education at Workplaces: Long-Term Unemployment, 
Wages and Enrolment. (September 2007). 2008. 
 
127. Bertel Schjerning: Dynamic Aspects of Entrepreneurial Behavior. (April 2008). 2008. 
 
128. Sinne Smed: Empirical studies on "Health, Information and Consumer Behaviour". 
(September 2008). 2008. 
 
129. Helene Bie Lilleør: Uncertain Returns and Children's Schooling in Tanzania.  
(Oktober 2008). 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
